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Founders Fund on Truth-Seeking, Taiwan, and Whether You Can Still Beat the S&P | Ep. 53

Uncapped with Jack Altman · 1h 11m · transcribed Jul 2026
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Section Insights

# 0:00

The Importance of Directional Truth

Why is being directionally true more important than being exactly true?

It's crucial to focus on directional truth to shift strategies effectively, as many people moderate their approaches and fail to push hard enough for change.

  • Shifting the overtone window requires boldness.
  • Small adjustments can lead to significant impacts.
  • Moderation can hinder strategic progress.
# 0:01

Unique Culture at Founders Fund

What makes the culture at Founders Fund unique compared to other firms?

Founders Fund emphasizes truth-seeking over hierarchy, fostering an environment where every team member can contribute ideas and investments without the constraints of traditional corporate politics.

  • Truth-seeking is prioritized over hierarchy.
  • Organizational structures support open debate.
  • Investors are encouraged to have personal conviction in their deals.
# 0:03

Investment Mechanisms at Founders Fund

What are some unique investment mechanisms at Founders Fund?

The 1% mechanism allows team members to invest a portion of their earnings into deals they support, aligning incentives and measuring conviction among partners.

  • The 1% mechanism encourages personal investment.
  • It helps gauge conviction levels among investors.
  • Flexibility in participation respects individual financial situations.
# 0:10

Cultural Dynamics and Team Cohesion

How does Founders Fund maintain team cohesion despite heated debates?

The culture allows for passionate discussions while ensuring that team members care for one another, avoiding toxic politeness and fostering genuine relationships.

  • Healthy debate is encouraged without damaging relationships.
  • High emotional intelligence is crucial for team dynamics.
  • Candid discussions lead to better decision-making.
# 0:20

Challenges in Venture Capital

What are the challenges faced in the current venture capital landscape?

The venture capital environment is becoming increasingly competitive, with high valuations and unrealistic growth expectations, making it difficult to identify truly promising investments.

  • High valuations can distort investment decisions.
  • Investors must be cautious of unrealistic growth projections.
  • Historical performance is essential for evaluating potential.
# 0:30

The Future of Semiconductor Manufacturing

What are the current challenges in semiconductor manufacturing?

The U.S. has lost its edge in semiconductor fabrication, relying heavily on foreign manufacturers, which poses significant risks to national security and technological leadership.

  • U.S. semiconductor manufacturing needs revitalization.
  • Dependence on foreign fabs is a national security concern.
  • Investment in domestic capabilities is crucial.
# 0:40

Geopolitical Implications of Technology

How does technology intersect with geopolitical tensions?

The rise of China as a technological power presents challenges for the U.S., necessitating a strategic approach to maintain technological leadership and prevent potential conflicts.

  • Geopolitical strategy must align with technological development.
  • China's ambitions require careful monitoring.
  • Collaboration and competition shape the future landscape.
# 0:50

Investment Strategies in a Changing Market

How should investors adapt their strategies in a changing market?

Investors need to focus on micro-level opportunities and avoid macro-level speculation, ensuring they back companies with solid fundamentals and realistic growth trajectories.

  • Focus on micro opportunities rather than macro trends.
  • Backing companies with strong fundamentals is essential.
  • Avoid speculative investments based on market hype.
# 1:00

The Role of Robotics in Future Investments

What is the potential for robotics in future investments?

Robotics presents significant opportunities, but investors remain cautious about humanoid robots, focusing instead on vertical-specific applications that demonstrate clear value.

  • Robotics is a promising investment area.
  • Vertical-specific applications are preferred over humanoid robots.
  • Clear value propositions are essential for investment.

Transcript

0:00 It is less important to be exactly true than it is to be directionally true because it's really hard to shift the overtone window. Most people are like they try to like sort of moderate their approach to something. Because of that, they're not directionally pulling hard enough to shift any strategy. Whereas, I think Peter is just like, I'm going to get like super I'm going to dig in my heels on this and just to move the window >> just to move the window a little bit.

0:24 And that tiny adjustment that ends up being made is really powerful. >> All right. Well, very excited for this. What a crew we have here. Delian, you excited to be here? >> Oh, yeah. >> Yeah. I've been looking forward to this for a while. >> In the lines, end zen. >> 100%. It's It's going to be hard. And train. >> Oh, sorry. Tiger den. >> The tiger den. Yeah, that's right. >> Can we run that back?

0:46 >> That was a lot of discombobulating commentary. >> We got to try to We're going to try to have a serious conver. going to be this whole 2 hours. >> No. And I got to do this with Trey and that was amazing. So, we wanted to bring it all together. My first question is actually for EV and we're going to start in a really positive place. We really respect what you guys have done and what you do as a firm. I hope that's the same. But E, you've worked at both.

1:07 You've talked a bunch about like what makes Benchmark unique. I've obviously gotten to hear a lot about that from you, but I'd be curious for you to talk about what you loved about Founders Fund. Maybe compare it a little bit to like what's different from other places, maybe Benchmark, but I'd just be curious for you to start here. I think when people that aren't in the investing business think about what investors do and like what the day-to-day or like what an investment committee looks like within a venture firm or any investing firm. I think they have this this idea in their head that like you know the team comes together. They've done a bunch of research. they've done a bunch of work and they have this like very intellectually honest debate about the merits and considerations of the investment and like weighing the riskreward and then coming to some like intellectually perfect decision about that investment given all the information that they've gathered and that's just like not how basically any firm actually operates. There's so many other you know politics or organizational structures and incentives that like push you away from this like truth-seeking place. And so I think the the really unique thing about Founders Fund that that when I came in I thought was just so amazing and unique was like not only that it was like a culture that bought like truly bought into the like process of truth seeeking and like really putting like truth seeeking on a pedestal above like you know the the hierarchy of who's a GP and who's not a GP or any of these other things. But then also there was like even like organizational incentives and structures in place to like keep that the same basically no matter who was you know in the halls of of founders fund.

2:35 so the one that that I've I've I've mentioned before is this like 1% you know, like the 1% mechanism or provision or whatever whatever it's called, which is for any investment that you do at Founders Fund, 1% of that investment on a dollar basis is set aside for the people that worked on the investment to basically angel invest up to 1% of the total dollar amount. and it's not just like some, you know, workplace benefit. The entire idea of that mechanism is to basically measure the conviction of the partners or the investors that are sponsoring a given investment. And so >> you still do that?

3:09 >> Yeah. >> Like if somebody doesn't want to do it, are you is that like a thing? >> No, I I think like it's it's really important to be mindful to liquidity constraints obviously like you know people on the team have very different personal financial situations. so it's not super prescriptive, but it is like a useful tuning because you don't have to do the full 1%. you you can split it up between the different parties working on the deal or you can say like, "Hey, I have five grand or whatever that I I want to put towards this. It's not a signal lack of conviction. It's just like based on liquidity.

3:42 >> I think it's more helpful like on an individual comparative basis. Like if you're known for doing lots of 1% and on this one you're choosing not to, people will ask. But it's like if you typically don't and then don't, that's not necessarily a signal. Are there any other like incentive aligning mechanisms like this that you guys have going >> or what would you I guess what would you two ascribe obviously you've been at founders fund much longer than than I was. What would you ascribe and do you agree that like the the thing about tr seeeking kind of being like the highest calling of of the team and like what do you ascribe that to if it's cultural if there's organizational things that lead to it?

4:12 >> You know when I first joined Founders Fund as you guys know like I I didn't have any interest in venture capital. I just ended up there because Peter basically told me that I was going to do it and I wasn't clear that I had an option. >> >> I love that. That's the best kind of recruiting process. >> Yeah. >> And so I when I showed up I I kind of didn't know what I was doing and I had this like hypothesis that venture capital was going to be more like what you said. It's like this diligence exercise and you meet with hundreds of companies a year and you know you do like a deep process on each of them and the hard part is making the literal investment decision. It's like not what it is at all. It's like there are tens of thousands of companies that are raising at any given point. 99% of them are obviously knowably bad within a second. And so really it's about access and finding the super high conviction things that you want to pour your energy into. And I think that's like really what makes Founders Fund unique is that we're just very internally honest about that. And if you're not personally super high conviction, I really want to do this deal. I'm going to fight for it.

