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They Called The Trade Wars & China's Housing Crash | Nikhil Kamath | WTF is Finance Ep 4

Nikhil Kamath · 59m · transcribed Oct 2026
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0:05 Mhm. >> Matthew, as someone living in California, is the world turning left again? Are we going back to socialism? >> not in No, actually California. San Francisco is is you know, >> if I take San Francisco out of it. >> No. Well, oh, well, no. I mean, Shouldn't debt be priced by the ability of the borrower to pay back?

0:46 >> Right. But that's the that's the thing. They can they can they can always print they can always print the money. The US cannot always print it way out of any kind of trouble. question here. Is dd dollararization real? Do you think crypto has future? Can you wager a guess as to what will happen again in the next 10 years? >> Well, this is the interesting question, right? I'm talking about in theory, right? In practice, it doesn't work this way. That's that's where it gets that's where it gets tricky.

1:11 >> Probably just one thing that is to embrace whatever comes. That sounds scary. thank you both for doing this. Matthew, would you like to go first and tell us a bit about yourself? >> Sure. I write about economics and finance. I have a publication called The Overshoot and I co-wrote the book Trade Wars or Class Wars.

1:48 and Ning >> I'm a professor at a Shanghai J University and Chinhai University and also I wrote a few books on investment in China's macroeconomy one of them is titled China's guaranteed bubble predicting the collapse of China's housing bubble and then I've been advising policy makers in China and many other parts of the world on macroeconomics and monetary policies >> since we are in China today maybe we can begin by you telling us how the Chinese economy is doing now >> I think the economy is stabilizing. I think we have been having some corrections in the housing market over the past 5 years that's taking a drag on the macroeconomy. That being said, I think mean the the new growth engine I mean being the the so-called new quality productive forces higherend manufacturing new technology AI and high-end semiconductors are coming up pretty strongly. there are couple of issues that's bothering the economy right now. One is of course consumption which is not growing as strongly as people are hoping for. The other is of course increasing frictions on the export or the trade side of the economy.

2:58 But both sides are doing okay relatively speaking in the global context. People are just wishing for the better. >> Can you bucket China into 10-year periods because I don't have that much context. I've read a few books on China but I don't see I want to know what changed between 2000 to 2010 2010 to 20 and what is the last 6 years like >> I think probably one I think one benchmark people would commonly use is the general growth speed. I think for the first 10 years of this century it was growing over 9% and for the past decade or so it was around seven and over the past 5 years is more around five. So I think that's a numerical summary but then I think if I have to use major milestones in history 2000 mark China's entrance into the double hill which is really helpful to China's economy and then of course we have the 4 trillion stimulus packages coming out in 2009 which is a big boost for both infrastructures and the housing bubble and I think of course COVID is like a shock to the economy and then the correction or the crackdown on the housing sector is having a lot of influence those over the economy over the past 5 years.

4:16 >> Matthew, this is like a conversation, so feel free to butt in wherever you like. >> Sure. I I I think one thing, you know, as as Ning was saying, I think it's was worth emphasizing the extent to which CO was really a break, not obviously uniquely for China, but for a lot of the economies in the world. And you know, one of the big points of contention that we've seen in sort of China's relationship with with other countries and it's come up recently in the in the past few weeks at the G7 meeting is this idea of China's rising trade surplus and the idea that the new productive forces that are beneficial on the one hand for Chinese producers are considered very threatening for competing companies in you know Europe in particular with with motor vehicles. And I think one you know piece of context that's that's helpful here is that if we look at China's external balance with the rest of the world in the years immediately leading up to the pandemic the trade surplus depending on how you measure it was around you know 100 to200 billion a year which is you know at one hand it's a big number but it's you know the global economy we're talking about tens of trillions right now it's more like $1.1 trillion a year so a big shift between 2019 and now that's really a function I think of I several things but I think very much you know the response to co and one thing I think that's striking is the productive side of the economy in terms of you know the factories being able to produce more and sell things recovered from co faster and better than the domestic demand consuming side part of that reflects as Ning was saying the consequence of the housing bust part of it reflects other factors as well but you know that divergence has been significant and persistent so even as sort of the overall economy I mean you as saying stabilized that that sort of the composition and unbalanced nature seems to be I'm not sure if it's necessarily getting continue to get worse but but it's very large and and as I said the size of the the surplus now relative to the global economy is is quite large in particular relative to the size of China's trading partners.

6:09 >> I actually chime in about I was in a session yesterday called the two-speed economy is actually what I call a K-shaped economy. I think that's not just a China phenomena. This is becoming a global phenomena in across countries or within the same country across different social stratas. There are very different or diverging trends going on. And then I agree with Matt. I think China's export has been increasing very rapidly over the past five six years. But then I think there are multiple there's a multitude of reasons for that's happening.

6:37 >> I have a question here. Some countries have a trade surplus, some have a deficit. Fewer have a surplus, more have a deficit. What happens if this continues 10 years, 20 years down the line? >> Well, one answer potentially is nothing. you know, it depends. there's nothing inherently sustainable or unsustainable about about deficits or surpluses. There are reasons why certain places might want to be spending more than they're producing. you know, the canonical example you'd have is is a a society where you say you have a lot of younger people. It's relatively underinvested infrastructure, a lot of growth potential. maybe is poor, less technologically developed. That's a kind of place where you would expect that the needs of the people to invest and grow rapidly and their future productive potential are such that it makes sense for people in the rest of the world to invest there. you know, lend them money, export, you know, advanced machinery and things like that and and they could have persistent trade deficits for a while and grow rapidly and that'd be beneficial for everyone.

