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Adjusting for Credit Risk: Masters In Business with David Eichhorn

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# 0:00

Introduction to David Eichhorn

Who is David Eichhorn and what is his background?

David Eichhorn is the CEO of NISA Investment Advisors, managing approximately $0.5 trillion in institutional assets. He has a strong background in finance and mathematics, and identifies as a quant with a deep understanding of investment strategies, particularly in fixed income and liability-driven investing.

  • David Eichhorn has a background in finance and mathematics.
  • He is a quant with expertise in investment strategies.
  • NISA Investment Advisors focuses on institutional asset management.
# 13:35

Transition to Head of Investment Strategies

What challenges did David face when transitioning to head of investment strategies?

David transitioned from a client service role to head of investment strategies, which involved adapting to a more consultative approach in managing client relationships and customizing investment strategies as the firm grew, particularly in liability-driven investing.

  • David moved from client service to a leadership role in investment strategies.
  • The firm emphasizes a consultative approach to client relationships.
  • Growth in liability-driven investing necessitated a deeper focus on strategy.
# 27:10

Market Dynamics and Equity Strategies

How do current market conditions affect investment strategies?

Current market conditions, including a strong credit environment and the concentration in equity markets, challenge traditional investment strategies. David emphasizes the importance of diversification and making smaller bets across portfolios to mitigate risks associated with concentrated positions.

  • The credit environment is currently favorable, affecting investment strategies.
  • Diversification is crucial in mitigating risks in concentrated equity markets.
  • Smaller bets across portfolios can lead to better overall performance.
# 40:45

Government and Corporate Debt Impact

How does government debt issuance affect the investment landscape?

The issuance of government debt can crowd out other investors, but the demand from large tech companies (hyperscalers) for capital is also influencing market dynamics. This competition for investment dollars is pushing yields higher, as corporate bonds are issued at higher rates to attract investors.

  • Government debt issuance can crowd out private investors.
  • Hyperscalers are competing for investment dollars, affecting yields.
  • Corporate bonds are issued at higher rates due to market competition.
# 54:20

Understanding Alpha in Private Credit

What is the distinction between alpha and leverage in private credit?

David discusses the misconception that high returns in private credit are due to alpha when they may actually be the result of leverage. He advocates for accessing private credit through unlevered vehicles to avoid high fees and unnecessary risks associated with leveraged investments.

  • High returns in private credit may be mistaken for alpha but often stem from leverage.
  • Using unlevered vehicles can provide better access to private credit.
  • Avoiding high fees and risks is crucial in investment strategy.

Transcript

0:00 Strap yourself in for another banger. I sit down with the head of NISA Investment Advisors. They run $0.5 trillion or so in institutional assets. David Eichhorn has been CEO there for a few years, as well as the head of investment strategies. He's not just a fixed income and pension fund, investor. He's a quant. He has a deep understanding of what drives, liability based, strategies, as well as the bond market, geopolitics, everything that's going on, what really produces alpha as opposed to just access risk and leverage.

0:41 I thought this conversation was fascinating. And I think you will too. With no further ado, my conversation with Mrs. David Eichhorn. David Eichhorn, welcome to Bloomberg. Very, delighted to be here. Loved the show and, excited to chat today. I'm delighted to have you. What you guys do is really fascinating and so unusual. We're going to delve into that.

1:12 But before we get there, I want to spend a little time talking about your background. You get a bachelor's of science degree in business administration, majors in finance and mathematics from Washington University in Saint Louis. Was that sounds like investing is the original career plan. Was that it from the start? Mostly the career plan was, you know, pay bills, honestly, and pay and and try to work through school and all that. Right. So, but yeah, I, I've always considered myself a quant at heart.

1:42 And so, it was a really nice and fortunate combination. I'd love to say there was a great plan in it, but, I'm a first generation college grad. I didn't know that was even a thing until some number of years ago that became popular to kind of talk about that first one in your family to go to college. No. All my brothers and sisters. But our gen was the first, you know, and so, it certainly it was it was great being local at Washington University.

2:06 I grew up in Saint Louis. I was a commuter, which isn't even allowed anymore. Probably a regrettable decision from a college life experience, but, but but had to work a lot to to pay the bills of what you when it was still possible kind of to pay for college still back then. But the math, the math really was the superpower that I think, supercharge the finance. Degree, frankly. So, I met, you know, Bill did vig who's who I love to describe when I was Nobel laureate, Phil did vig at Washington University, because of the math degree.

2:37 He, he took a shine to me, for lack of a better term. And, you know, it's more one of those, you know, in the land of the blind, one eyed man is king. I had some programing background. I knew how to. I knew, I'll say, relatively sophisticated math for what was in the finance department, and and he really got help get me my first job at JPMorgan. And I'm eternally grateful for Phil. And he remains a great friend to this day.

2:59 You spent your first three years after college at J.P. Morgan, again working on the institutional side, helping clients develop investment policies, strategic asset allocations and perhaps most importantly, asset liability management strategies. Tell us about your J.P. Morgan experience. Well, I'll probably come back to the theme many times, but, serendipity has struck a lot in my career. So. So Phil connected me with Mike Veneto, J.P. Morgan, who, ran the what they call the strategic Investment Advisory Group.

3:32 Dom lucked into that. That was a group of, I think at the time, 17, 18 PhDs. And we were a couple of us were the first ever undergrad hires. And even within that group lucked into as opposed to cleansing databases and god awful work that the quants needed. I somehow got put in an a client facing role very quickly. We advised we shared free consulting, you know, maybe air quotes for, you know, free consulting to our large clients on various, you know, classic mean variance optimization style analysis of managers, things that were, you know, newer for the time to roll out to clients.

4:06 And so I got a great, background in that. And at that time, most people were weren't doing it. We started really pushing the concept of asset liability managing, really what became, I'd say, the forerunner to LDI type strategies. How do you amongst other things, but certainly for large corporate pensions, how do you manage risk as opposed to in an absolute context, how do you manage it? Vis-a-vis a liability. Whether that be how you think about your equity allocation, but maybe most importantly, how you think about your fixed income allocation.

4:35 How does it mitigate some of the liabilities inherent, interest rate risk? And again, not many people listened in the late 90s. And that kind of continued on into the early aughts at NISA. But it was setting the groundwork for what ultimately became kind of known as LDI. And so I think the average layperson hears liability and they're thinking, car accident. Yeah. Explain. Especially from a pension fund managers perspective, what do future liabilities mean in plain English? Well, you know, you know, our industry uses some funny terminology like liability.

5:06 It is a liability. Ultimately the corporation I kind of think of it a little differently. It's a promise by the corporation to its to its, participants and its employees to pay them a benefit in the future. And, of course, there's a lot of rules around these, these promises and the ability to how to fund them over time because of a lot of issues that have occurred in past decades. So these are pension trust where assets are set aside to pay off these liabilities.

5:32 But what the liability represents is pensions that have been very much earned by the participants that are owed a, a retirement benefit, typically classic defined benefit structures or are a retirement benefit for life when you when you've retired often that have some, some portion of it is will outlive you if your spouse outlives you, etc.. So they're very long dated really bonds effectively. And that's kind of what we wanted to point out. Certainly in our early days in this, as we were pointing out, these liabilities in pension funds, think of it as a short position in a bond.

6:05 You owe someone money for a long, long time. So if interest rates fall, that makes that liability more valuable. I also equals harder to pay off all else equal. And if interest rates go up vice versa. So a natural mitigation strategy is is to own bonds on very long bonds like zero coupon treasury strips. That was kind of some of our early innovation at NASA. And then over time, where as folks got more and more comfortable with derivative strategies using things like Treasury futures, interest rate swaps, a whole host of things to hedge more and more of that interest rate risk with a derivative instrument to to offset the volatility of that liability.