5:21 I'm going to be willing to argue. I'm going to be willing to like put my reputation on the line disagreeing with Peter. If you're not willing to do that, you're just never going to get a deal done. And so that's really all it is at the end of the day. >> Yeah. I I spent a little bit of time early in like my venture career in KV. And one of the things that I find very uniquely different between you sort of the two models is at FF so much more of what we do and I'd have to look at on like a dollars basis or dealc count basis but there's so much more that I feel like like sort of rises from below if that makes sense where it's like individual team members that have like you know sort of really strong conviction and then are steadily presenting that case to other colleagues and working their way up and then you know at FF still every check above a meaningful size requires Peter's approval but it's almost always like that person steadily you know sort of gaining conviction and convincing others and then eventually presenting that case to Peter much more so than like top down Peter saying like we need to go invest into you know sort of this thing and I think that creates some like truth seeeking by default because there's such high like activation barrier of Peter's got many things going on Trey's got many things going on and so if you're going to take up yes of their time especially because like venture is not the only thing that they do you're going to want to have a really compelling case as to why versus at other places where like the GP PS are really full-time only investing GPS. I find that they also like are the ones leading a lot of the investments, you know, sort of themselves, which I feel like that's like less the case at FF. The incentive thing is interesting. Like I feel like one of the things I've noticed here that Ev and I have talked about is that like because there's sort of like nothing at benchmark to fight like everybody's equal. You're never going to get, you know, a promotion. You're never going to get a raise. And so because a lot of that stuff is stripped out, it leads there to be sort of nothing other than just try to make good investments and try to help your teammates make good investments versus I think at a lot of big firms that gets like harder because there are other competing interests that people have. But I think Founders Fund seems to have avoided a bunch of that through a lot of these sort of mechanisms that we're talking about like you know there's the 1% thing there's the fact that like a lot of senior people are like crazy busy but I also feel like you guys have a cultural thing where there seems to be something to it like I think you know EB's talked about how like you know at a founders fund partner meeting people can like get pretty heated over ideas or even maybe at each other but like somehow at the end like everybody still like really likes and cares about each other which I think is like the inverse of that which is like ruinous empathy or sort of just like toxic collegiality that I think is much more common where people like >> everyone's very polite >> very polite and then after the meeting they're like look at that idiot like I can't believe he thought that >> I just think the EQ of the team isn't high enough to be able to operate in that way >> we just got a little sprinkle of it and so as a result we everybody just says what they think and moves on.

8:02 >> Yeah because I just don't think people are tuned to even understand how the things they say have like an emotional impact on other people. super high EQ person not work particularly well at Founders Fund. >> Either that or they'd be like really good at manipulating the take full >> one or the other. I'm not really sure. It could go either way. >> They'd never know. >> They never know. Yeah. Exactly. Actually, can I ask what what is like Peter's interpersonal sort of what what's the experience because I think he like I could imagine you sort of saying this in either direction, but he clearly is deeply attuned to people in some important way. Is this thing you're describing about EQ is that related to him? Is it different from him? Because obviously, you know, when you have a founder of a firm, of course, like a lot of the DNA is going to to go through it, but like does much of this kind of come from from him? One of the things that he said to me very early on, we were talking about having kids and, you know, what we wanted for our kids and stuff and, we were talking about like intellect as being like one of these things that you as a parent think about wanting for your kid. And, he said something to the like along the lines of, I think like 130 is like roughly the right IQ because anything over 130 there are too many trade-offs. and I think that's like sort of you're like you're not hiring people for their EQ or lack thereof. You're hiring people to have really high IQ that are able to hold their own hold their own in these debates. And the reality is it's like when you do that, there are trade-offs, >> right?

9:31 >> And so we're kind of experiencing the result of those trade-offs anytime. >> Too smart for your own good. >> Yeah. Or or maybe it's exactly for everyone's good. because we don't have these like weird harbored politics and animosity. At least I don't feel I've never felt >> before the pod told me that he can't stand you, but other than that, I think it's all everyone likes each other. >> Of all people, I think Delian and I are very cool with one another.

9:53 I I think like Peter deeply understands people but like from like an intellectual framework level like I think he's very good at like quickly understanding where is somebody biased where do they have blind spots like you know what are they good at what are they not good at in terms of like how his words will have like xyz emotional impact like you know you know Trey said yeah I think that you know sort of poor but I think when it comes to like deciding on whether or not to make an investment it's actually much better to understand I think somebody's intellectual capabilities versus the like emotional impact side of it and >> I I think also right now is probably amongst the best cultural states it's been in in the time that at least I've been there. But then even from the like history that I've heard and I think there's a variety of reasons as to why that is. But definitely one of them is if you like look at the you know call it median age or median tenure of somebody on the team. It's probably something on the order of like seven or eight years u which is I think reasonably high relative to most years at a venture firms you know amongst a spread of you know call 12 people that are there.

10:49 >> Has the culture gone through like ups and downs? I mean, you've been there a long time. >> Oh, for sure. >> And do you think it matters? Like, maybe ask more accurately, what do you think the impact is of like good and bad cultures at various points in time? Because obviously you can make a great investment in the context of a terrible culture and vice versa. >> Primarily, it's like can you retain the people that you have that are doing a good job. I think that's like ultimately the thing because you're right, like you could have, you know, Bridgewwater as like an example, like great performance, but I think it's a really hard place to work for a long period of time. Yeah, that's sort of the trade-off that you're making at some of these funds. It's usually not like a systemic problem. It's usually like they're individuals inside of these systems that tend to sort of like buck against what the general expectation is from the team for like what they signed up for, if that makes sense.

11:38 >> and then when they feel like there's been some sort of violation, things get, you know, they get dicey. when I first came into Founders Fund, it was definitely like people were kind of in their offices staying very quiet, staying away from each other, and you know, I was walking through the halls trying to give people high fives and they were like, "What's going on right now? This is really weird." But then like things got really collegial and you know, it yeah, it kind of goes in waves depending on how people are vibing, how we're like adding to the team, whether or not we're like exiting rapidly when people aren't working out.

12:12 and just being like really honest with ourselves about what we want in the long run. >> You know, I was just thinking as you were saying that like you obviously worked really closely with Keith for a long time and then you didn't. And I'm actually interested to hear, we've never talked about this, but like what are your reflections on like you had this like sort of like apprentice relationship for I don't know what it was, five, seven years a half years, six years. Yeah.

12:35 >> You're kind of like doing your own now, you know, with him going back to KOA. Has that been like seamless and smooth? Like do you reflect on that all a lot because I think it's like it was like an uncommonly sort of tight apprenticeship model. You don't see it all the time. >> Yeah. Yeah, I mean obviously like single biggest influence I've ever had on like you know sort of my you know sort of career and I think that'll be the probably the case for the rest of my life because it's just like there's nothing that compares to those like early period where it was like he was the only person that I basically like you know sort of worked with for like a really extended period of time versus now even though like Trey and I worked together a lot it doesn't compare to like yeah >> I'm also not spending 12 hours a day you know with Trey even like when we're most you know sort of collaborative there's always this like talking point that I give to founders or investors which is within an operating company there are actually like a like decent set of constraints that you have to you know sort of live by which is like you have to like serve your customers, you have to like fund raise, you have to actually hire talent etc. And so if you were to like examine the cultures of Anderrol and Varta as an example, there's for sure differences but in the grand scheme of like distribution curves, they're like probably not that different relative to the distribution curve that you see in venture because in venture there's effectively only like one rule which is like IRRa and make money and then the rest is sort of like totally free form. And so if you were to compare the like benchmark versus FF cultures, my guess would be that you would see way more differences in that versus like XYZ to you know sort of top tier you know basically startups would actually be much more you know sort of similar. I do think that seeing Keith operate in these different environments like very you know sort of closely with him. I do think like my, you know, sort of net reflection on it and I think he would agree with this is like I do think his work style, personality, how he likes to do things actually just does fit into how KV's culture, etc. like operates a lot better than I think it did like at FF. I'm not sure that that would have been obvious without actually like literally doing what he did and in some ways like sampling the two. And I do think also him coming over to FF helped fix some of the things that he wanted to get fixed at KV. So I think actually like the whole process and outcome was like the best for everyone all around.

14:30 Obviously now not working with him like day in day out is like an interesting experience where it definitely like you know took me some time and I remember you know Trey and I went on this like super long walk maybe like a week after it was you know sort of clear that's where you know sort of things were headed. It had already steadily been happening over the prior year or two where I was doing more deep tech I was doing more you know sort of art of things which are very not the like fintech etc type of things. The thing that made me comfortable with in some way staying was actually looking back at the prior year of investments and realizing like of the people that like I worked with on like votes on a deal check the prior year was actually 80% Trey and Scott Nolan >> and it was only like 20% Keith and so I was like oh well like I'm already you know sort of doing this job >> out of the wing.

15:05 >> Yeah. Yeah. I'm out of the wing already basically. >> The other thing that's worth mentioning about this is that like Keith stylistically is like a really good coach or mentor because he's very hands-on. He's he like he wants to do updates. He wants to, you know, get in the weeds with how something is going. That's like the opposite of really Peter and myself. Like we're not like that at all. Like I I think I'm a terrible >> lead. Like I'm I'm a bad I I don't mean lead investor. I mean like board manager. Yeah. I'm like I'm not I'm not a good board member. I'm not a good manager. I'm not a good mentor. I just like I'm not wired.