7:35 the flip side is you can imagine a society sort of in the opposite situation. Maybe it's older already at the technological frontier. there's less growth potential. They have already advanced goods and maybe they would be >> more the US. >> Well, this is the interesting question, right? I'm talking about in theory, right? In practice, it doesn't work this way. That's that's where it gets that's where it gets tricky. >> And also on the theoretical side, I think I mean that is the case when we still have gold standard and in bread and woods. But now that that is gone, I was just trying to add on well trade is no longer necessarily the only determinator in this equilibrium. Now you can have I mean one side is the trade imbalance and the other is the capital account kind of imbalance that people have different preferences for put putting their money into different countries or by design certain countries have the ability to produce more capital or monetary supply than other countries so that's somehow balancing off of the imbalances in the trade area >> right I think you know particularly in the US case and it's not unique to the US I think it's true for basically >> that we're not talking about theory anymore >> yeah the the rich English speaking countries in general the the thing what they have as as an asset is as a legal system that people find very investor friendly that's a language that people who are rich >> used to be >> well okay I said the rich I said the English speaking democracy so this is this is a broader this is a broader universe than just the US but you know it's a it's a and and they have and a language that basically any you know rich person in the rest of the world knows so u that is those are going to attract you know savings from the rest of the world relative to other countries regardless of whether It makes sense. So you have the strange phenomenon. We've seen this for for decades of places that in theory ought to be, you know, sort of standard theory should be having trade deficits because of their investment needs actually having surpluses and sending you know, buying financial assets rather than borrowing. they are net lending to places that are rich like the US, the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand because their financial systems are more are accommodating and sort of meet that need and which is a very strange not not what the sort of standard theory would say is optimal but it's it's what we've we've been observing for the past several decades >> and just to place a devil's advocate I think mean in the old regime I think when there is really prolonged and serious imbalance in trade I think I mean if we use history as a benchmark war is unfortunately the word that we would have to visit or revisit what that is when the two countries or countries one country with other countries cannot resolve their disputes or cannot address the imbalances for a very long period of time. I think the one which normally is on the the deficit side but sometimes because the the surplus side cannot claim the money they are owed there will be a war or some kind of military conflicts.

10:17 >> Yeah, there's unfortunately a history of colonialism and imperialism tied up with that older model. Is there an unsaid understanding? Say China has a tariff. Say China has a trade surplus with America over the long term. Is there a under is there a unsaid understanding that China will buy say American treasury for example or invest a part of the money back into America? >> I think for now I would say largely yes because I think it's most push and pull.

10:46 one is I think Chinese do find the US dollar to be still a safe asset and then it's deep enough that we can deploy our capital into but at the same time it's also because there's a lack of alternative I mean in a way this is related to what we discussed in a different session about R&B internationalization because by that time even even though we're not happy enough with the US dollar as a res a storage of value there's really no other alternative we can put the money into of course gold is one possibility but the market is not deep or large enough for China.

11:18 >> Why can't you reinvest the money back into China to maybe improve the infra or manufacture more? >> one is I think Chinese manufacturing has already received considerable investment. So I don't think we're really looking for capital in that regard. The other is I think that happens in trade balance. So it happens in foreign currency and of course it is in the country's interest to keep certain amount of currency in order to a foreign currency in order to stabilize its own exchange rate or for the security of the unspeakable. So what matters when I'm looking at economics and I'm seeing how well a country is doing or what it should do. I look at the trade balance I look at inflation >> fuller employment I guess in domestically >> employment. What else?

12:07 >> I mean you look at production of what it is people want. I I'm not even sure the trade balance is necessarily the metric by way of success because there are a lot of things that can affect the trade balance. If one guaranteed way to either reduce a trade deficit or to generate a trade surplus is you just crush your domestic economy. if people can't afford to eat anymore then you know but they still can sell things to people in the rest of the world and you're going to have a shift in the trade balance.

12:27 That's not that's not a that's not a benign outcome. I mean I think one thing that's useful remember is a lot of the big shifts you see from surplus. So u Korea right u very great developmental success story people talk about export-led growth >> but up until the Asian financial crisis South Korea actually ran trade deficits consistently from 1953 until 1997 I think there was like one year maybe in '89 but but basically until then deficits then you have the Asian financial crisis very traumatic experience and then ever since then they've had large and persistent surpluses and I think it's fair to say that even though Korea is doing much better now than it was say in 1997 the circumstances that led to that that shift in the trade balance were not benign. They were not good for Koreans.

13:08 I don't think it was good for the world. And and I think that that's an important you know context. >> Is that what worked for China? I had I saw some data that China only consumes 40% of GDP in India that number is 55%, in the US it's 68%. Did China domestically consume lesser and hence they could export more >> proportionally? Yes. And I think there are several reasons for that. One is clearly just culture. I think East Asian countries have this tendency whereas I think India does not have that historical tendency. part of that is the shock from COVID both in terms of people's balance sheet and in terms of people's confidence or their feeling of safety with consumption. Another is of course what Matthew mentioned about what there is some imbalances. There's certain suppression of certain factor prices and there's some inflation of certain other factor prices. I think in the interest of the the country maybe not necessarily to a particular sector of the economy or the employees in those sectors. So I think that is slowly adjusting slowly but steadily. but I I I I understand and I think I can see that certain other countries have issues with this model of growth. But then going back to what Matthew has said, I think whatever happened to South Korea or some other Southeast Asian countries during the financial crisis has taught China a lesson about a running deficit, maybe even a brief and concentrated period of time could open your country to vulnerability, which is a reason for China want to continue its leadership in consisting or insisting on its export surplus.