6:40 And there's a quote of yours that I found okay. All right. Well my buddy I say way too much. So what is. And you said the best career advice you've ever received was to quote treat your career like a financial investment. The earlier you accumulate knowledge, the longer it compounds. Yes, yes. It's what I tell our new hires all the time, you know, and I always say that because it's funny, like, you know, work a lot of hours, invest a lot in your time, but, you know, just work a lot, work really hard right out of school, you know, comma says the CEO.

7:13 Right. You know, of course I want that out of my board. Yeah, exactly. You know, and of course, I, I'm very upfront on these issues. Yeah, I get a dividend from that. If you do that early in your career there's no doubt. But and I hope you're staying at NASA for the rest of your career as well. But but you get a dividend the remainder of your career when you and I. And I'd love to say I had, like, that perfect vision, but that's exactly what happened to me at JPMorgan with the breadth I got.

7:36 And then when I joined at NASA, it was less breadth, but crazy depth, in particular in the bond market, etc. so I had that opportunity if I, if I as I leaned in, I built this, I think a lot of intellectual capital early in my career that now I'm, I'm taking a lot of debits from that, that big that those big early investments. And I always point out to folks because, you know, life, life's always complicated, but it's never going to get easier than straight out of school.

8:00 You know, life gets harder as it goes on. So when folks asked me in their young, about work life balance, I kind of giggle. And I giggle, partly because that's not how I almost view the world, but. But I also think about it more from your entire career. I mean, I'm a bond guy, right? NPV work life balance over your whole career probably means overloading the beginning of your career. It sets you off to have a really great bowels, because there will be times where you do need to take you have kids, you have things going on in life.

8:27 Parents where you have to take a little bit of withdrawal from that balance, but you've already built it. And so that's that to me, is is again, I'd love to say that's how I thought of it when I was 21 years old, coming out of school. It just how it worked out. I at least have the sense to realize how it worked for me. And certainly in between what the investment bankers at Goldman do 100, 120 hours a week and the folks in France, with August and July off in 30 hours.

8:54 You said that? Not me, but okay, somewhere in the middle is something that's rational right out of college, whether that's 50 or 60 hours a week. Yeah. You build up that knowledge base and that's what compounds there's no doubt. And but you know, it's also I mentioned New York. You know, I was probably so I was never investment banker never though 120 hours or whatever. But you know, it's probably 80 hours a week, but, you know, an honest Barry, you know, it's sad to admit it, but tell my kids, as I get older, I can't be embarrassed anymore.

9:19 It's said, you know, I didn't know anybody in New York. I was kind of with a group of folks that were a lot older than me, PhDs and whatever, me, a couple great friends. But, I didn't have much else to do, which is a funny thing to say in New York and maybe a little lonely. And then the other thing is, like I say, one of my two checks went to rent every month, even at a well, pay JPMorgan.

9:36 You know what? I chose to live. So if you stayed after 8:00 at JP, what you got fed. And so they put you in a car. And I thought getting these, you know, Chinese was just the best thing ever. I, I walked I was close enough to walk so I didn't need the car. But but so, so lo and behold, suddenly, you know, then you come in every once on the weekend, and then it adds up to 80 hours.

9:54 Yeah, no doubt about it. But I think I benefited from that far more. This is my point. Like JP Morgan got something out of that. I know I got a lot more. I got a lot more. It was almost like stealing, honestly. What I got out of that amazing. Almost like stealing. I want to I want to keep progressing through your career. After three years, you jumped from JP Morgan. Which is a giant platform. Yeah. Yeah.

10:17 To what? At least at the time, was a much smaller one in, in 1999. What motivated that, that transition? Well, certainly nothing against, JP Morgan. It was a wonderful firm and and it is an amazing firm and I think continue continues to to to marvel at what that organization has been able to accomplish. So loved my time. They're deeply appreciative of Mike and the whole team for for my time you know working at JP Morgan. And again, honestly supercharge my career.

10:45 The exposure I got was just outsized, for for kids straight out of school with a lowly BSB, a, you know, degree, but a couple things, you know, was interested, you know, certainly had, you know, at the time it was the.com bubble kind of brewing and everyone was talking about employee ownership and, and, you know, being at a startup, NISA felt like a startup. And it kind of was it was only five years old when I went there.

11:09 But being really honest, I was a little homesick. I love I love my time in New York. I I'll never say a bad word about New York. I enjoyed it, but I knew I wouldn't live there, the rest of my life. And, my then girlfriend, now wife, was in Saint Louis. We met in college, actually. We worked at the same frozen custard stand. That's how we met. And it was time to make a decision. And ultimately move back to Saint Louis and, started talking to Jesse.

11:36 Oh, it's prior CEO. Dear friend, to this day, he was reluctant to hire me. I always like to say, because he thought I had gotten a little too much exposure for only three years in, and I could be a problem child, at NASA. But we worked that out over time, and it was a great story ever since. So you you work with the founders of this, as effectively an apprentice for. Yeah, 20 years. Is that a fair number?

12:00 Guess it depends on how you want to carbon date it. And when and when when exactly. You know who is the apprentice and who's the master. But, I it's funny you use that term very. I don't know if that's great due diligence on me or. But I don't know if I've ever made that public, but I refer to, having the great luxury of apprentice, of apprenticing under a number of, of really masters of their craft and, and whether it be Jess or Bill or Kenny... -So Jess Yawitz is one of the founders, and Bill Marshall, -Co-founder?

12:26 They started they were both professors at Washington University and went to Goldman Sachs, mid-80s. Really the first quant revolution there. They went there actually to build the effectively that Goldman competitor of the Marty Liebowitz group over at Solomon and so built a huge quant group unlike me just truly hated New York with a white hot passion. So he always wanted to get back to Saint Louis, and ultimately did that. He was actually just was I don't know if his official title was CIO, but when they started GE, Sam, Jess was effectively the first CIO of of GSA.

12:57 Oh no. And so but disliked New York, etc. ultimately moved back to Saint Louis in 90 and effectively bought management buyout of a company called National Investment Services of America, which became Nestle formerly, as it's known today, in 1994. So he's he's a Goldman Sachs in 90. Yes. Around the same time as people like Lee Cooperman and Cliff fastness. And they were a run of folks running GE. Sam, I could be wrong. I yeah, I could be wrong.

13:26 I think maybe Bill hired Cliff and so I could be wrong on that. But it's funny you say Leon Cooperman was was just his first boss at that. He was officially the boss of GE. Sam. And I think when Jess left, surprisingly, I do think that wasn't well liked. I don't I think words were exchanged, but I know they're they're they're are, good friends. These days. It made it may have taken a little cooling off. Lee, doesn't hesitate to say no.

13:51 That's what everyone says. I've never met him personally. And so I've had him on the podcast. I know Cliff very well. Yeah, he's one of my favorite quants. Yes. World, because he also is endlessly amusing and again, and witty and. No, no, I appreciate people who don't have that filter. I share that affliction. So when I see it in someone else, I'm like, oh, you got to watch that. Yeah, that's not a great thing for you to be saying.

14:18 Cliff can get away with it much more than I can. Yeah, absolutely. And, I always enjoy his podcast because there's always something I learn. You're apprenticing with the two co-founders for 20 years. In 2018, you become head of investment strategies. That's a substantial position and certainly a giant promotion from where you began. Tell us a little bit about that transition. What were the challenges and surprises that await? Maybe I was 18, I don't remember exactly the timetable.

14:46 So when I joined, I was actually in the client service group. And so this is the style of how we work with clients has always been highly consultative. We're only an asset manager. We don't have consulting fees or anything like that, but highly consultative engineered solutions. Almost everything is in a separately managed account. So our client service team would would our route were are investment professionals a deeply know our strategies and deeply know how to customize them over time, as we started to catch some growth, particularly in LDI, there was a natural reason to have still that same model of client service, but then a group dedicated to like, okay, one more level of depth that focuses on on custom design of strategies, etc.