15:44 >> Are you sure that that means not a good board member? because I think a lot of great board members are I I agree about the manager thing, but >> I think it depends on what you're looking for out of a board member. If you're looking for someone that's like going to get their hands dirty and like help you with things tactically, then it's probably I'm probably not going to be very good at that. if it's, you know, protect the the founder and be an advocate for the founder and stay out of the way and don't create unnecessary friction, well, yeah, that I'm I'm great at that. I'm great at not creating additional friction. but I I think that like it's just like stylistically super different. Delian will reach out to me and be like, "Hey, there's a company that I would like your read on or there's a question that I have that's hyper tactical." But like am I going to reach out to Delian and be like, "Let's review.

16:26 >> Am I going to reply to that email or not?" >> I don't know. I'm just like, it's just not it's not me. And and I think that maybe you got to the point where the thing that you legitimately got in in droves from Keith was not something that made sense in the long run. I I remember when I first started working with him, I would like describe it as like you get to like work with this person that's like one of the greatest of all time and he has this like knowledge tree through all the situations that he'd been with, the different business model, startups, founder conflict, like lawsuits, etc. In each situation that I get to like observe him in, I got to see like one branch of that tree and then as you get to observe him over the course of six years, you kind of actually create the metal layer tree and it's like this is the tree of knowledge that like works for Keith. And I've definitely like adapted a lot, right? like I would say like of my equivalent it's probably like 60 70% is probably like mostly overlap with Keith and then my 30% is mostly just the like I like a little bit more of the like hardwaryy like physicsy materials like those types of things but 70% of like how I get excited about a seed round how I operate with a founder afterwards like I definitely still largely take a little bit more of the Keith style like venture assistance role balanced with like you know I'm deeply involved with artist so like I maybe can't quite do what sometimes you know sort of Keith does in terms of like depth of involvement with companies but like They definitely take a different approach to it than like you know sort of Trey. Trey and Peter do.

17:41 >> Yeah. Like what you said about you know Keith fits beautifully at KV. He's like a particularly distinct personality. So maybe you see it more sharply with him. But I think like we probably all are great in one environment and terrible in another. It's probably, you know, there's people who are be an amazing founder for one thing, horrific for the next. I think so much of like life is like getting yourself into the place that you're supposed to be in. If I was at a venture fund where there was like an expectation that I take a board seat on the on the deals that I lead, like I would quit. Like there's just no way. I couldn't do it. I don't like being on boards at all. Even for companies that I started myself, >> even Monday partner meetings, if we had to do those, like if you told us partner >> Yeah. If we had to sit through like four or six hours of us like taking pitches all together and then discussing them all together and discussing the portfolio every single week, I think the entire founders fund team would quit.

18:31 Yeah. Do you not like the board member stuff because you think the board member theatrics or it's because you're like I made the investment and you should figure it out and I don't want to be part of like >> I've thought about this a lot. There are three things. Okay. >> The first reason I hate it is the board member theatrics. It's like people who >> it's exhausting. >> Who believe that somehow they are better at running the company than the founder and they like stand on a soap box and try to convince everyone in the room that they're really smart. I I I can't >> I hate when you say you like you're in a board meeting and like someone's there and they're like this. You could tell that they're like this is my Super Bowl.

19:00 Like I'm going to I'm about to show off. >> I'm about to show off. Exactly. Come on. >> And also like if we if you invested in the company, you should probably believe that the founders are the right people to run the company. Otherwise, you shouldn't have invested. So that's the first the first thing. The second thing is information density is at an all-time low. A pitch meeting I in 30 or 45 minutes I can like do a full dump of everything that I believe that I need to know. And if I have follow-up questions, I can do that asynchronously or whatever. But I can't tell you how many times I'm sitting in a board meeting that's like scheduled for 3 hours and it's like, "Dude, we could have done this in an email." Like, just tell me what the numbers are. Tell me what your struggles are. Yeah.

19:38 >> Answer a couple questions. Let's get >> And you think about how that three-hour meeting is. They had their whole exact team there. >> It's crazy how low the information density is. And then the third reason is that I don't actually think that I'm adding a lot of value. And I don't like being in situations where I don't feel like I'm adding a lot of value. And so when I sit through this thing where I like sponge up a bunch of information, maybe I like interject one or two things, it's like this is not only a waste of my time, it was a waste of everyone else's time to have me like sit here and pretend that I'm going to know the right things for you to do in all these moments.

20:12 >> Okay. So you don't want to do it, but do you think venture should have people who do want to do it and are engaged and do the whole board member thing or do you think the whole construct's wrong? >> At some stage, I think you you need to have governance. Like there should be a board that serves a function. I think these boards are pulled together way earlier than they should be. Like a series A company should not have a board. It's just really stupid. You know, what are you reporting on? Oh, we like built additional features into our product. It's like, who cares, dude?

20:43 It's like I don't >> I just I just do a series aboard me and they're like, "Yeah, we had a great month. I don't give a man." Like, >> I really don't care. It It's exhausting. There's almost a perfect correlation between the funds or people that think you should have a board at a seed or a series A and the type of people you don't want on your board long term. >> Okay. >> I think the core thing at FF is for a decent chunk, especially of the venture team, we're constantly comparing it against just going to go work on our own companies. And so I just think the venture the way we view venture is very different where it's like we are working on this because we're explicitly choosing to not work on the company and so this better be very high value relative to somebody who's doing it full-time that is like well I need to figure out some way of making myself feel valuable in this world and so board member theatrics is one way of feeling good about it. Well, then you you both have boards at Varda and at Enderol. Do you feel like you've been able to take these things that you really don't like about boards and like like would you how would you grade not to put you on the spot, but how would you like grade the work that you've done to make the boardroom advant and roll?

21:40 >> Massively condense information density. That's like the number one thing is that there's no such thing as a useful three-hour board meeting. It's like 90 minutes tops. >> only run through the most important stuff. obviously you can have additional materials if people want to dig in more deeply async. but keep it keep it really really tight at Andrew. One other thing is that the there only three board members, me, Palmer, and Brian. And we've controlled that. We don't want to have seven investors as board members because it just increases friction in a way that isn't actually useful for the company.

22:17 From the third point on like my ability to add value, I feel differently because what Delian said, which is that this is also like sort of my full-time job and like I actually feel like I am doing the things that are most valuable for me to be doing personally with the company a as chairman as you know a co-founder of the business. My biggest point of feedback to most companies is just on the information density side. It is crazy to schedule a two-hour board meeting or a three hour board meeting or four hour board meeting. I mean like if you can't do this in 60 to 90 minutes for an early stage company like what are we even doing? It's just absolutely out of control.

22:54 >> Tre is actually on like the you know sort of artboard so he can maybe you know sort of grade how you know sort of we do independent of my assessment of it. I do think early on we did a pretty decent job of yeah keeping it you know sort of very dense and now in the later stages there's almost sort of like I think of it as like three sections of the board meeting where because we have sort of completely different customer sets from our DO business and our pharma business we typically end up doing like a DO update and it's like basically just for Trey like no like because it's like I mean look it's like he's like one of the best DO people of all time and definitely way better than anybody else on the board by like many orders of magnitude and then even then we just did our last one yesterday and I'm sure Trey like midway through was just like we were asking like do you know this customer group do you know this and Trey's like Nope. Completely different than like where Andreal works and does etc. I can give like you know high level guidance but like you guys are the ones that know this is kind of what I imagine was going through you know sort of the back of your head.

23:39 >> We also did the whole thing in 30 minutes. >> Yeah it was 30 minutes so we like you know you know ran through it you know sort of quickly and then on pharma we do find it incredibly valuable some of our external boards including you know Samir from KV where there on any particular deal pharma asset etc. There's just so many dynamics that it's like actually honestly hard to have all of that internal expertise. and so there I actually find it like you know deeply valuable and then like third section is like ops finance etc. There it's like yeah it's where at our current stage of amount of capital raise deployment etc.

24:07 It is helpful to have like some external governance on like even down to just like founder comp, executive comp and just like you know you know getting external perspectives but >> this is another area where I would say benchmark and founders fund are like pretty opposite where you guys are like it's you know mo as much of the work as possible is on building. It's like in some ways the investing is like we'll do as much of it as we can but it's kind of competing with you know operating in a lot of ways versus at benchmark everything is designed so that there's literally nothing else to do but invest and like that's sort of like the goal almost is like Benchmark wants there to be nothing for the partners to do but make investments and work with those companies. You want it actually to be very hard to make investments and >> you want there to be lots of things that compete for your attention that aren't investments that are better things to >> do. Yeah. It's sort of like the being professional at anything. It's like if you're a professional baseball player, you're going to >> hit a lot in the batting cage. You're going to take a lot of ground balls because that's what you're being paid to do. It's like you have to do it. And so if you're a professional investor, you're going to feel like I have to be doing deals all the time. Now, the challenge is like having discipline around that because sometimes the right decision is not to invest. That's right.