14:38 >> Yeah, I would also say that that's not the only time that's happened. So if you look at the Euro crisis, I think we've seen in retrospect a similar phenomenon where a lot of countries did not were not concerned about effectively a balance of payments crisis of the kind that hit the East Asian countries, you know, 15 years earlier and then they were and then you look at the past 10 years and those countries have adjusted very dramatically and and even the countries that didn't necessarily get IMF bailouts or or other things with you know the ECB, they have shifted and so Europe as a whole has had this massive structural shift in its behavior in terms of spending less relative to what they earn. Which again at the individual country level it's understandable why you have that traumatic experience want to avoid it but from the perspective of the world as a whole it makes everyone worse off and so this is a really unfortunate phenomena that keeps happening. but that's you know you have that's sort of the structure of the way the financial system as it is you know having these you know periods of you know severe stress and then if you're in trouble I mean in theory the IMF is there to help you in practice hasn't really worked the way I think it was intended to and that's that's why we kind of keep ending up the situation I think there's a little distinction to be drawn about well how much the whole world is going to benefit or suffer from a prolonged period of trade imbalance and but then there's also I There are winners or loser to that and depending on which camp your country falls into I think the countries may have very different views on well yes maybe the whole world is probably coming down but then at least I'm still in a more favorable position in the whole world >> what happens though like 10 years from now say everybody continues at at the same level the surplus and the deficit >> I I I think I do have a couple of imaginations in my mind one is of course exchange rate I mean in way exchange rate is the way how to adjust trade imbalances and of course I think China is going into a I mean I I still remember China started its exchange rate reform about a decade ago and then R&B went down in devaluation for about 30% but it has appreciated 10 to 15% since last summer. So I think it is entering into a period where there is wider range of two-way fluctuation which I think is somewhat related to or reflecting of the trade imbalances not necessarily as closely as it should be in the past 2 three years but then I think that's one way of adjustment of course probably some other countries are thinking China is not adjusting enough or fast enough. So that's one area of adjustment. The other is I think I mean really depending on whether you are the global south or you are the more developed economies. I think the global south has issues with imbalances with China but then at the same time China is investing heavily into those countries through ODI. So yes there are some issues but then those countries seem to be feeling okay there will be a a transitional period where many of the goods were now importing from China will be eventually produced in China. Of course that's a whole different kind of questions we can ask but then they seem to be less concerned whereas the more developed country are thinking well well does it mean that each and everything that we're going to consume in our country will eventually be produced in China which I think is probably the bigger issue we're talking about here.

17:52 >> Are tariffs an answer? I've never heard economist say so but maybe you're the rare exception. >> I'm not convinced they would be. I mean look strictly speaking the currency is the thing that you'd expect to move and what's striking I mean Ning has said that China's currency has moved more relative to how it used to do but it's also striking that the current the exchange rate now the in sort of a trade weighted basis especially if you account for the fact that China's had a lot less inflation than the rest of the world is actually much lower now than it was say 5 6 years ago which is striking because that is the time period when Chinese goods became much more competitive on world markets. And so normally one might think if we sort of have a sort of standard model that's when your currency would appreciate that if you're make if if if you and your if your company your country's workers are making things that are better and more valuable for the world. One way they are rewarded for this is that their purchasing power purchasing power goes further internationally and basically their wages are worth more internationally the current but because the currency goes up and they can import more and the fact is that it's actually been reverse in in the past 6 years and obviously a lot of moving parts here in terms of China's not a fully open capital account what you invention and all that but it is striking that that is so sort of if we zooming out and say like the currency is very low how you get it from where it is to what might make more sense in a way that isn't and destabilizing from China's own perspective, Chinese government's perspective is a challenging question, but I mean that I think is sort of a macro perspective. I think that's also why I think some of China's trade partners are looking and say, well, this is, you know, kind of unreasonable. And if you have that perspective, tariffs certainly not the first best option, but you can you can see why some people might think like, well, the tariff might correct for this. So, like the normal reason you wouldn't use a tariff is is that you know, if you have normal floating exchange rates, you put the tariff on and that increases the relative appeal of investing in your country. So people are going to send money there and then your currency goes up and then the value of the tariff basically what you've effectively done is you've just screwed over your own exporters. and and nothing else changed. So that that's why people don't use tariffs historically. But sorry and and if the but if the currency is not moving then that creates a different dynamic.

20:03 >> I I won't deny that I think tariff will have some certain impact on balancing the the trade imbalance and also to that extent I think the floating off exchange rate will do something similar. But I do also want to bring up the possibility or the alternative explanation about I think Matthew mentioned about why China's export has really take a big lead after big leap after the the covid period. I think in that period yes of course there's some disruption in the global supply chain but then at the very same time China was managing very well in order to have a very well selfcontained supply chain which can produce a lot of things not just without disruption but at a much lower cost or much higher efficiency. So in that regard yes if you levy a 100% tariff on toys produced by China probably China will lose its competitiveness. At the same time, even if you levy a 100% tariff on new energy vehicles, China's new energy vehicles will still be very attractive in European market or maybe even in the states. Yeah, I think it's also worth the mechanism of a tariff is you're basically making it more expensive for your own people to buy things. So there might be reasons to do that just like there are reasons to raise taxes sometimes, but it's be clear about, you know, how it works and who's paying it and what what the costs are. And that's usually why people don't like to do them.

21:22 >> Yeah. Again, in theory, I think mean the whole world will be worse off with tariff no matter how much and levity from which country. >> Are we aligned on that the world will be worse off with tariff? >> Probably. I mean, obviously depends on sort of what the second order reactions are. I mean, if if the thing you're worried about is >> I agree to that. the second order in fact if if if the situation so I mean you know to be less sort of generic like Europeans are thinking about this as a possibility visa v China because of their concerns their auto industry and if their concern is that if they don't have if if their first choice is they would like either Chinese investment in Europe to produce electric vehicles that creates jobs and so forth or China has a currency appreciation or some combination of those things then they would prefer that and then they say well if we at that then we do this tariff because we think there's a systematic problem that's going to wipe out a large chunk of our industry. you know, you can see why from their perspective it might make more sense even if you're sort of starting from a blank slate and say this is not going to make people better off >> and like many other large and complex issues I think there's no one solution to the problem >> right but if that logic were to be true I get applying a tariff against China but there are many countries which don't orchestrate their currency you levy tariffs on them too right what's the logic there >> I I don't I don't think there is I mean I'm not ping tariffs I'm talking you asked the I think it's probably fair to say that we're not both of us neither of us is a big fan of but then >> yeah when you when you guys said earlier that you went to college together was that a tail he he went there for college I went there for PhD >> at different times how old are you guys >> I know but I want you to say it for camera >> old enough >> yeah right I don't know I'm 39 53.

