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Former SEC Official on FTX, WeWork & Why Startups Stay Private

Newcomer · 58m · transcribed Sep 2026
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# 0:00

The Need for Regulation in Startups

Why should startups be tamed?

The speaker argues that the startup financing system has shifted over the past few decades, leading to a lack of investor control and oversight. This has resulted in founders having too much power without sufficient accountability, which can lead to mismanagement and failures.

  • The shift from investor control to founder control has implications for startup governance.
  • Oversight and accountability are crucial for sustainable growth in startups.
  • The absence of regulatory frameworks can lead to significant risks for investors.
# 11:47

The Importance of Founder Oversight

What role does oversight play in startup success?

While having the right founder is critical, it is equally important to provide oversight to ensure accountability and proper management. Without guidance, even strong founders can lead their companies into trouble.

  • Investor oversight is essential to prevent mismanagement in startups.
  • A strong founder alone does not guarantee success without proper governance.
  • The culture and management practices within a startup are vital for its long-term viability.
# 23:34

Challenges of Scaling Startups

What happens when startups grow without proper structures?

As startups grow, they need to professionalize their operations and implement appropriate internal controls. The lack of these systems can lead to chaos and mismanagement, especially when the company is preparing for an IPO.

  • Growing startups must adapt their management structures to handle increased complexity.
  • The absence of internal controls can lead to significant operational risks.
  • Investors play a crucial role in pushing for professionalization as startups scale.
# 35:22

The Impact of IPOs on Market Dynamics

How do IPOs influence company governance?

The IPO process traditionally encourages companies to implement better governance and internal controls. However, with fewer companies going public, the lack of these structures can lead to inefficiencies and increased market volatility.

  • IPOs can drive companies to adopt better governance practices.
  • The decline in IPOs may contribute to a less regulated and more volatile market.
  • Effective governance is essential for maintaining investor confidence.
# 47:09

Understanding Startup Valuations

What challenges exist in valuing startups?

Startup valuations can be misleading due to the influence of investor preferences and the lack of reliable information. The term 'unicorn' has become a goal for startups, leading to inflated valuations that may not reflect true market value.

  • Startup valuations are often based on subjective metrics and can be inflated.
  • The concept of 'unicorns' has created unrealistic expectations in the startup ecosystem.
  • Reliable valuation methods are needed to provide clarity in the investment landscape.

Transcript

0:00 If they were a public company, would FTX have been found out or you think it's the same problem? >> You can sell securities, an unlimited number of securities to an unlimited number of investors without providing any disclosure as long as they're all accredited. Well, what I hear you saying is that public company managers or spokespeople, their representatives are more disciplined than private company managers and their representatives. >> Do do you see a path to regulated markets?

0:27 Renee Jones, thank you so much for joining the Newcomer Podcast. >> Thank you for having me. >> Untamed Unicorns, you know, a title that gripped me as soon as I saw it. You know, you're a professor at Boston College Law School and we're at the SEC governing startups and companies from 2021 to 2023. so a lot to talk about both the argument about what we should do with startups, how they should be governed and then what's happening sort of in the Trump era almost going the opposite direction. I I want to start off just with I guess the core intuition of the book like why should startups be tamed? You know I think some in Silicon Valley would see this and be like a untamed unicorns that's exactly what I want. they're sort of strong running free. Like I I don't know why why tame them. Okay. So, basically my my my book really focuses on how the startup financing system has changed in the past 20 30 years from a system of basically investor control where VC investors had a lot of power and a lot of authority and ability to guide startups as they grew from you know a beginning new company that's just starting off with a new product to the point where they're ready to sell their products to the public and then if the company succeeds to do a public offering become public reporting company where then the SEC rules analysts, journalists and everybody else has an opportunity to see what's going on and to provide some discipline and accountability. and that's now shifted to what I call a system of founder control where founders have the power in many of these large startups to control who sits on the board of directors essentially choosing their bosses and that gives them a lot of freedom. And in this situation, we've seen a lot of bad behavior, illegal conduct, and a lot of harms imposed not just on the startup investors, but also on their employees, on their customers, and broader society.

2:24 Certainly I think Silicon Valley investors would agree with you that founders have a lot of control now. That's sort of I guess they would say sort of a market dynamic that founders have the sort of appealing thing that they want and so they've sort of contorted to give founders the the control. I'd say, you know, correct me if I'm wrong, but like an overarching like argument in the book is like, all right, maybe you could believe that like private markets should be this sort of unregulated chaotic thing and it'll just like sort itself out and people get burned or what, you know, but there's also this element that these are the companies that then decide how society works and sort of extracting them from sort of >> any sort of government oversight is creating problems that all of society has to, >> right? So startups today, we call them unicorns because they used to be very rare multi-billion dollar startups, but now of course they're ubiquitous. And we have 1,500, some people say 1,600 startups that are valued at a billion dollars or more. And that used to be unheard of. And again, that's why they're called unicorns. but they're as big or bigger than many public companies but they're not subject to the same accountability accountability mechanisms that we depend on to ensure that they're working in the interests of the investors but also in the public.

3:39 so a lot of the problems that I that I write about in the book I try to trace the changes in the startup financing model to changes that have occurred in the legal system. So show that changes in the law have really enabled these startups to grow so large, right? And that that that's what's led to the changes in the startup financing system, the changes in startup oversight and governance, and that's what's led to some of the problems that we've seen at companies, of course, FTX, Darren House, We Work, >> right?