25:12 And so if >> by the way, one good way to implement that is by saying if you want to make an investment, you have to be on the board for the next, you know, 10 years. >> I mean, I would never make an investment. I would just come out If I had to make that situation, >> you're going to pay 1,000x multiple >> on revenue and you're going to be on the board for 10 years. >> 2,000 hours of board meetups.

25:35 >> Delian, you said something recently that that did really resonate where it's just like the investing side of things should almost be like an exhaust or you see it almost as like a side hobby or like an exhaust of what you already do in your operating day-to-day job at Varta. And I do think that there's like even as like a mental framing I was trying to to frame that for myself and it's like in some ways like you know depending on like the stage of investing that you're doing like you could see your job as like I'm a researcher and I am a networker with this group of people whether it's like let's say you're in cyber security like cyber security experts or whatever and then the exhaust is that once in a while I do an investment. There's this investment that we were just talking about earlier that you guys met you sort of this week that we just led the seed round on that I think is like a like perfect example of this where it's just like I over the past couple years have just gotten deeply frustrated watching like cognitions and you know cursors out of the world completely transform how like a back-end software engineer at like a ramp or a meta or you know name your favorite software company you know significantly improve their productivity and then you just look at the sets of tools that we like use internally at Varta for our firmware engineers thermal modeling etc it's the same stuff that I was using in 2012 when I was building robots and it's like there's effectively no change like the software was like slightly updated but there's no improvement in productivity and so I just started spending a ton of time looking at all the tools in that category some are now later stage companies in our portfolio like nominal I think is one of these that was like an early you know sort of example of this but the one that you guys you know sort of met this week was this example of like I was just so frustrated that there's this like very roach manual work that our junior mechanical engineers do that felt like the classic type of thing that AI should clearly be able to not just like slightly improve the workflow on but completely remove and then was like I had probably met at that point maybe like 15 different companies that were like in this space frustrated by all them. I met like the 16th one and I was like great this is the one like it's just the best founder the best product the best idea and I was like I want to invest and it's like I partially like doing it because I like doing the early stage you know get 10% like you know start to be a little bit of like that founder coach but then I also specifically like it because it like solves a problem at work or another one that we like did together way back in the day that is just one that solves a problem personally is like we both did eight sleep together back in the day and it was not because like we like had some deep hypothesis on like mattress markets or anything like I'm so hot in the middle of the night.

27:47 >> I'm just so hot in the middle of the night and I'm just like I don't want this to happen anymore and this is a good product. And I remember at the time we were like we have no idea if this is going to be a good business but like it is a really good product and like typically over time good products turn into good businesses. >> My memory is that I actually was I was crapping all over this deal. I was like guys this is so dumb. Why are we investing in a mattress company? And I think it was Keith that actually said like just try it. and I like I slept on it for one night and I was like let's freaking go let's invest in this company. But yeah, I think that's totally true on the on the like being a professional investor side of things like >> you know I think if you look at different vintages like 2022 you could argue that actually like the best investors were the investors that stopped investing. How do you deal with that if if like you've tuned your whole system for like building a track record by making good deals?

28:39 >> I think there's a couple. one is cuz I was actually just looking so we we had a fund that I wasn't here obviously but there was a fund that was that had 2022 included in it. I don't think it's like it's hard to be excited about much of what happened in 2022 but it's a three-year fund and then it also has 2023 and 2024 in it. And so one answer to this is you're consistent through vintages. You have some time diversification per fund and like you know you hope that the 2022 also includes the 2023 and so like you get through some of it that Yeah, this is Brian Singerman used to always say that venture is not a macro asset class. It's a micro asset class. As long as you're in the right companies, it doesn't really matter. but like >> the if you just look at the data around the 2022 vintage or the window around that, it's massively underperforming other vintages. I think there's like some truth to that and then there's also some risk. There is there is risk to it but it's also like unless you're Peter Teal I think trying to call the market moment is also very risky and like you look at like let's take like public market index investors people who just buy and hold the S&P destroy people who try to like time it almost almost every time >> and so I think if you're not one of a small number of investors that you know you guys might have on your team I think it's you can you can mess it up in a big way cuz I think there was a lot of people who were like 2017 this is a bad time we're at the top don't invest for the next few years and then you know you miss some good companies or 2023 2024 you still don't have your faux pack on the gas you can miss it so I I guess my counter to that would just be that like most people can't call the macro very easily and if you can't call the macro very easily and then you miss the good vintages >> you have to focus on the micro >> you miss it all if you can't call the macro there's at least enough data that you should be able to like remember prior cycles which it doesn't seem like we have the ability to do at all memory is so short like 2022 is not that >> >> was 4 years ago and everybody's like, man, we can't do that again.

30:36 >> You know, maybe if this happens in 20 years, our kids won't remember. >> I'm like, 34 months ago, you know, it's crazy. >> Well, core investing memory of mine was actually an offsite at your house, Trey, and this was peak in 2021. The crazy thing was like the consensus in the room was that it was the bubble was about to pop. Like one that we were in a bubble, and then two that it was definitively about to pop. And the conclusion that we came out of that offsite actually was to Peter wanted us to go to the beach for a year and do a sbatical. But the the conclusion was let us invest in our very best companies. We made two investments.

31:09 I won't say them in in case that's weird, but we did two investments and both of them have been actually even vintage adjusted really really good. Mhm. >> And so I think that like to the micro versus macro point like the the winner of 2021 was the worst possible time to make an investment probably in like the last 15 or 20 years in venture. And I think if you still get the micro right, like maybe you would have made more money if you would have done those investments in the summer of 2022 because you still probably could have done them. They're still really good investments.

31:37 >> This is this is the nature of Peter is that like no matter how annoyed you are with him, he's always right on some timeline. Yeah, he's always right. I can't tell you how many times I've been like, "Oh, this is so ridiculous." Like, you know, he's getting so emotional about this this thing that like I don't understand why he's so charged about it. And then 12 months later, I'll look back and I'll be like, "Shit, wow. I can't believe how well he nailed that."

32:04 >> But I think it's really dangerous to try to do this if you don't have someone like that. >> Yeah. If you're not Peter, >> I couldn't do that. There's no way I could. >> I think almost nobody can do that. >> Yeah. And and I think there's like something really unique about him as well as well where he understands that you it is it is less important to be exactly true than it is to be directionally true because it's really hard to shift the overtone window. And so like most people are like they try to like sort of moderate their approach to something. and they because of that they're not directly pulling hard enough to shift any strategy. whereas I think Peter is just like I'm going to get like super I'm going to dig in my heels on this and just to move the window >> just to move the window a little bit and that tiny adjustment that ends up being made is is really powerful and I come come up with this all the time with and with our executive team where like you know that everyone wants to be reasonable and I feel like I'm constantly coming in over the top being completely unreasonable and I think it's just like a >> not actually wanting the outcome that you're saying >> right it's just a learn behavior from Peter. It's like I'm going to say something that even if I don't believe that we should do exactly what I'm saying, I'm just trying to pull people out of their, >> you know, their, you know, unintentional stasis that they've kind of locked themselves into.

33:23 >> The quote that I remember from that offsite was basically Peter saying something along the lines of like, I know that you guys are going to want to deploy. Like, there's going to be people that on this team that want to make investments right now because like the category is so hot, everybody thinks everything is best. Bubble's about to pop. And so the rule is only like you know go figure out what are like the you know sort of two three best companies we'll invest at that at like whatever the market clearing price is and like bubble will pop but because we've invested in the truly you know sort of best ones and gone hands off on everything else the best ones will make it out through the other side and so one of those investments was the $9 billion post you know ramp round nine months later the company did a down round at 6 billion basically in valuation and so in theory that like you know late 21 early investment like looked bad's now obviously at like a you know $40 billion valuation and so even the IR with the like, you know, down and up still made sense. And so I think it was Peter sort of pushing this like you guys are going to deploy, I can't stop you. Even if I wanted to like stop you guys from fully doing it, it's not going to happen. So therefore, at least just do the very best ones and then stop. And then we did kind of feel good because it was like yeah, we made two really big investments and we're like, okay, like you know, we can stop now.

34:24 >> Is there any like rising discomfort in Founders Fund at this current moment that's like 2021 or is that not the tone? >> I think it's probably different across different people. I am very uncomfortable. I am not enjoying this moment at all. maybe some other people are. >> Why aren't you enjoying it? >> I feel like we're getting back to this point where the prices are untethered from reality, and it like reminds me a lot of 2021.