23:17 >> Okay. I'm asking you all the questions that I don't have answers to. and I wish I knew. Why is American debt or American treasury say T bills 20 year long-term debt? Why is it still being bought at 4%. With the amount of debt that America is sitting on, I don't get why the world is buying this debt at 4%. So mostly it's not the world. Someone is actually it's Americans. So I guess that's one point. And in general and I'm sure Ning has a lot of thoughts on this as well, but I mean in general >> bond yields for countries that have their own currencies like the US, like China, like the UK. the interest rates mostly are a reflection of what people think inflation and growth are going to be in the future. And it's essentially a question of this is, you know, if I have a choice between buying this thing that's going to pay a fixed amount over time versus, you know, stocks and they're going to go up a lot more, you know, that's essentially what sets the interest rate. And people, they can borrow money if they want to buy it if they think it's too the yields are too high or or, you know, things like that. And that's mostly what's driving it. And that the the amount of debt outstanding is more of an issue in so far as you think it's going to affect inflation in the future. but even then it still gets back to sort of what you think inflation's going to be.

24:42 >> But shouldn't debt be the ability shouldn't debt be priced by the ability of the borrower to pay back? >> Well, right. But that's the that's the thing. They can they can they can always print they can always print the money. >> So that's why the inflation point. So as long as you as long as you don't think they're going to be, you know, printing so much that it moves inflation meaningfully and then even then it's still implanted to that because a lot has been printed.

25:06 So I come back to the question why why okay both the Americans domestically and foreigners why are they funding the American government at 4%. I will probably for domestic investors I think mean there are couple of issues I mean I do a lot of research on behavior economics so one is they call local bias so people prefer to buy securities from their own country period every country is like that. The other is I think mean American economy has been doing very well and then I think for American own people I mean even if the the country cannot replace that as long as is printing the money enough fast enough then I think the American people are happy enough with that. I think the bigger question is for foreign holders both institutional and to a smaller extent retails. I think there are a couple of reasons there. One is for I think the largest holders of US dollars is largely foreign exchange or foreign reserves and for investors in those regards or some to certain extent sovereign wealth funds. Those institutions they require liquidity and they also require the depths of the market and there's just no other place they can turn to. I mean no other is too strong but then I mean you can turn to crypto but then it's only like one or two trillion dollars and then gold is a little bit more than that but other than that we're talking about trillions and trillions of dollars of reserves which have to find a place to park. So in that regard they have to park in US there's no other country there's no big enough security for them to find the alternative. So I think that's one thing which I don't want to use the word hijack but then people don't have the alternative. So that's one explanation.

26:41 The other is I think as Matthew has pointed out US has been doing pretty well after the second world war probably not as well as before but then I think it all concentrated in the past 20 years after the global financial crisis because in 2007 if I'm not mistaken the balance sheet of the Fed is less than $1 trillion. It was as high as almost $9 trillion and now I think it's falling back to somewhere between six and seven.

27:06 So we're talking about the the Fed is holding six, seven times as much in its balance sheet, which is pretty much the money it has printed out to the rest of the economy. So I think that's going to affect both inflation in general and also asset prices, which I think is more concentrated in the US. So I think that's going to have long-asting and serious social and political complications, but then those things take a far longer period of time to adjust. You know, I think one thing just to point out that's sort of a more slightly more benign interpretation of this is as Ning was saying correctly that foreign investors, particularly reserve managers, want liquidity and they want it, which means it has to be a big market. But the only way it's a big market is if there's a lot of debt in the first place. So you cannot have a liquid market for assets unless the government's borrowing a lot in the first place. So there I mean it kind of goes together. It's like why is there not a European alternative?

27:53 Like Europe is a very large close in size right in size like collectively to the United States. ostensibly has a pretty investor-friendly legal system more or less you know but doesn't really compare part of it to the market's very fragmented individual countries have very strong incentives against borrowing in part because the euro crisis and so forth and so you know there's a reason you know Japan's another interesting case right there's a ton of debt outstanding actually relatively popular to a certain extent even though the yields until very recently were basically zero but you know again you have to and this is actually something that came up in in the panel that was on yesterday is you know China in theory could have a a place here but the central government does not issue much debt. a lot of reasons for that, but that is going to naturally reduce the demand or the the appeal of this thing these instruments for foreigners if there's not a lot of it out there and it's not traded.

28:42 >> China has capital controls. So does India where I come from. I personally believe that long-term if we didn't have capital controls more money would actually flow in and less would flow out. how is it in China? Do you feel that way? Do you think capital controls are a good thing or money should be more funible? >> as a market economist I don't think capital control is a good thing. But then going back to what you have said I think I I I think mean in the very very long term depending on how you define long term I think yes probably removing capital control there will be more money flowing in than flowing out. But in the very short term this is where I think policy makers are most concerned. in almost all countries I think they're concerned with a a short-term outflow and that's going to create really drastic shocks to the financial stability and then we have experienced that or witnessed that in the Asian financial crisis and in some other episodes of history. So I think that is where the central bankers and the policy makers in China are putting more attention to I think that that's sort of explaining why China is unwilling to or hesitant in removing capital control completely. I think China is going towards the right direction but they're at play a slower pace than the rest of the world is hoping for.