15:25 and that's when we formed the investment strategy group. I, I honestly don't I would have been in the mid aughts and what have you. And, and that's what has now grown is really like a parallel group in the client service investment strategy group working amazing tandem together of being highly client centric. Our client team is amazing at how they connect with clients, work with them very closely, understand what they're trying to accomplish, and then the investment strategy team, among some other things they do really operate almost like a Swat team where depending on a particular client issue strategy, something we're trying to solve in some cases, to be very clear, we can't solve it. It just doesn't work.

16:01 But we that group will swoop in to see if we can design something highly bespoke, that hopefully in markets that are very hard help, help solve some of those client issues. Coming up, we continue our conversation with David Eichhorn, Chief Executive Officer and head of investment strategies at NISA, discussing how he helped build the firm into a nearly $0.5 trillion manager. I'm Barry Ritholtz, you're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

16:31 I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters and Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week is David Eichhorn. He is chief executive officer and head of investment strategies at NISA Investment Advisors, an institutional manager running nearly $0.5 trillion in client assets. So we mentioned you became head of investment strategies in around 2018, 2021, as Yawitz and Marshall step back, you become CEO.

17:04 First question about that, what was the reaction from clients? You've been there for 20 years. Did you have to demonstrate, hey, I'm up to the job or did they did they know that you already? Well, there's a few things to unpack there. First, actually, really important date. And we can come back to employee ownership. But actually, maybe the most seminal moment, more than certainly me becoming CEO was, on January 1st of 19, we effected a, management buyout of Jess and Bill.

17:29 So, so, so so that was, you know, it's hard to go from Gen one to Gen two. I always joke, I'm more like Gen 1.23 or something, right? That's close to the beginning. But I'm not a founder to be sure. So that transition of staying employee held, which is not easy to do in our industry, was really employees and without outside capital, no private equity stakes, no, etc.. That was not easy to pull off. And, that was that was a big event in our history and one we're really, really proud of because of the the, the we think being employer held is undoubtedly an enormous competitive advantage.

18:06 And we talked about doing it forever. But you know, everybody says they're going to stay employee held. And then not everyone does. So so I think that was probably more moment momentous. You know a client once said to me and just like, you know, when I see companies sell, it's always obvious to me why it's good for the owners. It's rarely been obvious why it's good for me. And so and that's our intention to stay that way, which remains hard.

18:27 So, you know, business is hard. So that was a real seminal moment. And I guess because of that, by the time you know, the other thing about being one of the great thing about being employee held is that we just answer to ourselves. We don't have outside shareholders. So it was to to pick an industry term. It was such a gradual glide path. You know, if Jess were here, I think we'd both say, when exactly did I become effective CEO?

18:49 And we really wouldn't know. But it was before that date, and one I had the luxury of working with all of our clients for so long and really getting to know them. So it's not like I was an unknown entity, and I think the writing was very much on the wall. Somewhere along the way, I think I got the title of president, which kind of made it clear there's a succession plan. I don't even know the years because they honestly, they just kind of blur together and, and honestly, you know, if I have, you know, one, one regret, you know, I think maybe in other times or place or other people, maybe I could have, and just will probably, you know, watch us.

19:21 Could have tried to push him out of the CEO spot sooner and whatever, but just had no desire to because I just loved working with him all the years. And so I think if we probably both have any regret, I wish he was a couple years younger and he stuck around a little longer. Really, really interesting. I want to compare notes. We did the same thing 100% employee owned succession plan, with my partners. We did it because I'm turning 65 this year, and it was time.

19:50 I mean, I've been saying I'm going to do it sooner than later, and it always seems like you could keep kicking the can down the road. The way we structured it was a ten year plan. Yeah. With, chunk of equity at the end to be disposed with as, as needed. All employee financed, you know, outside private equity, with an outside line of credit if needed. Okay. Curious how how you went about doing this. That could be a whole long conversation, but I'd say a couple things.

20:21 One, the two generations have to kind of like each other to have reasonable. Clearly you have. And you've done that at your place. I think a big element of that is also the generation that's leaving. Either you're going to need to to borrow a lot because they want cash on the barrel head, which is a reasonable thing. We did not do that or that. That gen has to have the confidence that they can be paid out over a reasonably long time.

20:44 So I'll call it effectively longer than ten years. We'll just say that. But a but a preferred pay out that's you know, you know, I'll call deep in our capital structure. It's the only thing other than our, our owners that I would say they should feel pretty good that that's highly secured. But it's got a very long tail to it. I think that plays another liability, another liability. And and that that undoubtedly is a liability of nurses.

21:04 But, you know, luckily we were in the midst of some grow, some meaningful growth. And so even versus where we started, we've had growth and earnings etc., that have put that also even at a more secure level. So I think, I think everyone's been very, very happy with that outcome. So let's talk a little bit exactly how NISA earns its, daily bread. You've talked about how the industry, calls things fixed income Alpha, but really it's beta in disguise.

21:35 Tell us a little bit about how you have found, a number of my little bugaboo. Yeah. So, you know, I think, beta, you can get beta very cheaply, you know, particularly in this day and age. And what I mean by I'm using it as an equity term, but whether we're talking fixed income or equity or what have you. But for for a manager to just take extra risk, extra compensated market risk and try to pass that off as alpha, it's just anathema to us, right?

21:59 It's paid plus risk, not truly alpha. Yeah. And so, so a common thing. So in fixed it. What does that mean in a fixed income space. Let's say you're running against something like the the Bloomberg Aggregate Index. Half the index or something is treasuries that represent an amazing attractive nuisance to managers and say well treasuries it's hard to enhance those. So I'm going to buy, you know, maybe some abs, maybe some credit, maybe high, you know, short duration, high yield, whatever it is to out earn.

22:23 But all those things are just beta. They're just they're just extra risk that we look at clients and we try to point out, well, if that's what you want us to do, let's change our benchmark and not have that attractive nuisance of 50% of treasuries and make it hard. And then what we deliver is then what we believe to be true alpha. So and the data supports the skill not skill and risk. Yeah. And and that's a word we use a lot skill which then ties in.

22:48 We can talk about information ratios and what we target in that space. You know information ratio being our targeted excess return over the volatility we take to get it. But but importantly that that you know, not just my conjecture or complaining about the industry. The data supports that. If you look at the the you know again pick a benchmark the Bloomberg aggregate. If you look at managers in that space and you look at their excess performance and note I didn't call it alpha, just their excess performance, which is often quite meaningful, particularly in the credit environment we've been in now kind of forever.

23:17 Great credit environment. They've meaningfully outperformed when I regress it, however, that excess performance on the credit markets or for that matter, the S&P, suddenly that excess performance shrinks a lot or so differently. They're just systematically long credit. And I'll say there's nothing wrong with that. But I don't know that you should pay active management fees, right. You can get an ETF that's a credit ETF for next to nothing these days. So so our strategies when you look at our alpha which to be very clear can be depending on the environment can be more modest than some of those than the excess return provided by other managers.

23:52 But when you regress and you look at none of that's pure alpha, pure what we believe skill based excess return that we believe you should pay for as opposed to beta. I want to dive into that deeper, but I want to start by pushing back a please, please, please. So I love equity side. We know how hard it is to beat the market. Yeah. To beat a broad cap weighted indexes over long periods of time. Seems like we know the half dozen people that have done it over decades.

24:20 On the fixed income side, say traditional bond managers. Yeah. The potential for beating the index is the Bloomberg is relatively easy. It's fertile. You get rid of the worst quarter decile, third, whatever you want to chop off the worst credit risk. You're aware of duration when rates are going up. Yeah. And you extend duration when when rates are going down. It doesn't seem that hard to generate what the industry calls fixed income alpha. Yes.