34:50 >> I mean, you're also you're in obviously there's AI, but I know you spent a lot of your time in hard tech, which is now probably just as hot as AI, it seems like. >> Totally. Yeah. If not hotter in some ways. I feel like there's almost been a bit of a reset particularly on like vertical AI SAS where people are like oh crap like >> the the labs are kind of going to do a bunch of this stuff. Yeah. So maybe there's even a bit of a reset, but there hasn't been any form of a reset on on hard tech. And I think, you know, Founders Fund for over a decade has had this sort of Founders Fund Science concept of, you know, we wanted flying cars and instead we got 140 characters.

35:26 And we've probably been more active than anyone in investing in these hard tech companies. And did they work out? They did not. For the most part, they did not work out. >> Well, but you got I mean you got the ones that mattered. >> Yeah, we got we got the ones that mattered. But if you if you think about like where the most of those gains came from, it was actually PayPal Mafia. It wasn't like a thesis that turned into great returns. It was not like that turned into >> That's funny because most people in your position would obviously say, "Oh, well, our thesis played out and yeah, we had some losers, but we had Androl and SpaceX." And so it was basically right, but you're saying that like actually the thesis didn't really serve us and we would have made those investments anyway.

36:00 >> And I think they were actually hard to make even with the thesis. you know were were it not for Luke Nosk basically like putting his career on the line I don't know that founder son would have done the early SpaceX investments when I pitched the founders team on and they were basically like who's running this company like it's not you and it's not Palmer so you need to come up with a better solution so these things weren't even obvious even when they were direct network and so I think I I think the thesis side of this like we're just way more careful around it now than we were historically where it's like it's not sufficient to have a really strong technical founder. You you have to have somebody that's equally good on the business side, otherwise it it's just not going to work. And what we're seeing a lot of today, whether it's like hard tech or defense tech or manufacturing, industrial automation, whatever it is, is that there's a lot of people with great ideas and interesting technology.

36:58 but significantly accelerated rounds for the commercial progress. >> and the belief I guess is that like well if the product works the company will just obviously work and I don't think that's actually obvious at all that the company will work. I admit I like don't mind the current moment as much. But I think a part of it is like I probably 50 60% of the investments that I do are these like you know sub 30 post rounds and then it's like sometimes some hot founder from some XYZ thing spinout comes and says I have offers at 7500 post and I'm like >> great that's just like not the business that I'm in and like you're welcome to you know sort of go raise that. So I think I mostly ignore it and then I feel like the current like you know not to speak on the behalf of the entire firm but I feel like the maybe if I were to give the like what is the closest that we have to like the 2022 you know sort of take it's that there are a set of generational companies that we are involved in you know OpenAI Anthropic SpaceX and etc that are all now at this point largely priced in so late stage all IPOing soon that it's like not very obvious what that next cohort of companies is that could even accept a billion dollars of investment you know sort of right now and so I think that's probably the biggest you know sort of question is like we've had a pretty, you know, wild deployment rate over the last 3, four years in terms of especially, you know, some of our growth checks.

38:08 Maybe not as possible over the next three or four years if there, you know, aren't logos like that. >> We're sort of the Delhi making these investments at under a $30 million valuation. He has to spend a lot of time at preschools >> finding finding young founders who are willing to accept such low valuations for their for their seed. >> Is that why you're not allowed within 50 yards of school? Yeah, I've always been wondering why that was >> on this segment by your PR team.

38:33 >> Yeah, exactly. Before we It's a little bit on the line for me. >> It's not even close to the line. >> The idea of like a $30 million seed round valuation is like, "Oh, wow. That's >> that's huge. >> That's reasonable." Like reasonable. >> It's like 3x what reasonable would have been 10 years ago. >> So long. It was so recent that it was unreasonable. Like it's 5 years ago. People are like, "Whoa, what these YC companies think they're raising at 25?"

38:55 Like, >> who do they think they are? Like I did a six mil post seed round like you know two months ago. Six post. >> Yeah. Six post. Yeah. >> I think the thing that that the founders are missing in this this equation is that like the economics >> at these different prices at the early stages shift significantly. And so like there's so much money in venture that there are all these new funds that are setting up. It's like way too aspirational. There's way too much money in the system.

39:20 >> Well, they forget them new funds. It's really just the the mega platforms are consolidating $40 billion or whatever. >> Even that. Yeah. >> and because those terms are shifting, it's like the deals that you could do 10 15 years ago that led to these 100, they're gone. They're gone. And so, like then the question is like, can you actually over a venture cycle, like a venture fund cycle, can you actually beat the S&P 500 with the new this new unit economic even if you are hitting the monopoly players? I don't know. It seems like it's way harder than it has been.

39:51 >> I think it is way harder than it has been. I mean, I think it seems like you'd expect across the industry multiples to compress, but the power law is still super strong. Obviously, >> one thing we've noticed is like in our latest venture fund that we kicked off maybe like six or seven months ago, the like average entry price right now, I think, is something like 700 million in valuation. And if you compare it to the prior five, those would probably be on average cuz we do some mid-stage rounds in there, but it would probably be like 80 to 100 million, you know, in like, you know, entry point average price.

40:16 probably speaks to the fact that like even seed rounds that we're doing are so high that then when you you know add in some of the mid-stage things that are also high. >> We don't talk about this much. What's your current comfort with the temperature and venture and funding and everything like that? >> Yeah, I'm also deeply deeply uncomfortable. I think that the similarity to 2021 that I draw is that in 2021 there was this just like unanimous sense because 2021 people were like investors were making a lot of money. Like there was a lot of things that were IPOing. everyone was getting like a great cohort in 2020, 2019, 2020 and 2021 of really big IPOs that gave everyone kind of like a big taste of liquidity at the same time that everyone was getting markups very very quickly and very very like high markups very rapidly and there just started to become this sense where you'd have a company that would be at say like a 100 of AR and it would get priced at $10 billion.

41:05 So you'd have this like 100x multiple on it and the investor would be like well but like obviously it's going to go like 100 to 300 then 300 to 700 and then 700 to 1.4 and that's going to be worth 30 billion and I make a 3x in you know four years or whatever. It it was just like this sense of inevitability without really digging deep into like one just the immense difficulty and the base rates of how many companies that are at 100 of AR that ever make it to 1.4 4 billion of AR in that like arbitrary example, but there was a lot of situations that looked like that where everyone was like, well, of course, like it's here and like the trend's good, so it's going to be there. And it's like, well, wow, like if it does get there, it's a 3x from where you're investing in. And two, like in history, the amount of people that have gone from here to there is 5% of all companies. And so you're like over underwriting relative to historical norms by >> 20 all the dilution along the way.

41:55 >> And you're not incorporating dilution in that equation. And so you only have these situations when people are you know making a lot of money and and like I I I also I think this like this duality is the key to a bubble where like it will also like these last three years unquestionably is going to be the period where venture capitalists have made the most amount of money in history. And SpaceX, OpenAI and Enthropic they're going to produce the most amount of returns that we've ever seen probably by two orders of magnitude of any batch of companies. But then when you strip out those four companies or five or six companies, then like you start one playing with house money and two you start assuming that everything's going to like be daisies and roses because of the the success that that has been baked in other parts of the market.

42:37 And so it's just that that feeling like I'm feeling investors have that feeling of inevitability where it's like yeah I'm going to invest at 5 billion but it's going to be 15 billion in two years and then we're going to IPO or we're going to sell it at that price. And it's like a just we've forgotten how hard how brutally hard it is to go from one to >> even if you go down from the 100 million ARR line. One of the things that I've noticed in my 12 years doing this is that there's this weird glass ceiling between 20 and 30 million >> where like a reasonably managed enterprise SAS company is going to get to 20 or 30 million >> in revenue. But then like getting through that glass ceiling is super freaking hard.

43:16 >> Yeah. like the percent that make it from 20 to 100 is amazing. Huge drop off. >> Huge drop off. And so I think that early on in in my time in venture, I would meet with these companies that are like, "Yeah, in three years they've gone from 0 to 15 million in ARR." And it's like, "Oh, that's really good. That's a really good trajectory. We should like dig in." And now I'm just like, "I don't know." I mean, >> well, it's tough because the way VCs are underwriting is forcing founders at 1 to 5 million of AR to tell a story that we're going 2 to 30 to 150. And like you see that all the time. it and and then it forces people to build companies in weird way. Like it's all kind of distorting. I think what's different about this cycle relative to 21 is that in 2021 you still had not even the best companies were able to beat the original like Google early years of revenue growth and then anthropic in this cycle is literally the first company that since Google has actually like shown an even steeper basically you know sort of curve and then I think that feeds into both the like hey you're playing with like house money there's so much liquidity coming but then also assuming that like anybody else will be able to now match that same you know sort of revenue trajectory and there's things like you know even in our portfolio cognition is obviously on like a sort of you know, growth rate and then I think it just goes down the stack where people assume even the seeds today 1 million AR thing is going to be able to follow that >> but it goes up a lot of businesses that could raise at you know a quarter of the valuation that they're raising at but because the market's where it is it's like well I rather than just saying I'm going to go from 1 to 4 to 11 whatever which you know there there is a way to venture finance that business it just looks different. How do you guys respond to the like the pitch at a seed or a series A or series B kind of where you're focusing where the founder is super confident that they're going to go from 1 to 10 to 100 to 500 over the course of like 3 years.