29:55 >> The rates we spoke about the treasury rates 4%. If you had to call it in 10 years I'm asking you the same thing because I I run a fund and I want to know how to allocate money. Where would you call American long-term debt what rate in 10 years? given that I'm not don't feel confident I can predict what's going to happen in the US in the next six months. I don't but maybe I'll push back a slightly different way which is I'm I I I actually sympathize with the idea that yields are somewhat low seem too low in the United States now rel not they'd be 10 years from now >> sympathize with us or >> what you were saying that why but although not necessarily for I'm not sure if it's the same reason but I think essentially that actually the growth outlook on the one hand in the US I think is somewhat better than had been implied when people were more concerned and you know pricing in a lot of rate cuts and also the flip side that inflation I think there was sort of a very >> naive optimistic view that inflation was just going to go right back down to 2% without any issues and I think that's and that didn't make sense to me before the you know Iran war and it still doesn't make sense to me and again for actually relatively benign reasons in so far as the economy is doing pretty well the job market's not deteriorating it had been stuck at three for a long time like why would it slow down so that's kind of where you If you if you think that in fact there is this sort of growth impulse from AI related investment, I would think that would increase the returns on risky assets which means that non-risky assets should pay more compensation which means yields should go up. We've seen a little bit of that in the past 6 months but I'm not sure it's been enough. I mean I don't feel I mean unlike you not run funds I don't feel confident enough to actually you know there's a lot of risk management things associated with that but that's that's kind of where I would be on that. I mean looking sort of the longer term you'd have to look at things like well what what is the state of the rule of law in the United States what's what's the growth what happens to demographics right I mean we've already had a huge change in the demographic outlook in the past couple years that is going to have an impact on you know long-term growth trajectory which should infect should affect you know what you think is the the right set of interest rates so there a whole lot of things that you know looking 10 years out very >> are there any direct correlations between demographics and economics like the world is aging India which was a very young country is aging what changes from an economic policy thinking in a way when the world is older.

32:21 So in theory what people would say is that you have less need for investment because you're not having the extra growth of more people older. I guess a couple things there's population growth rate then there's like the age composition. Those those things tend to be related but not quite the same. So if the growth rate of the population is slowing, you should expect to have less investment. That should push down interest rates. all else, you know, not changing. There had been research about saying that aging populations should actually lead to higher interest rates, but if you look at what the samples were, they were all based not on the actual age structure, but the dependency ratio.

33:00 >> And the dependency ratio of the societies you're looking at were all ones with lots of kids, which means they were actually growing rapidly. So it's a very different dynamic than having a lot of old people. So even if it's the the workers to non-workers ratio looks the same those they're going to have a very different kind of perspective there. So I mean the only real example we have of a country that's sort of done this is Japan although interestingly Japan now you've seen interest rates go up a bunch recently so you know who knows there a lot of moving part demographics are clearly important but how they translate to everything else and I'm I'd love to know what you know Ning's thoughts are on this >> I I I I think I tend to agree is agree with Matthew I don't think I'm going to give you a straight answer. a couple of things. One is I think the whole world is undergoing so many changes that it's very hard to make any reliable predictions on almost anything. I I recently published a book titled nonlinear thinking. I just think that we tend to think linearly even though the world is going through drastic changes. The second is I I I worry less about demographics even though it is a very very serious issue.

33:56 I worry more about the relative safety across different countries. after all I mean the the the the yield on treasury is not just a matter of the investment value it's also about the safety so I think given all the things that's happening in the world I think relatively speaking US is probably still the safest so in that regard what is the benchmark for the whole world when it comes down to monetary policy I I don't know I think mean ever since the the quantive easing we have entered into a new regime that nobody really knows the answer to because beforehand we thought oh such quanting such a supply of money will lead to inflation soon enough but then we haven't we have been searching for inflation for almost 12 13 years before it finally came back a little bit but then it seems to be disappearing again so why why is that if the if the raw input for anything everything is energy and energy prices have shot up I'm not even talking about the traded value but the actual physical value of the commodity why has inflation not come back in a more meaningful fully >> I have a theory a a sort of half joking theory which is I mean look at the stock market in the US and look at the housing market in China up until 2021 yes we don't have increase in inflation or the CPI for many countries but then most of the money went into asset prices and the property prices so in a way that is good because that is absorbing the the the uphand u the the the the pen up demand for the the consumer prices to go up. But then I think the longer eventual social problem from that is you have increasing income or wealth inequality in the society and then eventually that's leading to some extreme political movements which I think we're experiencing right now.

35:44 >> Is dd dollararization real? I know China started China changed after the tariffs on Russia. I think the pace of change increased. What's happening now after the conflict and the geopolitical turmoil of the past couple of quarters? >> I think China has been pushing the R&B to be more internationally adopted through either trade or through exchange swaps. I think that the case with Russia is just one small part of the the general push for R&B intern internationalization and to a greater extent I think I mean China has been increasing its trade surplus by so much that it has accumulated a lot of overseas adoption of R&B. That is one part of why R&B is becoming more popular. But just as we discussed in the other session yesterday, I think in terms of the total settlement for for for the whole world, R&B has not gone up a lot in the past decade or so. So in the regard of well is this a really big push or is there some balance or marketing mechanism is at play I think I would tend to think the letter is more powerful in yes China is becoming more powerful and more international but then it's still in the hands of in the eyes of the beholder about which one I would like to hold eventually and I think a big question for that is how to provide a better venue for foreign investors to invest in offshore R&B related or denominated assets which I think goes back to Matthew's points about Chinese companies or Chinese government would have to issue more safe assets overseas which has not happened so far. Yeah, I think getting back to one thing Ning was saying before is you cannot ddollarize unless there's an alternative and the you know R&B is obviously one possible one I think in one also obvious one and was very obvious people 20 years ago but no one talks about anymore is the euro which again like why why has that not become more of an alternative I think you know specifically in the Russia case is interesting because it wasn't unilaterally the US right that was actually a very coordinated move with the Europeans with the Japanese part of the reason the Russians were so surprised about this they they thought they'd actually protect it because they moved all the reserves reserves out of dollar mostly out of dollars you know in anticipation of this and were very disappointed when they found out like the Japanese froze their reserves for example so and that's that you know the you know moving to what I think is is the big question here and if there isn't you know constructing a market that would be compelling you having a currency where there the assets for it and and the infrastructure not a lot of people seem to be willing to do that and so it hasn't happened yet >> on that topic I think crypto was considered as a potential I mean contender to that and of course I mean it has its drawbacks but then I think the introduction of stable coin in the past couple of years maybe solidifiesing solidifying US dollar's dominance in a way about R&B is not pushing as hard or as fast into that direction >> stable coins are just dollars >> it is just dollars but a different way of using dollar >> gold and some other weird stuff I mean who knows what's on >> but then I think the the the technological the technologically more advanced and more efficient and cheaper way of adopting dollar may give dollar an additional edge I I would put stable coin as dollar moving away from swift to a better transfer mechanism but essentially the dollar >> u as economists do you think crypto has future >> if you take the cynical view that that the appeal of crypto is the ability to operate outside of the law then I feel like there's always going to be a market for that >> and also I mean if you take it as an asset I think there's always a market for that too just from a pure motivation of diversification and hedging.