24:54 You're saying hey, man, that's not really. And to be clear, there are some. So there are some managers that also have that, that beta component and you regress it out and like wow, that's impressive Alpha on top of it. So it so I'm not saying it doesn't exist. Leverage not additional rate. Agreed. And levering into private credit and leverage. But I'm talking about investment grade kind of classic bond engagements. There are some that do it and they do it exceptionally well.

25:17 The relatively few, the vast majority of managers, some actually, when you when you look at it, net of the beta, they're long on average they have negative alpha not even positive alpha left over. So so so yes it is a fertile space to beat with excess performance because it's unlike equities. Great. Great counter example. Unlike equities it's easy to get long beta to that. And again long really long spread. It's it's it's buying. Spread your assets or selling your treasuries and buying you know buying corporates or whatever.

25:49 It's easy to deliver that excess return. It's not easy to deliver genuine alpha. And there's there are few and far between out there on the equity side, the closet indexers, you're not really getting what you pay for and you're paying high fees for it. It sounds like you can get away with it more on the bond side if you're a closet index. Or you could be a closet indexer with a very modest overweight of, of spread.

26:14 And so look for something like the yield. And then now when we finally hit, hit the air pocket, it'll be very clear what you were doing, you know. Right. So, so even if you're, it's modest and you saw that in the financial crisis, you saw it briefly in Covid until the fed for inexplicably, frankly bailed, investors out way too quickly in my opinion. But, they've learned to do there's a bubble wrap the economy and so so you can't make a mistake.

26:40 Maybe a little bit too, what what do we see in a 500 basis points of rate hikes? Bonds got shellacked. Yeah. Was that a revealing moment of. No. Because credit spreads were. I mean, a little bit. Yeah. Early 22, a little bit. But credit spreads held in there. And, you know, the equity market actually had a rough go for a bit, but then quickly recovered. So it wasn't enough of really a downdraft. But but there was a if you're paying attention you would have seen this exact issue.

27:08 But it wasn't as obvious as the GFC. Certainly wasn't as obvious of several weeks within Covid. Again, when the fed decided they're going to start buying corporate bonds and whatever, well, everyone was safe, so it came out pretty quickly. But so it really, really you can see it when it's there. But you ultimately need to have a more distressed environment. And we haven't had a business cycle kind of in forever. And so, so, so in the, in the the other challenge with that very is and if you're if a big part of how you outperform is overweighting spread product.

27:38 Well spreads have been grinding in because this has been a great a great credit environment. So to get the same excess performance, you need to own more of that lower spreading asset, which sets you up very poorly. For if the an air pocket occurs so so the spring wanes tighter and tighter, you know, this is the nature of our industry, etc.. But I do want to on the equity comment okay. So these equities are funny because we've launched actually a quantitative equity strategy.

28:04 Now within the last, you know, within the last year or so. What's interesting about equities is is it has it's it's very hard to just be long beta. So, so that that's a hard thing to do. But really are, are all of our strategies that we manage, whether it be fixed income or equities. We believe in breath. And I think because there's an inherent humility in breath, right, that we we really want to have a lot of small bets across our portfolio because then we don't need to be right very often.

28:32 Right. If you make one bet, you have to be right on that one bet. The equity. What's interesting about equity markets, particularly with how concentrated they've gotten, if you don't give a manager ability to short a little bit, doesn't have to be a lot, then the amount of surface area they've lost of expressing negative views on stocks is just shrunk. It just dramatically shrunk. So so to us a key and you can see this ties into our derivative heritage and what have you.

28:58 For us, the only way really to have success in and in the equity active space is have a lot of small bets. We don't believe in concentrated fundamental management there, and we need permission to short modestly so that we can. And what's nice most of the industry is and a lot most managers don't short, aren't allowed to. So we actually think the short book is actually got the highest potential in modest shorts because there's a lot of small bets.

29:21 But that really gives us the potential to add meaningful alpha. So when you talk about breadth on the equity side, a lot of small and I'm assuming non correlated or low correlated. Yes. Positions. Yeah. What does it mean. What does breadth mean on the fixed income. We're really quite similar. So so our equity strategy is capital s systematic. Our, our credit strategy that we've had since the inception of the firm is is highly quantitative. But I wouldn't it is not systematic in the classic sense, but it's similar.

29:53 You know we we have a highly diverse so so any benchmark that has, you know, corporate securities and it we run against a lot of investment grade benchmarks. We're going to own you know several typically three or 4 or 500 issuers against that and have a lot of very small active positions, a little overweight issuer a little underweight. Again, that's how you get breadth. And what you're seeking is to have, just as you point out, a lot of uncorrelated bets.

30:17 The neat thing about fixed income I'm a I'm just a fixed income. I'm a geek at heart, but I'm certainly a fixed income geek at heart is also unlike equities. There's a lot of Q SIPs under one issuer. So you can have a you can have a name in the index, AT&T that's got one stock in the S&P, but it may have five 5060 whatever underlying bonds in our index. And what's beautiful about the fixed income market because it is strictly over-the-counter.

30:42 All of those trade slightly different spreads. They should trade at different spreads. But what we do is we watch and many times we think they trade traded slightly the wrong spread, a little rich or a little cheap. So there's actually real value to be added by actually trading within the complex of one issuer. That is some of the highest information ratio alpha. We deliver because we're trading one AT&T for another AT&T, it's the same credit risk, but we're picking up yield because we're moving from a rich bond to a cheap bond, etc..

31:09 That's really been the DNA, a big part of our fixed income strategy and why we I think we seek some of the highest information ratios in the industry. You mentioned long, short. The hot, long, short thing these days are the like. 130 3150 50s you say you use a modest amount, on when you say modest, is that 10%? No. Well, no turns in that range, that 130. You know, in our c modest. It's it's all beauties in the eye of the beholder.

31:39 I think if you're a 130. So, so in that range, you know, 130, 31, 50, 50 things like that in that zip code. I think why I say modest, it's important. If we're doing that, we're going to concentrate our short book and 20 stocks. Then even 10% is kind of terrifying, frankly. Right. Whereas if you're, you're structuring the portfolio in a way where that short book may have if we're running, it's a global index, we may be, you know, it may be thousands of securities where maybe the average short position is six basis points or seven basis points.

32:07 So so it may add to 40% in the short book, for example, there's no real but even the meme events and whatever if you're in Avis or, you know, AMC or whatever, if you happen to be shorted, it's it goes the wrong way. But we're talking a few basis points, a performance as opposed to a more existential impact on your strategy. So and again, it's a key element of the strategy that that humility that says and it's fundamental law of active management.

32:31 Right. If I spread a lot of small, relatively uncorrelated positions, I only need to be right a little bit more often than I'm wrong. And I think that's that embedded humility in the strategies we manage. Quants love that strategy. Don't want to love that strategy. And they say, yeah, they should. So let's talk about the derivative overlays that you guys do. Your one of the largest, derivative managers, certainly on the fixed income side in the world.

32:57 Walk us through what an overlay does for the client. Why don't they just manage this in-house? It seems like it makes a lot of sense. Well, maybe that last point and I can come back to more detail. Derivatives are operationally messy. And and they seem simple at a on a high level, they seem simple. But, there's a lot of potential loss even in just execution. Particular when you start talking about over-the-counter derivatives like swaps, etc.. So, so that operational intensity is, is is no small part of it.

33:28 But also getting best execution in derivative markets is is really something we pride ourselves on. And you need to be in that market a lot. If you are a, you know, an occasional tourist in that market, a struggling for the word, I think, the dealers know very well how to take advantage of that, and that's kind of their job. So but now why why do people use derivative strategy? So I mentioned we'll go through in detail, but in our liability driven investing for clients where their fixed income isn't hedging enough of that liability risk because they're still own equities for return seeking purposes, etc..