44:56 >> The running joke is that it doesn't matter what market you're in or what company you're running. The running joke we've had is that the end of your plan for any company under 5 million of AR this year is 30. >> It's all it's always 30. >> It's all it's always 30. It's just like you see a deck and it's like we're at four. It's like, "Are you going to go to 30?" And they're like, "Yeah, how'd you know?"

45:13 >> It's crazy. We had like, yeah, nine of them in a row. >> There's like a little bit of like, "Don't hate the player, hate the game in there as well where it's like, you know, you have like Hamont on a podcast being like, if my partners bring me something that's growing 3x, I tell them don't bring it to me. Like the new the new bar is 10x." That's not nothing against Hamont. That's like sort of where the market is. It's obviously investors are it's a game of opportunity cost, not absolutes. like you're trying to do the best thing in any given year, not something that just meets some bar. And so there's some some of that where it's like, well, you know, part of being a a good founder is being able to raise capital and like playing the capital raise game well, but I think you do have to mix that with like like a like a large amount of like you have to be genuine as well and you have to ideally have like worked out the idea maze in order to like show a path to actually doing that. Like it can't all be bluster.

46:01 >> Yeah. And I think also like we're, you know, our model is that we're going to work closely with them for a long time for, you know, that's just what it is. And so I think, you know, it'd be very frustrating for us to work with somebody who's like my plan is 10 to 100, but I've got no plan beyond how I'm going to manage that. And I don't know what team I need to hire. I haven't thought about what team I need to hire. I haven't thought about what that product service looks like. I haven't thought about if you're going to sort of take the role of I'm going to work with this person. And then they're going to say that in order for that to be an enjoyable plan as you work with them on it, you'd want to you want to believe that they're going to think about, okay, like I know actually what's going to go into it and it's going to be really hard.

46:35 >> This is sort of Peter's quad chart from 0 to one around indefinite optimism versus definite optimism. If you're going to be optimistic, you should at least have a plan. >> Yes. It's too frustrating otherwise. Yeah. >> I feel like you would probably be more allergic to any version >> of of that tray. I just remember a you know there there was like some company we were meeting back in the day and they're like I'll be coming from a dinner with Mark and Dre and you you just like email back you're like don't do that. You're like that's that's not a game that that we should be playing.

47:03 >> Oh the competitive game of like look at meing all of my connections. >> Yeah. It's like well like oh you guys better move quick because like afterwards I have like a dinner with with this famous person and you're like this is just founder to founder feedback. Don't do that. sound like I don't remember doing that but it sounds like something I would say the thing that I feel is so triggering to me about these like crazy plans is is not the like optimism and obvious like I I believe that they should have the ambition it's the like willful like like removal from all historical >> examples >> and it's an easy time to be like things are different now the rules are changed you know you can have billiond dollarar companies with four person teams and it's like you can kind of I think convince yourself that just because the rules have changed that there's no rules at all anymore.

47:55 >> Well, you can kind of do that with software but with hardware it's like you have to like make real things and like this idea that you can like 100x production in a 12-month period. It's just like I >> I'm I'm sorry. You you literally can't I'm just going to say that like >> Okay, can we talk about I I want to go to a hardware topic before we all sat down. We were talking about chips and I've spent some time with some like public market investors recently but you know everybody knows that like people love semis right now. People don't like software they like semis. We obviously have like you know huge comput shortages. We have the situation with you know Taiwan and China. We've got America sort of like without its own real ability to you know fabricate anything. There's a lot of startups working in chips and semis in various ways. I would just be curious to like hear your sort of like lay of the land of the situation like where we are kind of like as like a tech industry you know maybe then we can get into like you know country positioning and sort of some of the broader things maybe that connects to Android and whatever but maybe just starting with chips as a point in time like what's the lay of the land what are people you know excited about like what are we missing >> I think the biggest challenge is just around fabrication it's like there's a lot of energy going into chip design you know making more efficient AI chips or making more leading edge chips or you know whatever it is for memory or for inference like there's all of these different things that people are working on and that's great I'm glad that we're doing that but at the end of the day like these chips are all coming from the same place like they're being made and for decades the United States was the really only player in semiconductor manufacturing that was actually where Silicon Valley came from and we've completely lost our way with this almost entirely happens outside of the United States to the extent that we were doing anything in the United States over the last you know couple of decades it's not leading edge anymore it's you know some of the more mass scale like automotive chip fab and things like that or lowcale kind of research and development fabs and we haven't really figured out how to reshore the leading edge fabrication and obviously like this is what the chips act was intended to It doesn't seem like there's a whole lot of traction coming out of the money that was spent there. the government has made this big bet on Intel taking an equity position in the company to try to get them to the point where they can be not only a manufacturer of their own chips but also as a merchant supplier of chips to to other people. their yield rates are still really low.

50:29 Obviously, Libu is doing everything he can to level that up and has the Terafab project that he's working on with Elon now as well. So, it's sort of our best bet, but not at all certain that it's going to work. The other companies that have leading edge processes like TSMC and Samsung have been like getting attention from the government to try to get them to build domestic fabs in the United States, but the incentive structure for those is totally wrecked.

50:55 Like, it's not clear why they would build any of these fabs. It's not clear that the talent even exists to do it domestically anyway. So, I feel like our focus has just been sort of wrong. It's been on the e I'm I will say this and I I actually mean it. We're focusing on the easy part design, which I'm not saying is easy on an absolute basis. I'm saying on a relative basis, we're focusing on the easy part. And there's a lot of money to be made there. But if we don't fix the hard part, none of this is actually going to work.

51:25 >> There's not even like an optimistic plan right now. Like I think if you were to just look at all the chess pieces today and how they're playing for the next 5 years, there's nothing that would indicate it would be any different 5 years from now. Like at least when you had like in 2015 we lost you know sort of access to space cuz we shut down space shuttle and like we were dependent on like you know the soy use for taking people up to space. At least you could like be like at least Elon is trying like there's a like path to something where those will be brought back 2020 we have it. If you were to like analyze what everyone is doing today and say in 2030 you know whatever one is there going to be leading edge fabs in the United States at scale it's like no there's not even like anything that anybody's working on that would lead towards that today >> over the next decade and if you haven't thought about this no need to give an answer but over the next decade what do you think the probability is that Taiwan is is quarantined otherwise >> I think it's high probability that it's not what it is today. Yeah. if that's like a Hong Kongl like situation or if it's some sort of you know the United States reaching a day where we continue to have access to critical supply chain and we've given up something in in that arrangement or like a full-scale invasion where you know we have to make a really hard decision about whether or not we want to actively support Taiwan. One of those outcomes is wildly probable. I 90 plus percent in the next 10 years.

52:42 >> I feel like your view is pro must be something along the lines of like we need to be able to, you know, we need US chip fabs, right? >> We both need to like create a credible deterrent threat for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan and that's the andal side of the problem that we're focusing on. which has led to our co-founders being sanctioned in China. So that's that. Yeah. >> Basically impossible like is there anybody are there any entrepreneurs with any amount of capital that could just start a net new chip fab or is that just is it too big of a problem? I wrote this article about choosing good quests and I made some joke about how like celebrities monetize their brand by, you know, selling consumer goods like tequila or popcorn or whatever it is. Just it's a commodity. They just slap their brand on it and they make a bunch of money. Good for them. our version of this in Silicon Valley is like starting a venture fund. You know, it's like all these people that have the ability to raise gobs of cash and do really hard things. They, you know, sit on the roof like Big Head from HBO's Silicon Valley and raise a venture fund and, you know, p around with AI. and we really need them to be founders. We need them to be heroes. It's a big ask, but like I'm shocked that no one has taken it more seriously because it feels like the most important thing that people could work on right now. What would like what does it take? Is this like Elon plus $100 billion? Like what what actually is required for this problem for somebody to net new start one?

54:25 >> I think it's Elon plus tens of billions of dollars. I don't know that it will require hundreds of billions, but definitely in the mid10s to do it. I mean there's all sorts of levers that you have to pull. like you would have to get the US government involved in pulling you to the front of the line with ASML to get the EV. you would have to like figure out the supply chain stuff. You would have to build out the process which is literally like thousands of tiny steps that you have to get high yield rates on so that you don't fail out as you as you make them, which is a talent problem. We don't have enough skilled labor that understands how that works. It's really hard because it's sort of death by a thousand cuts and it will require someone that has the ability to manage that complex process as a leader.