39:28 >> When we were talking about ddollarization, will it come down to something as simplistic as who owns what percentage of global trade should have the incumbent currency of the world? >> I don't think so and it has not been so historically. I think it has a lot of influencing factors in terms of how what is the trade balance looking like? what is sort of the the power of a country in order to guarantee or ensure the safety of its security and then of course the future how well the economy grows economic growth will be in that country and then of course how bad the inflation will be to offset that growth.

40:07 >> Can you wager a guess as to what will happen again in the next 10 years to global currency? What happens to the dollar also? Will it depreciate or appreciate >> against what? >> Against the remn it probably should because you're running a trade surplus >> probably. So yeah >> against a country where they have a deficit against maybe it should appreciate. >> Well should and would are two different things.

40:37 >> Do you think it will? Do you think it'll become so transient and transactional the value of the dollar? A lot of people, you know, whenever there's turmoil in the world, when there's a war, even if America's secondderee part of the war, people actually move back into the dollar because it's the safe haven asset, which kind of is very counterintuitive when I think about it. Do you think that will change and tomorrow the world will be different?

41:06 >> I think the only constant in life is change. So I think it will change. It's just a matter of whether it's going to change in a decade or change in a century. So I think eventually it will change and I think there are more and more people saying it cannot go on forever. I mean meaning that the US cannot always printed its way out of any kind of trouble. But then I think it takes time. I just want to make the analogy that the US economy surpassed that of UK in around 1875 but then US dollar did not totally replace sterling until like almost 100 years later. So it's a very long and gradual process and full of changes ups and downs. Let me put it this way. As a trader, if I were not to trade a dollar swap, I'm not trading dollar, euro, dollar, remn, but I'm figuring out if I should buy the dollar index or short it, what would I do?

41:56 One thing for sure, we're not a trader for the next 10 years. So, yeah, I mean, it's a it's a tricky question because I think one thing we've seen is that a lot of things that appear to be unsustainable and you can write all these arguments for it turn out to be sustainable for longer than you you'd think. And there also all these other factors that people don't tend to look at. I mean you one thing I remember learning about and people thought it was such a revoly when it happened the there's a big earthquake in Japan in 1995 >> and people were looking at this and they were looking at in the context of Japan had you know they'd had their big banking and real estate bust and the aging and shrinking population was coming out and so people were saying oh clearly the yen is going to depreciate. There was like there's all these structural headwinds for it to tailwinds for it depreciate and then you have this earthquake and what did it do?

42:38 went up a ton because it turned out that all these Japanese insurers had all these foreign assets and they had all these claims they had to pay and the foreign assets were in other currencies and the claims were in yen. So they had to sell all the stuff and they dumped it and then the yen shot up. So I I think you know some of what we call like a flight to safety. I mean this is all what happened in the financial crisis with with the dollar, right? The dollar had been depreciating for a long time.

42:58 There are good reasons for that. the US was arguably the center of of the banking crisis. You know the dollar shoots up and it's not because people thought the dollar was a safe place to be. is because it happened to be the case that there were a lot of short-term claims denominated in dollars and there were long-term assets that were not and you know that was just how people had to pay their bills. So it things like this just make it very tricky to say with confidence just cuz we have all these sort of theories like oh it should be this because of all these good reasons and that's how a benign adjustment would occur. It might do something totally different. M I know Raid Dalio and he keeps saying that when short-term rates go up and long-term rates are below short-term rates is the first real sign that the dollar the incumbency of dollar as global currency is going to change. Do you buy into that?

43:48 >> I mean far far to disagree you know with something that D would say about global macro. I'm not sure I fully understand like how that works. But >> I mean I I think one thing also that's an interesting perspective is you know we generally talk about that like a reserve currency and I historically isn't quite right. there were usually more than one. I mean there some would be bigger than other ones but even in the period people talk about like sterling is the reserve currency. It was notable in so far as say like Japan had most of its foreign reserves in sterling asses like the early 1900s but there were other large blocks and arguably this is function of empire but still like that French francs or reich marks or you know US dollars right and so like it wasn't completely the sort of all one or nothing and I I I think a return to that kind of world I mean first of all that world arguably still does exist right it's not like 100% of all trade is in dollars 100% of financial assets that's just not how it is but there are other currencies used. So you could have more moving in that direction. I mean even even the UK right people do not think about the UK as being like a major alternative player but in terms of its share of global reserves in terms of its share of financial transactions the pound actually punches way above its weight in a way comparable that the US dollar punches above its weight. It's just that the UK is such a small economy people don't pay attention to it but proportionally it's actually pretty comparable and I think that that kind of thing you know could keep happening.