33:58 That's where we step in. And we use a variety of instruments Treasury futures, total return swaps, repos to add interest rate risk to hedge. Importantly as a hedge vehicle we're hedging that liability. So we're getting long interest rate risk to offset a liability. That's a huge portion of our derivative book. The another huge portion. And it's funny, our derivative book is quite heterogeneous. We could talk about all the sub strategies, but the other one is is broadly speaking, portable alpha strategies.

34:25 So, I don't have a perfect carbon dating on one, the first of those strategies that were ever launched. We had to be pretty early on because I think our first strategy goes back to 2001 or 2. It's certainly become much more popular. And it's become it's become more interesting. We've been running them all along. It kind of comes back to what we believe is really critical, is that sometimes alpha can be found in areas where, but you don't want the beta associated with it, right?

34:49 For whatever reason. Well, Portable Alpha allows us to port risk premiums of of betas very, very cheaply one way or the other. So a classic portable alpha strategy would be a client has identified some great hedge funds. They have high confidence in them. And they only they have a modest allocation at a policy level to hedge funds. But they have identified more managers in that space than maybe, say, large cap U.S equities, for example. So they allocate over allocate to hedge funds by taking some of that U.S.

35:17 equity book away. But they of course, the U.S. equity market is a great risk premium. It's delivered consistently for decades. They want that that risk premium back. So we step in as the derivative overlay manager to overlay those those call them equity market, market neutral hedge funds with an S&P 500 or global equity benchmark to get them back to their policy benchmark. And that's been a really for clients who've adopted that. That's been a really, really useful strategy.

35:44 Last question about how you've helped build out in this, you've grown into the largest U.S. manager of liability driven investing strategies for the average fixed income investor. What does LDI solve that? A traditional bond portfolio cannot address? Well, it solves that. You know, those pension liabilities I alluded to earlier are very, very long dated. So the preponderance of of active, excuse me, active fixed income strategies live more on the front end of the curve.

36:15 So yeah, it's wonderful if your manager delivers 50 basis points of excess performance or 75. But if you're short five years of duration and rates fall, it almost doesn't. It doesn't matter how much they outperform. So what it solves is, is changing the the duration of the benchmarks and or the overlay to address that very long dated liability. That's been the primary driver of those strategies. And that's why they've been adopted. And why honestly why pension funds.

36:42 You don't hear corporate pension funds causing problems lately on balance sheets or whatever because they're very well risk managed at this point, in part in no small part because of those liability driven and fully funded, well risk managed. And, you know, given their client base and actuarial tables, you have a really good expectation of here's what we're going to own 20, 40, 20, 45, 20, 50, etc.. And when you talk about liability matching, it's that far out in that specific annual use that a fair statement.

37:14 It's absolutely a fair statement. And what's been what's been interesting and I wouldn't call it a resurgence in corporate defined benefit plans. But we've seen a few companies, notably, you know, reopen their pension plan because I think with the advent of liability driven investing strategies, clients have undoubtedly the risks. They still own equities, but not nearly as much as they had walking into the GFC, which of course hurt quite a bit. I think there's a number of clients and plans out there that have realized we can actually run the this pension very prudently and actually outperform the liability in a reasonably consistent, more modest way than maybe they were hoping, hoping pre GFC, but in a consistent way that allows them to provide future benefits.

37:53 So so we've seen a really interesting again I wouldn't call it a groundswell quite yet but but for a decade or more we had only pensions closing and now we've had a few opening, which has been kind of exciting for us. Coming up, we continue our conversation with David Eichhorn, CEO and head of investment strategies at talking about the current rate environment for fixed income investors. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters of Business on Bloomberg Radio.

38:21 I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest today is David Eichhorn. He's CEO and head of investment strategies at NISA Investment Advisors. They run over $483 billion in primarily fixed income. But some equity strategies. So the current, environment for yields is absolutely fascinating. Bonds have been more or less, I don't know, is neglected too strong a statement?

38:54 No, I don't think so. For this century, anyway, for a, for a much of most of our employee base career, frankly. Yeah, exactly. So suddenly, yields are attractive, bonds are actually paying something. What is driving this environment? What is sending yields so much higher. Oh, so many possible. And it's a long list is a long list. And, you know, we certainly have macro views. We've come into our earlier conversations hard to have breath on those.

39:25 So we don't take big bets on our macro views because just, just it's hard to get them right in. They're very minor you know. Right. But but nonetheless with that with that disclaimer, I'll share, you know, share some thoughts. You know, clearly U.S. fiscal House is not in order. I'm not a doomsday or and saying that has to break any, any moment. Right. But, we have an I can be an equal opportunity offender on both parties.

39:48 Both parties spent money in environments that didn't make sense, meaning pro cyclical, you know, whether Biden or, you know, I'm a big and actually, I think one of the things, one of the reasons we slowly came out of the GFC is, of all things, I think our fiscal, the fiscal authorities and the Obama administration should have actually, they couldn't get it done, should have pushed more money into people's hands. And I think it would have pushed us quicker to a recovery.

40:10 Couldn't agree more. The flip, though, is then as we get into a pretty roaring economy now for for a decade, for all that, for all intents and purposes, we we we've continued to spend that way. So so that is unnecessary. We should be going the opposite direction. As a result, the US government's issuing a lot of debt that all that is undoubtedly pushing rates higher and higher. But on top of that, there's just a demand for capital that's insatiable away from the US government.

40:38 I mean, I and the hyperscalers issuance is government like I mean, it's country building, scaling and what we're talking about here. And so it's one of these funny issues where in this are arguments. We have an investment committee all the time. Is it possible, you know, you always talk about the government crowding out investors, like when the government is issuing too much debt and that's, you know, to some maybe that has been occurring with the U.S government, but with the hyperscalers like who's, who's actually, pushing who out of the market and crowding others out, the hyperscalers just have an incredible, insatiable appetite.

41:09 And undoubtedly that's pushing rates further and further up. And then and then lastly, now break even before you move on, I want to replace that. So you have corporate bond issuances for data centers for. Yeah, for anthropic, for open AI, for growth for all these different companies. Since they're not the US Treasury, they're issued at a higher yield and they're legitimately competing for investment dollars versus treasuries. Yes. And so the market is correcting that, saying, hey, if you want to fund these Treasury auctions, you got to sweeten the pot a little bit.

41:44 And so it's moving all rates. Of course, though, those issuers again, maybe there's 1 or 2 names in there that I wouldn't call the same way. But many of those issues are wildly profitable. So it's not like there's concern in the near term that, you know, pick whoever Nvidia is not going to be able to pay off their debts or what have you. They're just they're, you know, they're just there's printing money. But nonetheless their spreads are wider.

42:05 And it's just they're just, you know, I call that a new issue concession. But they keep coming with more new issues. They're just pounding the market. So I think all of that is pushing pushing yields up. And then you have this, well, one, we have a war that's pushing, you know, oil prices. But but I think just a sticky inflation. I think we, you know, our chief economist Stephen Douglas, he would have said we were on the path to having inflation where it needed to be kind of twice now and then we've had these, these the supply side tariffs and then the this seems like a very self-inflicted, well, very self-inflicted.

42:36 And maybe and again, I'm not a deep geopolitical thinker. It maybe it makes sense for the world what we're trying to accomplish there that's outside of markets and above my pay grade. But it's undoubtedly spooked oil markets which has injected concern on inflation. Now what I can't reconcile with is a couple things. Why that's pushing the back end of the yield curve up. Curve up as much. I don't think anyone thinks we're gonna have $100 oil or more for 30 years.

43:01 Whereas we may have it for three months or six months or a year or so. So it's it's been interesting how the sell off has occurred, and particularly the back end is up as much as it has. And then finally, what's what's been amazing, notwithstanding my relatively sticky inflation, even it's been improving, but still sticky. The fed isn't perfectly satisfied with it. But what you see actually break evens actually, you know, the yield. But the difference between, tips and, Treasury inflation protected bonds and nominal bonds.