55:13 >> Yeah. as I said, I'm not a good manager, so I'm not sure I'm the right person to do it. But >> Dylan can help. >> I have a little further along before I sign up for another one at once. >> but you know, I think that like there are ways that we can shortcut some of this system. we've invested in a company called Substrate that's building a new form of lithography that simplifies the process for the rest of the steps that are involved. and it's like it's really important that things like that get pushed down the road so that we can we can actually pull this off. But this is like civilizationally important. It's not it's not just a technology problem. It's a geopolitical problem.

55:53 >> I was going to say this before. I feel like this like the the China Taiwan thing on some level feels like we're all like willfully kind of looking the other way about it and it's just like if we're to believe what you said that it is wildly probable and it's a big problem and we have no plan and we're all just like that's all right just keep doing like well yeah every every time I meet with one of these chip design companies I think of them as like pinch runners you know they're like all right check this out I'm like really good at stealing second base and I'm like yeah but how did you how did you get on first face like who hit the ball? It's like just like really focused on that pinch running like I'm the greatest base runner in history. Not really don't really know how to solve the problem of getting the the bat on ball and I feel like that's what we're doing over and over again with semiconductors. It's like we've solved for with hundreds of pinch runners and we have nobody that can actually make contact. Trump also visited China for the first time basically in like a decade this past week and like Xiinping was extraordinarily clear in all of the communications of like our number one problem in issue is Taiwan references the facidious trap and says like you know we're clearly the rising power you're the decaying hedgeimonyi the only way to avoid kinetic war is like you need to accommodate our needs and our number one need that we've made very clear throughout this entire week is that like Taiwan reunification is something that we deeply deeply care about if we end up letting that happen it's just like a huge betrayal of all American values where we're the world police and you're letting you know, sort of westernized democracy, get taken over by an adversary.

57:19 >> And I think you have to take Xi seriously. Yeah. Like, you know, when he says that, that's he's saying, >> I am staking my reputation as an authoritarian on my ability to execute on my plan. He is held accountable by his populace for following through on the things that he said he's going to follow through on. I think no one in the West takes that seriously because in our mind, it's like that's a four-year cycle. Like politicians come and go and they say stuff. They say stuff and they very rarely follow through on it. And so we have this tendency to just like not take it seriously. But it's like he he he has to follow through. There's like there's no other way for him to stay in power. We need some fabs.

57:57 >> We need some fabs. Also in hardware u venode said this on the podcast that like you know robotics will probably be the biggest thing of all time. Obviously Elon's you know thinking about this a lot with Tesla. Have you spent a bunch of time you meeting with robotics companies? It seems like robotics would be something that would be square and sort of you guys interest. Are you guys looking at it a lot >> all the time? Seems like it should work, right? Like why wouldn't it work >> on some timeline?

58:21 >> Yeah, I think we haven't like yet made any like huge either like let's say like humanoid or like generalist model, you know, sort of investment yet, but like we do have a whole set of portfolio companies that either like use robotics a lot like Andre has plenty of robots, you know, in you know, Foundry. you know, Hrien, one of our portfolio companies, uses robotics all the time. we've made some like vertical specific you know sort of robotics plays. I think we're a little more bearish on the like you know humanoid as like a venture you know sort of category. We are comparing it to unitry in China and thinking like you know is there even an American ecosystem that can like support something like this. I think, you know, the hope that at least I personally have is that like, you know, humanoid robot to play out somewhat similar to, you know, sort of phones where it's, you know, Chinese hardware but American software and that forces this like, you know, forced taunt that neither side is happy with. Like China would much prefer that it was Chinese software running everywhere.

59:08 America would much prefer that iPhones are made in America. >> Did you like Jensen Pong's point on the Dark Cash podcast about like >> he's got to win. >> America should go win every market, including the Chinese market. I think my view is somewhere in between that like I don't think we should be like helping them but I do think that some of the chips sanctions actually heavily incentivize them to set up their own you know sort of fab ecosystem and so I think that like sometimes winning the Chinese market is a way to weaken them and so I agree with him in like that narrow point but I do think it requires like looking at that like on a marketbymarket basis. I don't maybe agree with the like American venture capital should be like funding Chinese companies because that feels like you're just strictly helping the Chinese ecosystem versus Yensen selling chips to China feels like you're sort of just you know giving them the opioid addiction but like you know in the form of chips and it's probably good for them to be you know addicted to us >> provided that there actually is such a thing as a US company owning a market in China.

59:58 >> This is not how it works. I mean, I think that's probably the thesis that Tesla had as well before they realized that BYD was just going to >> copy all their best stuff and cut the price. And >> I think that's the much more likely outcome. It's like the super naive ramblings of a monopoly hungry American who ignores geopolitical reality. I think well obviously the the right thing to do is just to do business with them because the merkantal list and like this is just going to work obviously until your IP is gone and they've taken the the market that you thought existed for you and they've exported it to the rest of the world at a much lower cost. I have a hypothetical for mostly for Delian. So the the if there is Chinese citizens that aren't, you know, CCP members that deeply want to come to America or come to a western country and build Western AI, build AI that enriches the western world away from China that they might not want to be citizens of anymore or want to leave or not want to build for that ecosystem. Do we have a responsibility or even should we invest in those very hypothetical companies or should we stay away from from those teams that that actually deeply want to contribute to and and advance western AI but because of where they were born have to go through different means to do so. I think if somebody is working on national security technologies which are argue like leading edge AI effectively is you know I don't think it's like an unreasonable argument to make that you should have to roughly abide by the regulations around that which is ITAR compliance at VA and we would not be allowed to you know hire someone like that if they renounce their Chinese citizenship if they fully became an American citizen if there's also strong confidence that the CCP doesn't have some of their like family members you know under gunpoint and can you know leverage that fact to get them to do things on behalf of China in America.

61:50 Sure. But I think that's that's really really difficult about like if it's just an individual citizen that has made it over. China still controls their life. Even if they like hate China, they don't want you sort of that to be the case. If they've got their grandma by a gunpoint and they convince that, you know, sort of person to sort of fly back to China and then detain them, doesn't matter what that person's personal beliefs are.

62:06 What matters is like the system that you're interacting with. >> The alternate version of this is suicidal empathy. It's like, look, none of us want to believe that every multi-billion Chinese people in the world are bad. Like, no one I don't believe that. I don't think it's crazy to believe that there's like some some racist tendency and having a concern around this. but like there are people in our society who have that level of suicidal empathy where they're like, "Well, obviously you can't say anything negative about the >> obvious logical like fall through of of doing the, you know, investing in in Chinese nationals with family ties back in the country and stuff.

62:51 >> Do you think that there is a like a deescalation path between, you know, America and China? like you know it's kind of implied in a lot of this conversation is that it's just like we're going to a tenser and tenser place over time. Is that just like what happens when you have a rising power and you just have to plan for that to be the case or do you think there's like any deescalation path? >> I'm certainly hopeful that there's a deescalation path that there's diplomatic solutions and you know hard power deterrence that will prevent us from going into war with one another. I think that's like the worst possible outcome for sure. We I don't think the American people have any memory of what it's like to go into great power conflict like and the scale of destruction that would result the last one. I think it would just be a lot worse for >> it would be devastating. We we can't afford to do that. And so I think part of it is like we have to hope that China has that same belief that it it's unthinkable and that we should do everything we can to stay out of it. But they've also spent, you know, the last 50 years with a very intentional strategy to box the West out of the the whole supply chain to make their success inevitable. If you've read the book Hundred-Year Marathon, it kind of talks about this in the the terms of like Chinese fables where there's this this story that gets cited a lot in Chinese fairy tales essentially that's hide your strength by time and it's this idea that like in western in in western literature we have this sort of tradition of chess thumping where like it it's all about you know showing strength and we expect that other people will do the same because we're like show us your show us what you can do and we'll show you what we can do and then we'll like decide how that gets litigated. Whereas like the Chinese strategy is always cower like oh no we we're so weak. We don't we don't have any power like our GDP is so low and they're just going to keep repeating these messages until the moment where the flip is inevitable and then we're going to look back and be like wait we have no leverage like we have no leverage. The belt and road just completely eviscerated our whole ability to control the supply chain. We don't own any of the like any of the ships that are required for global trade. We don't have any military advantages because we haven't invested in it. We have no access to semiconductor manufacturing. And then they're standing there with the entire deck of cards in their hands. And where does that leave us? And I think this is kind of like the fallacy about the moralism or the moralizing around this where it's like look at all these things that the US government could do with technology.