45:06 Actually the euro is comparable like if you were to put all of the countries together I think they get to like 60 70% of American GDP. Right. >> That's right. But it's a share of financial assets is much smaller. So that's that's what I mean about Yeah. So it could be right. I think that's striking that it's so much and that was definitely an ambition a lot of Europeans had at the time was to be you take advantage and sort of reach parody there. which they have not and that's sort of an interesting question why but I mean that certainly could >> I don't know if I would say this for majority but there seems to be some kind of philosophical decoupling from the US as well in the recent past in Europe >> the current majority >> the current the current American administration has not made it easy for the Atlanticist Europeans I'll say that right >> and and then I think it's probably not just the US I think I mean there's I mean Mark Harney prime minister from Canada made the the the statement in Davos this year about the the midsize economy. I think that there probably a greater need for a a block. Maybe that's the majority of the countries to have a different form of coalition or collective voice to be heard in the in the world because I think the world is becoming more and more concentrated US China and then everybody else but the world was not like that.

46:21 >> That was such a good speech. I think he called it middle powers. >> Yes. >> Yeah. which is interesting because we talk, you know, Europeans are like, "Oh, that sounds like us." Because each European country thought of that. But if they'd actually, you know, put their heads together, Europe collectively is just as big a poll or could be as the US and China economically and yet, you know, that's not how enough of them think about it.

46:39 >> I think that's the opportunity, but that's also the challenge, >> right? H >> when you spoke about the real estate the housing crash name back home whenever I talk to real estate developers there's a certain delusion that land prices can never go down >> I've heard this time and time again. I've heard this from everybody for a long long time now. >> How did it happen in China so maybe people back home can learn? >> I think it's a matter of narrative. I work a lot with Bob Schiller, so I think I'm unavoidably influenced by him. I think I mean in the first decade of this century it's probably the normal marketization of real estate because after all people don't have a property to own before 2000s in general and then I think the two after 2008 after the 4 trillion stimulus packages I think the housing prices went up so much that people are just convinced that well this is the best way to make my money and then I think after 2015 2016 in order to alleviate the fall down from the stock market crash I think there's another big way of off the push. So in China, this is why I wrote my book, a guaranteed a bubble. I think the government has a lot to do to support or to push up or shore up the housing prices which is solidified people's expectation about housing prices will never come down or land prices will never >> Can you elaborate elaborate what does the government have to do?

48:02 >> Well, I think a couple of things. One is in general people believe that the central government really cares about the GDP growth and back in the past decade from 2009 through 2020 real estate investment is the best way to boost the short-term economic growth. I think whenever there's a slowdown in the economy coming down from the central government down to the local government they all want to sell more houses build more houses so that's going to push up the economical growth at the same time which I think will be an more complex issue in India is land sales have become the the biggest contribution to fiscal revenues to many local governments in China. So of course local governments have the incentive of pushing up the housing prices eventually in order to sell more lands at higher prices. So those two forces work together to ensure people really believe there's no way the government is willing to let down the housing prices. And I think that is that guarantee from the government is reinforcing people's already strong expectation as you described in India about housing prices will never fall. Of course that's the purpose of my book. Once it starts turning, it turns very badly.

49:13 >> Yeah. Whenever everybody believes the same thing. >> Exactly. I mean, I also say there are plenty of other places that had housing bubbles and busts recently with different economic systems. So, it's a it's a pretty it's a pretty broad-based phenomenon. And I think actually the commonality is in those places in in Europe and the US and in Japan and elsewhere is because so many people have the majority if not the vast majority of their wealth in housing there is a very reasonable motivation for governments to not want housing prices to go down. I mean maybe you don't want to go up a lot but you certainly don't want to go down because you know you're screwing over a lot of your constituents. And so that the problem is as you said if everyone believes it's not going to go down that creates incentive to borrow more to go up right cuz then your downside risk is cap so you're going to borrow more to make it go up and that that's where it gets challenging but I mean that there is a there is a reason for this.

49:58 >> Do you have property taxes like high property taxes? >> That's one thing I have been advising a lot in China we do have in two cities but to a far less extent than what we normally have in other parts of the world. >> I think that's the only way to keep it in check. >> I agree. I I feel like even in India we have really low property taxes. We have a lot of the shadow economy the the money which is not paying tax sitting in real estate and maybe a good way to bring that back into the formal ecosystem is having higher property tax.

50:30 >> Yes. And as a California resident, we have we have the delightful situation of a a headline property tax that is, you know, normal, but then most people don't pay it because your actual the value of your house does not adjust with the market, which it creates. Some of my colleagues from UC used to have a research about showing that comparing the different states in terms of their property tax and the the amount of appreciation their housing prices there's a clear negative correlation between the level of property taxes and the speed by which your housing prices appreciate. I say another thing that as a policy reminded of you US cross-state differences the extent to which lenders have less protection if they're lending against real estate that will also be a useful corrective because the more secure they are or the more secure they think they are whereas I I remember looking at or reading research on this in the US the housing debt so Texas some legacy of the like pre I think the Mexican constitution was inherited that like you essentially if you did a home equity loan on a house in Texas more or less like you could you had no coll like there was forclosure like you get nothing. and so one interesting consequence of this was that you did not have unlike much of the rest of the country when in the 2000s there was not really this huge boom in Texas and in housing in mortgage debt and housing prices because you couldn't use it in the same way as as collateral for you know to finance your consumption unlike a lot of other states. So I think that's that kind of thing which was definitely not done deliberately on their part but you know that it's I think those kinds of reforms can also be useful. Matthew, as someone living in California, is the world turning left again? Are we going back to socialism?