43:27 You see, those break evens really hung in there, particularly on the back end. So so, you know, in the low 2%. So the break even market is saying there's credibility in the fed I think there should be by the way. So what that means is what then if yields are going up what has to move. It's real yields. So the fact that to your point you know of suddenly bonds are interesting to to folks. The fact that we're getting close on the 30 year, you can nearly lock up a 3.5% real yield in a U.S.

43:54 Treasury for 30 years. A real rate of return over that horizon is is extraordinary. It seems too high, frankly, for our economy, my mind. But but in all honesty, I would have said that about 50 basis points ago. The 275. So I'm glad you mentioned tips. They seem to be somewhat attractive here. What are your thoughts on them? They they're they really are. By the way, you say that to the average investor and they're like, tips, right?

44:20 Yeah. And so, you know, but at the end of it, I think, you know, managers, investment managers kind of, sometimes lose sight of what the money's there for, right? You know, I mean, we, we can fall into a trap of like, oh, we have this beautiful strategy and product or whatever the only purpose of investing is to pay some future consumption slash liability. And most people eat, eat in real terms. That is, they need inflation adjusted return right over time.

44:43 You know, exactly. I mean, as nice as that would be. So so tips tips are one of these enigmas because they're actually the safest security from the perspective of an individual thinking about, retiring or whatever. But they confuse the hell out of people. And that's one of those things that and I get why they do because they're a fixed income security. But yet their coupon is changing. Now it's changing because of inflation. Exactly the reason you want it to change.

45:08 But they confuse folks. But the fact of the matter to get, you know, high 2% reals, you know, ten year and over 3% real rates of return, in, in 30 years, wildly attractive, all time highs for the 30 year, tip since it's been auctioned. And the only reason, honestly, it's not the all time highs for ten year tips is they're just really unloved when and not misunderstood when they first came out. And so they traded I think about 4% reals or something.

45:33 But so I'm assuming with institutional clients you probably don't spend a lot of time in the muni space. But if if you like tips for individuals munis are incredibly attractive. You know, if you can get 4.6 4.7% triple tax free, which is 8.5% tax equivalent if you're in New York or California, one of those states. And yet you talk to people who have munis and they run the other way. Yeah. And, and and probably for the wrong reasons because they just again, seem different, seem a little complicated.

46:06 I mean, if you can reduce your tax bill, that's, that's that's return, right? You know, I mean, that's that's really quite valuable. I think maybe some of the right reasons are certainly some state and local governments are having a little more fiscal issues. So that may be a good reason. But but again you're right. Munis are not my space exactly at but but for a taxable investor on balance they just they make a lot of sense.

46:26 I suspect it's just a lot of recency bias. And people probably think back to that. Now if you're in new Jersey or Illinois, it's not quite the same as Connecticut or Vermont or York or what have you. But, it's just one of those things that this is the first time in my career. Oh my God, he's a really interesting. Yeah. You mentioned treasuries and the issuance versus corporates. What sort of competition is the treasury market getting from places like Japan or buyers in Japan, where they're now getting yields in yen, which they weren't?

47:06 What sort of competition is that? What is the the appetite for treasuries from overseas. Yeah, it's it's it's definitely waned a bit. We wrote in our chief economist wrote a nice piece a long time ago. It's been a while. There was a concern of China weaponizing the U.S. Treasury market for hold. That certainly could be possible. It'd be definitely meaning sell. Sell, sell bonds in the middle. Yeah, like in the in a trade war, etc.. And spike yields.

47:32 Now they own a lot. It'd be a little bit cutting off your nose to spite your face. And they have a lot of their own fiscal challenges in circuit right now. So, so not worried about that per se. But but just to your point, you can get higher yields everywhere now. I mean Japan for the we talk about decades right of of of having ridiculously low yield. So so there is waning demand. And I think that that's the thing about global markets.

47:56 Everything spills every direction. Right. And so when you have more attractive yields now you have different. The UK has more attractive yields. But the UK has a lot of fiscal challenges as well. Right. So some of those yields let's be careful that those aren't real credit risk premium that are starting to creep in. I don't think in any real way that's true in the US market. But but you have to be careful that you're making fair comparisons and adjusting for credit risk.

48:21 What about the, you know, I wasn't planning on talking about, so many global things, but since you brought up the UK, what about the rest of Europe? It looks like Germany is in recession. France is on the edge of recession and having geopolitical headaches. How do you look at, you're a global investor. How do you look at bonds from from Europe? And most of what we invest on behalf of clients is, is, is U.S., but we of course, have to, compare and contrast that because global markets, again, they bleed everywhere.

48:50 Right. And so, you know, I don't want I could come off as going down the full American exceptionalism route. And I have to be careful on that. But, you know, Europe has has us has its problems. Just the Europe has, has greater ones. And then and you get into the UK which undoubtedly regrets Brexit certainly whether or not some voters do or don't fiscally I think they regret Brexit. They should regret Brexit quite quite heavily. So I think, you know those are those are markets that, you know, you alluded to work hours earlier again not necessarily going go down that there need to be a lot of structural reforms and a huge element of that as pensions and again, so I'm not playing the American exceptionalism moment.

49:26 Social security needs to be, I'll say, reformed. We need to move back. Retirement ages. This is the greatest generational transfer of of wealth also being stolen by one generation. I hate to say boomers relative to others right now. And politicians need to get serious in the US about social Security. But when you look at retirement ages and what they're actually talking to France about reducing retirement ages, which is just which is left, which is the laughable thought.

49:52 It's not fiscally sustainable. It's just kind of a farce. So there's just a lot of structural issues, you know, that that will have to be addressed. And I don't see it in the near term in a lot of those countries. Yeah. The the horse trade on social Security is obvious. Raise the cap. Yeah. Where like, comes out and we're living longer. You 65 is not a rational date. It is nearly think of as as retiring and it's not a rational day given our demographic situation. Right?

50:20 I mean, Social Security was kind of designed around a concept of, of, of a continually booming, demographic, a demographic demographic dividend, which has stopped right, and meaning lower for lower rate replacement and importantly, and maybe getting political, less immigration. Right. You know, I mean, our superpower as a country, just saying it for what it is, is, is thoughtful immigration reform because that now suddenly changes the dynamic. And we get that demographic dividend back. But, it's not easy to change fertility rates.

50:51 We can't will that to happen. Immigration. We kind of can we can make good choices on that. So, that's our saving grace. If we choose to exercise it, we don't seem to be right now, in addition to all the reforms you mentioned of the of the of Social Security itself. So let's talk a little bit about private credit. I don't know how much of your portfolio you look at private debt, private credit, things along those lines, certainly has raised some question marks over the past couple of years with a few, problem children.

51:23 How do you look at the private space? The old space. Is that something you guys play deeply in, or is it just another perhaps non correlated asset? We do not play in it. And certainly not not yet. In that market. But you know, I mentioned we often play a very consultative role with clients across their whole asset allocation and particularly that derivative overlay, business often allows us to have kind of a real bird's eye view of asset allocations, and we can discuss ways to optimize overall, our client's overall asset allocation. So specifically in private credit, I've written a few pieces on this recently.

52:00 Some of them, have caught some amount of attention, somewhat critical of, of the asset class, but importantly, not the loans and the, the illiquidity premium they deliver when you look through. And in this context, I'm talking about, you know, more direct lending, classic middle market type stuff, etc., what's in BDCs typically in interval funds. And so this has nothing to do with current challenges per se of interval funds. We can come back to that. But one thing I've I've written about pretty extensively is, is the engineering that's put around private credit destroys a lot of its value in our opinion.