65:31 We're so concerned about how this technology is going to be abused for all of these unethical use cases. And it's like, guys, if you're concerned about a western democracy, imagine a world in which we have no say >> in how these technologies are governed. And we're walking ourselves willingly into this situation where you think it's bad. Now, wait until you see what's on the other side of a dominant China. Cuz it's not going to look like the effective altruist version that people believe that it's going to look like. It It's just like complete banana pants.

66:05 >> Yeah. the like chest something versus you know sort of being quiet I think was like exemplified the day that we basically you know you started striking Iran where you had Trump obviously everywhere you know thumping your sort of chest effectively on that day in the China Post there wasn't basically a single mention like in any of the headlines about anything that was happening in Iran for them it was just like this is not you know a thing that we even like you know pay attention to categorize have no opinions on Xiinping effectively just said that like I forget his exact quote that day but it was something like that's America's issue America's you know sort of challenge that they've like you know sort of chosen to step into I think if you imagine the equivalent of that versus like in the cold war with the Soviet Union, all of the headlines within the Soviet Union would have been about like here's what America's doing. Here's what we're doing to counter it. It was all like soft power through proxy wars, etc.

66:48 China's just not even though like a lot of their oil comes from Iran, they're like effectively just not engaging on this like, you know, so proxy war and it's the difference between being against a great power that is another chess thumper versus the Chinese approach. >> Yeah. Fascinating. I know you guys have to go in a minute, so I want to end with a couple light topics just to pallet. One is our boy Sam Blonde. he worked with you guys at Founders Fund and then you guys led a prior round. We did a recent one. I I'm actually curious, you know, obviously we're both really excited about the company, but like what was what was your experience with him like as you know a teammate? Did that like inform like why you're like I want to back him?

67:22 What was the you know what was the experience there for you guys? I worked with him a lot in the Miami office where he was you know sort of based and it was incredibly clear that he is just a phenomenal salesperson like he is somebody that like knows how to close a deal whine and dine etc. I think unfortunately as we've talked about over the course of this podcast, the venture job is not really necessarily a sales job once you've yes, you know, come to a conclusion you want to invest. There is for sure a little bit of sales that happens in terms of like you know convincing somebody to take your capital, but the vast majority of it is a like don't try and close every 10,000th investment that is out there in the world. You need to like you know discern which is like the one to five that like you know sort of matter a lot.

67:58 And so I think that was partially why he even came to the conclusion after like a year at Founders. He was like this is not the world for me. I'm glad that I learned it very quickly. I'm going to go do the world that is for me. And like part of why we love Monaco is it literally just feels like Sam embodied in a company. It really does. Like it's just like I've never seen it so clearly in a company where it's just like you people talk about oh the founder personality shows up personality >> a little bit. But this is Yeah. It's like usually like the founder it's like you can kind of smell the founder everywhere in a company. This is >> this is it is it is Monaco is Sam. Sam is Monaco.

68:28 >> Yeah. Totally. I think you guys just closed a big new fund and you know we talked a lot about sort of you know discomfort and but then there's obviously a lot that we're excited about and everything like that and I realize some of it's for early some of it's for growth but like as you guys think ahead and we're not you know this is not you know Peter in 2022 or whatever saying everybody take a break like I expect you guys are planning to deploy it is this going to the same type of stuff you've been doing recently or are you like this cycle has actually played out we need to find the next trillion dollar companies that we're not currently in like What's the head space right now?

68:59 >> We have a separation between funds. We had the venture fund on one side and growth on the other. the venture fund actually we raised years ago >> 2021. Yeah. >> And you're still playing out the same fund. >> Well, what we did is we realized that we raised it. It was too big and that the again the economics of these things are really tricky and so we ended up splitting the fund in half and then we just backed them chronologically up against each other. So, we're currently investing out of the second of those two funds that we created. and then growth is focused almost entirely on companies in the portfolio already that are seeing continued growth. I think it's only about 20% of the fund is new.

69:42 >> 80% is doubling down. >> Was OpenAI already in the venture fund at one point? >> No, that was a grow that was first growth. >> Yeah, but that's probably one of the very few basically like OpenAI Anthropic both originated from growth. we've doubled down through growth. >> Almost every other meaningful position or check across the fund. and sometimes it's in like a totally different category. Like Crusoe is probably one of my like favorite examples of this of like, you know, originally started off as like a, you know, coin miner and now obviously turned into like data center producer.

70:10 But yeah, we've you doubled down throughout. >> It's funny. We were actually I was talking about this I I think I think with with the partners here talking about the the founders fund growth strategy and how this double down within the own portfolio as like 80% of the portfolio I think can only work at a place like Founders Fund because it's maybe the only firm that's invested in >> the companies that have compounded at like a 30 plus% >> rate when you have SpaceX 30 years so it's like oh it's like okay well you have SpaceX you have Stripe you have and you like there's probably three or four more of them for getting you like Palanteer RAM. It's like oh it's like it was just as good of an incremental IR at 30 billion as it was at like you know 500 million 10 years later and it's like only if you're collecting those and like burning with those types of companies early.

70:56 >> It's hard cuz you have to be so rational to say we're not going to just invest in our three best companies. >> Yes. Like it has to meet like an absolute bar not just a bar within your own portfolio and the ven diagram of those also just happening to be the best investments at growth. But then the advantage of being involved in the early stage is like the fact that like and roll incubation ramp seed stripe like series A >> volunteer incubation >> talent incubation it's like it's not to say that we have like you know perfect access or perfect pricing but like we almost always are able to invest the amount that we want to and so if you just look at the like sizing that we're able to get into these companies also is part of what makes the growth >> it's got to be a little hard to like match the time allocation to the dollar allocation though because it's like how much time do you need to spend on deciding on these companies that you already work on and then it's like you're gonna meet a lot of these new net new companies but you're gonna you know, deployed 20% of the fun. So, it just has to be the case that a bunch of times going into net new stuff and you just do very little of it.

71:44 >> Why do a net new defense tech thing? We can just deploy another billion dollars in Andre. It's like >> just doesn't make sense to do that. >> Yeah. Thank you guys for doing this with us. This is super fun. >> Thanks for having us.

Summary

The discussion revolves around the dynamics of venture capital, particularly focusing on the unique culture and operational strategies at Founders Fund compared to other firms. Key insights include the importance of truth-seeking in investment decisions, the challenges of the semiconductor industry, and the evolving landscape of venture capital amidst geopolitical tensions.

- Emphasis on being directionally true over exact truth in investment strategies to shift the "overtone window."
- Founders Fund fosters a culture of truth-seeking, prioritizing honest debate over hierarchical decision-making.
- The unique 1% investment mechanism at Founders Fund aligns incentives and measures conviction among partners.
- Current challenges in the semiconductor industry include reliance on foreign fabrication and the need for domestic manufacturing capabilities.
- Concerns about the geopolitical landscape, particularly regarding Taiwan, and its implications for technology and supply chains.
- The venture capital landscape is shifting, with rising valuations and the challenge of achieving significant growth in early-stage companies.
- Founders Fund's growth strategy focuses on doubling down on existing portfolio companies rather than seeking new investments.
- The importance of balancing optimism with realistic assessments of historical performance and market conditions.

Questions Answered

Why is being directionally true more important than being exactly true?

It's crucial to focus on directional truth to shift strategies effectively, as many people moderate their approaches and fail to push hard enough for change.

What makes the culture at Founders Fund unique compared to other firms?

Founders Fund emphasizes truth-seeking over hierarchy, fostering an environment where every team member can contribute ideas and investments without the constraints of traditional corporate politics.

What are some unique investment mechanisms at Founders Fund?

The 1% mechanism allows team members to invest a portion of their earnings into deals they support, aligning incentives and measuring conviction among partners.

How does Founders Fund maintain team cohesion despite heated debates?

The culture allows for passionate discussions while ensuring that team members care for one another, avoiding toxic politeness and fostering genuine relationships.

What are the challenges faced in the current venture capital landscape?

The venture capital environment is becoming increasingly competitive, with high valuations and unrealistic growth expectations, making it difficult to identify truly promising investments.

What are the current challenges in semiconductor manufacturing?

The U.S. has lost its edge in semiconductor fabrication, relying heavily on foreign manufacturers, which poses significant risks to national security and technological leadership.

How does technology intersect with geopolitical tensions?

The rise of China as a technological power presents challenges for the U.S., necessitating a strategic approach to maintain technological leadership and prevent potential conflicts.

How should investors adapt their strategies in a changing market?

Investors need to focus on micro-level opportunities and avoid macro-level speculation, ensuring they back companies with solid fundamentals and realistic growth trajectories.

What is the potential for robotics in future investments?

Robotics presents significant opportunities, but investors remain cautious about humanoid robots, focusing instead on vertical-specific applications that demonstrate clear value.

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