52:02 >> not in Cal. No, actually, California, San Francisco is you know, >> if I take San Francisco out of it. >> No. Oh, well, no. I take a few more pockets out of it. Yeah. >> Oh, no. I mean, that's that's kind of funny is you know, San Francisco has a reputation in the United States of being like one of the most leftwing places. But you know in the past four years San Francisco has real I mean compared to the country as a whole maybe but like compared to other cities moved kind of the opposite direction of a lot of places. I I don't think I don't think I don't think we're a bell weather but I also don't think that there's sort of a universal move one way or the other.

52:31 >> What do you think works? You guys are like economist. if you were to try and model policym and governance for a new country say we're creating a country today the country is called Matthew plus Ning what would the economic policies look like what is most conducive you have good demographics 30-year-old population a million people in your country big question broad question >> I think depends depends on whether Matthew is chairing the Senate or I'm chairing the Senate.

53:09 >> Would you like to go first, Nick? >> Yeah, I think probably a couple of things. I think I mean we always argue for a very important trade-off between efficiency and the fairness. So I think mean borrowing from the experience the successful experience of China I think I would say to start the country I would put more emphasis on efficiency than fairness which is not very easy to sell but I think that's going to lift the country. Actually China started with fairness then efficiency.

53:36 >> Yeah. I think that's just before the reform. Exactly. Yeah. The the the reform opening up. Yeah. Exactly. So I think I mean but I think that there's already some contrast in there. So I think mean I would put more emphasis on growth than the allocation of the resources eventually. But then I think that's the first thing I want to say. The second is we have to have some check and balance in ensuring the very basic welfaress welfare of the the people who are less advantaged. So I think again going back to how do you trade off efficiency and fairness and then I lean more towards efficiency but then how do we ensure fairness at the very same time.

54:12 >> Maybe you should coin a term because this is coming back in becoming so cool again that capitalism and socialism will probably have to merge and come up with a new word >> especially because of what Matthew's friends in AI are doing in San Francisco. So if somebody has to come up with a word, maybe it's you with all the books. >> Okay, good idea. >> One thing I would just say to add to your question, I think the size of the country actually is a important variable here. like if you're a small if you're a country of a million people you have a whole very different set of constraints and also different set of opportunities and if you're a country of you know 500 million >> and I think that's also important I think looking at you know if if you're starting from the situation of saying your country million people looking at places that are successful like like a Singapore or an Ireland or something I think are actually the relevant examples more than a big country that had a different experience and conversely if you were a big country looking at those are not necessarily be useful because there are certain niches that you just can't fill if you're that big >> and for that matter I think the three of us were in no position to make a comment on a country of 1 million people to start with.

55:13 >> Yeah. But we can have a new country. Do you think again this is a really extrapolated question but the way the world is moving for a while when I was growing up I thought everything was getting more globalized. The world was becoming one. Today we seem to be going in the opposite direction each country for its own. Where does this path go? And for that path, what economic model works best?

55:45 >> May I ask how old are you? >> I'm his age 39. >> Oh, okay. You're young enough. So, I think we already have very different memories of the world. And I I think I grew up in the period when I think the world is really coming together. And then it's changing, of course, for my son and for my daughter, who are both in their up who are in their early 20s. I I think I I want to emphasize on one thing. I mean I do a lot of research on behavioral economics and behavioral decision-m I think memory and experience have a lot of influence on people's mind and how they behave. So in a way I think we have evidence showing that people who were born and grew up in the great depression will be less likely to take risks and invest in the rest of their life. So I think it means it's sort of self-fulfilling in what you exper experience is becoming what you do or what you decide to do. So in that regard I think yes I think the word is far less globalization than before but then how that is going to shape the new generation of the people I don't know I think it once there's a trend in history I think it tends to last for quite some time until it turns around.

56:52 So I think we are unfortunately in this period of stagnation or even reversal of globalization. >> Yeah, I think Ning has made a really good argument for why you have long cycles of history because if it if it's based on experience and people live and then they that shapes their behavior for the rest of their lives and they die and you have a new generation that's going to last. I I think it's I think it is instructive that unfortunately basically as soon as you had the generation that lived through you know World War II die, we suddenly see a lot of sort of fascist or quasi fascist movements coming back and a lot of the places where they were fighting. And I think that's unfortunate. and I don't know if it's predictable, but I think that I think it's very much related to the kind of phenomena you're talking about.

57:28 >> I don't know if this is something you guys cover, but any views on India and what we should do better. >> I I think it's a large and emerging and very promising country and I have to say that I think there should be more understanding about India from China's side. I think I I know I think I'm under the impression that Indian have more understanding of China whereas there's not as much understanding of India. Hence there's less collaboration between the two countries which is a little pitiful.

58:02 >> Yeah I'll be honest I don't know as much as I should. I think one thing that one thing I do know that I think is is striking and useful is you know we were talking earlier about countries that are importing more in their exporting and their stage of development. And I think India actually has been doing that you know pretty consistently and I think that's you know they have been having you know strong relatively rapid growth over you know the past several day I think basically this was the early '90s I believe you know there were a lot of reforms that were done in India and that's sort of you know led to obviously but that's you're reaching the limit of my knowledge here so I'm going to I'm going to stop.

58:32 >> Okay. I think we're kind of out of time. Any last thought? Anything you want to leave the audience with? Well, I think we are going through a very unusual period of time. I mean based on our own growth period. So I think probably just one thing that is to embrace whatever comes. >> That sounds scary. >> Embrace whatever comes is a positive attitude. that's what I thought. I I do think you know to to your previous question I I think that there is a concern about sort of the and end of the sort of positive trend of you know growing international peace and cooperation and globalization. I think that's going to create a lot of changes which we've already seen some and I think a lot of them might be unpleasant but hopefully we can at least reduce the impact or mitigate that and maybe if we're aware of that it's happening maybe make it less of a problem and people be less afraid of each other.

59:23 >> I don't think meth is more positive than I am. I didn't think I was repos. >> But thank you guys for doing this. Hope it was fun for you too and hope to catch up with you guys soon. Thank you. Mhm.

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