52:35 So so when we dig through and we did a lot of wonky things that I'll spare you right now, but we, we, we got down to the loan level detail and on a loan basis we saw a nice illiquidity premium, a nice premium kick out of, of private credit. So if you own loans unlevered before fees we estimated something like a 3% excess performance. So so this is not a screed against private credit. That's fabulous. It's performed well on that basis.

53:00 The challenges that very few people actually can access private credit like that typically it's via a vehicle, can be private or public BDC, and the vehicle has a ton of leverage on it. So importantly, I'm not referring the bonds themselves are highly lever. That's the nature of private credit. I'm saying the managers have decided I'm going to take a dollar from an investor. I'm going to borrow another dollar somewhere, right from someone somehow. And now I have $2 to invest in loans.

53:26 The challenge with that is that borrowing is extremely expensive, in our opinion, so that borrowing often is coming up like right now. So for plus 200. So when I put that term of leverage on top of private credit at that borrowing rate and the pretty high fees, maybe this is jealousy because I'm not in the space, to be honest. But the pretty high fees the private credit managers, charge it. It takes what is in its organic native state a very nice risk premium in by our estimates, destroys all of it and then some.

53:57 So so specifically, if you look for the last 20 years and you looked at books that are publicly traded and what have you, 20 year performance, and instead I had a portfolio of high yield bonds indexed plus one unit of high yield credit default swaps. So, you know, you know, to add one more turn of leverage. So it's I go in the opposite direction. So I have high yield risk. And I'm adding another unit of it.

54:21 But in a very liquid format. It has absolutely dominated the performance of private credit. So this in a liquid format. This goes back to what you said earlier, that what people describe as fixed income alpha sounds like leverage plus risk right, is just expensive beta. Right. So like if I came to you, if I came to you right now and I showed you a strategy and it looked like I've outperformed the S&P for the last 20 years, you tell me this looks great, you'd be really interested in.

54:49 And I said, well, it's a two time levered ETF you'd like. Well that's not very yeah. There's no alpha there. What are you talking about. And again and there's value add and private credit. So it's not a screed against the industry or the loans. But this particularly this term of leverage is very painful. And that is what is not alpha. That can sometimes be passed off. And I and particularly with our clients because of that derivative over why this is like, why does eichhorn get writing about this?

55:15 Why do I care? I think clients are interested, to be sure, but we can deliver leverage portfolio wide and so many more cheaper formats. So for example, if you have treasuries, I can get treasury exposure and effectively sofr flat sofr plus a little. So we go to clients and what we've been talking with clients about is your private credit. Can you access it in a way, stop using the levered vehicles, use an unlevered vehicle, pay the fees on it, etc.

55:42 and then if if now of course, if to have that same amount of exposure, then I need to sell something else in my portfolio. So something that we can leverage cheaply treasuries, S&P 500, etc. don't borrow at 200 over to get access to a lever private credit vehicle. It sounds like it's not the asset class per se. It's the packaging. Yes. And the engineering. Yeah. And the fees. So which is part and parcel of that, I'm going to guess you're not a big fan of the movement to push private credit and into 401 KS.

56:13 I do not particularly. It always seems to me when whenever something is democratized like that, hey, we've run out of dumb institutions to sell this to. Let's Jim and and to mom and pop sports. Well, you said dumb. I'm not. I'm not going there. But but but yeah, I mean, I clearly look, I think that's a recipe for disaster. Maybe, I mean, let's just be candid. I think the the DC model has its own risks, period, compared to classic pensions, etc..

56:41 So, you can't you can't solve a savings issue with an investment solution. Period. Investment solutions can help mitigate under saving, etc. but whether it's private credit or equities or what have you, the first thing is, folks need to save enough. And there's a lot of behavioral challenges and in a lot of real world problems on that. But the idea that that private credit is somehow a, you know, a effectively a savior for, for 41K plans, etc..

57:07 I think we're I think we're seeing that right now with what's going on with, you know, semi liquid, you know, which is kind of like I say with a smirk, interval funds, they're not well understood. And when, when the pain comes, which invariably it has to in every asset class and folks want to redeem, we're going to see some really ugly situations. And I think folks will not have appreciated what they owned. Last question before I jump to my favorites.

57:33 So so you discussed, yeah. The past 20 years, we've seen pensions eventually winding down and a handful of new pensions opening up. Do you worry about these pension buyouts that are taking place? Are they rational? It seems certainly easier for a company to say, we're just going to outsource this whole thing to a 401 K provider. Yeah, they do worry me in certain ways. One, you better pick a really good insurer because they're going to have to pay those pensioners.

58:02 I worry if to me, if there's I have a worry of what's the next too big to fail. I'm not suggesting they're about to fail. I need to, you know, tomorrow or any day soon. But heaven forbid we have a problem in the insurance industry, particularly with how they've purchased so many pension annuities. The government will and the government will have to intervene, and it will be a massive bailout. Again, not predicting that, but it does in the pension guarantee, fund have like $30 billion actually.

58:29 Yeah. But but that's the challenge when, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp Corporation is very well funded. So if you're a pension inside the corporate system, if something happens, that company and whatever, it's well funded, you're fine. But if an insurance company transacts, it leaves PBgc is not covering that in its state of our insurance industry in the US is very state regulated. So it's state guaranty associations, which are effectively all unfunded. So so what how that's worked in the past.

58:57 When a little insurer goes belly up, the other big insurers will come in and say, well, we'll kind of cover it because we don't want to understand a problem marketing. And we don't we don't have pain. If a big insurer went, then that will be a very different issue. And again, I'm not I'm not chicken little thing here on this and whatsoever. But obviously a lot of insurers would move more aggressively into private credit. That is a concern of mine.

59:18 Undoubtedly. I don't I hope I hope it's an unwarranted concern. I very much do. But if it's so, it will be an unpleasant surprise and U.S. government taxpayers will be paying the bill. Really, really interesting. All right, let me jump to my favorite questions. I ask all of my guests, starting with something that you've touched on throughout our conversation. Who were your mentors? Who helped shape your career? It sounds like you mentioned one in college. You mentioned JPM and you mentioned a few at this.

59:50 Yeah. Who really drove your career? Well, I think, you know, you hit home, you know, certainly Phil did big to to make a connection and, form a microneedle undoubtedly at, at, J.P. Morgan. But, you know, you know, first and foremost, just, you know, it's been a mentor to me and a great friend. You know, I think again, for the two generations, I have lunch almost every Friday with Jess. You know, when he's in in Saint Louis?

60:12 He was great to work with. A lot of fun. Learned a lot. And, I, I owe a huge, huge part of my career. But, you know, those are certainly the big names, but the entire team at NASA, you know, some of which, predates me joining, you know, Ken Lester, who heads up our derivative desk, to get to sit behind him for years while he's trading at his. And, you know, true what I believe a master of his craft at what he does.

60:36 I've never traded a bond or derivative in my life, but, I kind of know a lot about how that works, but it's kind of just osmosis and listening to him over the years. And so, just just too many to name and, they've been great to me. Let's talk about books. What are you reading currently? What are some of your all time favorites? Oh, ultimate all time favorites, I guess I'd say, I read actually every morning a, daily stoic and passage of stoic philosophy and a reflection, in markets, it keeps you grounded.

61:06 We'll just say that I love to say I practice said so. So so. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. He's he's great. Really great. I just finished a book not long ago. Tunnel 29, came across, and it's really neat. It's about the, tunnel escape, under the Berlin Wall and, and it's essentially a historical fiction, but really grounded in history. But the neat thing this is not why I read it, but, you know, socialism apparently is getting a little bit these days.

61:33 You know, I'm I'm mean, I'm sitting in New York City right now. This is not why I read it. But as I read the we have a socialist there. Yeah, that's what I hear in the heart of U.S. capitalism. The fact is always fact is always stranger than fiction. But what was what was neat about the book is I read it, not the purpose and not even the goal of of the author. If there's ever been like a because people say, you know, socialism just has never worked anywhere, that's the challenge I have with it.

61:55 Well, they can always explain it away. Will Venezuela this or that or whatever. If there's ever been a test tube example where a country starting in the same circumstance that became West in East Germany, that ends up with a wall where the guns are pointing the wrong way, it's it's it's kind of revealing. And I wish more folks spent time kind of looking at that history. It was a great book. Have you ever been to Checkpoint Charlie?

62:15 Yeah, I have actually. I have is not the most amazing thing. It really it's mind blowing that it's a place you walk through the way people got out of East Germany, East Berlin astonished. You can't believe it happened. Honestly. I mean, as you, you just. And it's not like a thousand years. No, it was 75 years. Exactly, exactly. And it went up overnight and came down overnight. I have several, remember. So yeah, let's talk about streaming.

62:41 What podcast do you listen to besides yours? Of course. Yeah. What are you watching on Netflix or Amazon? Netflix? I should I get all the streamers confused so I forget which one. But, lately the two I've watched are the gentlemen, which is great Guy Ritchie. Yeah, I enjoyed that. Fabulous. This new set in is much more brutal than it is. But what you didn't think was possible. But it very much is. But start out with it's Guyger.

63:04 It's good. Exactly. It's all downhill. It's Guy Ritchie. Exactly. And the other one, slow horses, with Gary. Gary Oldman is just. He's amazing. Is so good on every whether just on any. Actually, there was a book, The Darkest Hour. So Gary Oldman did the movie The Darkest Hour. That's one of my favorite books. Incredible book to cycle. Yeah. Is that, Churchill. Churchill. Done. Dunkirk. Exactly. Yeah. Before the Blitz. But yeah. Really great. Great. And our, final two questions.

63:31 What sort of advice would you give to a recent college grad interested in a career in either institutional asset management or fixed income? Well, speaking as a quant, you know, if they're in their college career, take as many math and quantitative and coding classes as you can. But I think I'd circle back to it really is if you get at an organization and there's a lot of great organizations out there, where you have the opportunity to view it as an apprenticeship to use the word that I use.

64:00 And you used earlier, Barry. And, and put in a lot of hours to invest in yourself early, you know, and, and, and maybe the other thing is, you know, particularly with I but even before I, you know, we build a lot of tools that automate things and they're lovely. And that gives us, you know, it helps margins and whatever you need to when you run an analysis or you hit a button on a Bloomberg or something else and it gives you an answer, sometimes just go try to do it on your own.

64:26 You know, something that builds that visceral understanding of what's going on in, in, in calculations and markets, etc.. It seems counterproductive because you're like, why am I why am I redoing what this machine can give me an answer to? But it's it's ultimately where it's the only way to really know something. You know, the, the challenge you get and you write. I write that a lot of people think the purpose of writing is to have a finished work product, but really it's the process to organize your thoughts. Yeah.

64:56 And if you just get the answer, you miss that process in the middle. And then writing is, humbling. Honestly, you write a lot more than I do. It's humbling because I, I know this and how can I not make this clear, this point clear. So, it really helps you refine your argument, your thoughts. And there's times where I'm writing a paper and it actually changes the analysis I'm doing. You know, I thought I had the analysis done.

65:18 I just need to write the paper. Now I'm redoing all the analysis. And our final question, what do you know about the world of investing today might have been useful 30 or so years ago when you were first. Yeah. We didn't, you know, we had parts of our investment philosophy. You know, I'll circle back to I'm a believer, relatively speaking, in efficient markets. Right. And certainly and understandably in college. And it should be drilled into you the perfection of efficient markets and we've all you know what you know, whoever whichever academic I think I guess what I wish I knew then that I know now is that, or kind of I don't know if you never know something in markets.

65:55 Right. They're complex and adaptive, so they always surprise you and humble you. But but I think what what I wish I knew was there's these, the assumptions behind the efficient market hypothesis are all counterfactual in the real world. And I wish that had been pointed out a little more clearly to me, honestly. And then what happens is there's these weird gaps of how different institutions can trade certain things, or banks have capital requirements that, of course, our clients and pensions don't have.

66:21 They create these funny little gaps where if you live in those spaces, there's real alpha potential and real possibility. And so I think I'm still a relatively efficient market person, probably by most in the industries, which funny to say, for a big active manager. But but there are more cracks and crevices that where if you pay attention to it, there's like you can kind of suck the marrow out of like the market's alpha sauce. And it's and I wish, I wish I would have started that journey earlier as opposed to kind of stumbling upon it a little later.

66:52 I give credit to the Nobel Committee for giving the prize to both Shiller and Fama in the same year. Markets are efficient. Yeah, except when they're. Except when they're not on the data kind of. Yeah. You're talking about a very specific practice area. Yes. But the parallel is well, yes, but no, China is sometimes not always is is really what's so fascinating. Yeah. Yeah. David this has been absolutely fascinating. Thank you for being here. Enjoy it. So so generous with your time.

67:24 We have been speaking with David Eichhorn, Chief Executive Officer and head of strategies at NISA, where he oversees nearly half $1 trillion in institutional assets. I would be remiss if I didn't thank our crack team. That helps me put these conversations together each week, Noah Friedman is my video engineer, Anna Luk is my producer. Sean Russo is my head of research. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

Summary

David Eichhorn, CEO of NISA Investment Advisors, discusses his extensive background in finance and investment strategies, particularly in the realm of liability-driven investing (LDI) and fixed income. With a focus on quantitative approaches, Eichhorn emphasizes the importance of understanding liabilities in pension management and the challenges of generating true alpha in fixed income markets.

- Eichhorn's career began at J.P. Morgan, where he developed expertise in asset liability management and investment strategies.
- He transitioned to NISA Investment Advisors, where he has been instrumental in growing the firm to manage nearly $0.5 trillion in assets.
- The concept of liability-driven investing (LDI) is crucial for managing long-term pension liabilities, which Eichhorn describes as promises to pay future benefits.
- Eichhorn critiques the notion of "fixed income alpha," arguing that much of it is simply beta, or excess risk, rather than true skill-based performance.
- He highlights the importance of breadth in investment strategies, advocating for a diversified approach with many small, uncorrelated positions.
- Eichhorn discusses the operational complexities of derivatives and their role in hedging liabilities and enhancing returns.
- He expresses concerns about the sustainability of pension buyouts and the potential risks associated with the insurance industry.
- The current bond market environment, characterized by rising yields, presents both challenges and opportunities for investors, particularly in relation to inflation and fiscal policy.

Questions Answered

Who is David Eichhorn and what is his background?

David Eichhorn is the CEO of NISA Investment Advisors, managing approximately $0.5 trillion in institutional assets. He has a strong background in finance and mathematics, and identifies as a quant with a deep understanding of investment strategies, particularly in fixed income and liability-driven investing.

What challenges did David face when transitioning to head of investment strategies?

David transitioned from a client service role to head of investment strategies, which involved adapting to a more consultative approach in managing client relationships and customizing investment strategies as the firm grew, particularly in liability-driven investing.

How do current market conditions affect investment strategies?

Current market conditions, including a strong credit environment and the concentration in equity markets, challenge traditional investment strategies. David emphasizes the importance of diversification and making smaller bets across portfolios to mitigate risks associated with concentrated positions.

How does government debt issuance affect the investment landscape?

The issuance of government debt can crowd out other investors, but the demand from large tech companies (hyperscalers) for capital is also influencing market dynamics. This competition for investment dollars is pushing yields higher, as corporate bonds are issued at higher rates to attract investors.

What is the distinction between alpha and leverage in private credit?

David discusses the misconception that high returns in private credit are due to alpha when they may actually be the result of leverage. He advocates for accessing private credit through unlevered vehicles to avoid high fees and unnecessary risks associated with leveraged investments.

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