4:07 >> You know the drill. >> Part of the problem is just that they were allowed to raise so much capital before they had to disclose anything that might have cued regulators that there was something going on, >> right? They're operating in secrecy. that gives them a chance to grow large to accumulate market power. and then they use the money that they raise from their investors and the popularity of their services to evade the law, skirt the law, or actually change the law in their favor. And so and then again, we don't we the public, the customers don't really know exactly what's going on under the hood because they disclose what they want to disclose about their finances and their operations, but things that they don't want us to know, they're able to keep quiet. What are the key reforms that you're calling for?

4:50 >> So I basically focus on the need for disclosure to and all of my reforms that I recommend in >> the journalists I'm inclined to love love that >> as a business owner I'm like oh it is a lot of work. So >> yeah most journalists are in favor of more disclosure because it helps them to do their jobs. But so that the argument is basically you know when you raise money for investors to make informed decisions they need information. so I argue that the we should ensure that investors have adequate information to make investment decisions whether they're investing in public and private markets. So the private offering exemption that startups are relying on and private funds are relying on when they raise when they're raising money. there's a a rule regulation D rule 506 to just get into >> Yeah, we're going to talk about reg in this episode. you can raise unlimited amounts of money under regulation D without providing any disclosure to investors or the public as long as all of the investors in the transaction are accredited. And that's based on wealth and income standards. So those wealth and income standards were established back in 1982. So it's a million-doll net worth for an individual. You now have to exclude the value of their home or $200,000 of income, $300,000 with their spouse. So, >> so you want to raise accredited investor standard.

6:08 >> Yeah. So, it used to be a very small slice of the investing public that qualified as accredited investors when that standard was first adopted. But because of the influence of the impact of inflation, it now that at that >> it hasn't been adjusted. >> Yeah. It hasn't been adjusted and it sort of encompasses about 28% of American households. >> There's also some threshold for private company size. You want to force sort of public market style disclosures or no?

6:33 >> Yes. So, that's for raising money from investors. That's the regulation D, that says you don't have to provide it any any information if everybody's quote unquote rich enough. but then there was another rule that even if you were able to say raise enough as much money as you wanted in a private market, there was another rule called section 12G of the Exchange Act. Again, to get a little bit technical, and that rule, I call it the 500 shareholder rule in my book because it's less technical. And the 500 shareholder rule used to require any private company with 500 shareholders or more to register with the SEC and then become a public reporting company. And that rule, the 500 shareholder rule, is what reportedly forced Google and Facebook to do their public offerings.

7:16 >> And then companies like Stripe realized, oh, we can just have these SPVS and bundle them all up and claim that we don't have 500, >> right? Well, yes, that's true. But first, Congress changed the 500 shareholder rule in 19 and sorry, in 2012 with the jobs act, the jump jump start our business startups act of 2012. And the 500 shareholder rule was changed to a 2,000 shareholder rule. But at the same time, they excluded employee shareholders from that count. So it was usually employee stock options. And when employees started to exercise their stock options, that pushed these startups up to that 500 shareholder limit. So now we raised it to 2,000 said employee shares don't count and so now startups can delay their IPOs indefinitely. And then you've mentioned another development which is startups are getting so large and they're doing so many financing rounds and then there people who hold the shares who want to resell the shares and so there's a risk of getting pushed up to that 2,000 shareholder threshold. So what startups and investors are doing are creating these special purpose vehicles essentially partnerships. They'll count as one investor, but they'll sell interest in those partnerships to hundreds of investors and say that's not a hundred more investors, it's just one more investor, and it keeps them under that 2,000 shareholder limit.

8:27 >> The accredited investor issue, I guess I, you know, I I I'm not so sympathetic on that one personally. Like one, I mean, we just live in this culture where people can literally buy like gamble on prediction markets. So it's of the range of things that sort of the speculative retail investor wants to blow their money on at least besting betting on startups to me is like pro-social in in some way and sometimes there there is money to be made and as an asset class there's money to be made.

9:00 I I sort of read your argument as you know the logical reason to invest in the private markets is it's like a percentage of your portfolio for it to be the sort of appropriate percentage of your portfolio you need to be pretty rich otherwise you know you're not going to be able to achieve that and therefore we set these gates and I understand that but I don't know isn't it just a reality that retail investors have found lots of ways to do reckless things and like are we still in that world where if you can invest in like options and and does it really make sense to block them from investing in startups?

9:37 >> Yeah. So, I guess I would step back and think about the philosophy that underlies securities regulation because we don't have a system of merit regulation where the government is saying who can raise money from investors who cannot where where capital is going to flow. all controlled by the market and the thought is the idea is that if we provide sufficient disclosure investors will make informed decision. capital will be allocated efficiency efficiently and as more information flows into the market people buying and selling securities will make informed decisions or decisions will be based on information about the company's performance its risks its leadership.

10:13 so our whole economy is basically built around this idea that we put out information individuals and institutions make investment decisions based on that information and that will achieve the efficient allocation of capital. So if we take away information then what do we have? We we have >> but that's not the accredited investor th you're saying the accredited investor threshold is sort of like a pressure v a thing to pressure companies to engage in the disclosure. >> I'm saying something slightly different.

10:41 I'm saying under the current exemptive regime where you can sell securities without registering with the SEC, you can sell securities, an unlimited number of securities to an unlimited number of investors without providing any disclosure as long as they're all accredited. >> So the accredited investor definition is basically substituting the access to information standard which was the basis of the private offering exemption to a wealth standard. And that means that investors are investors are not adequately informed all all of the time when they're making important investment decisions when they're allocating capital on behalf of mutual fund investors on behalf of pension funds or even people just investing individually on their own behalf. They're not necessarily getting good information. So they're not making good investment decisions. And that's bad for the economy and it also in many ways is bad for our society.

11:35 >> Like mutual funds represent all these, you know, unacredited investors. And so even if we set high accredited investor rules, you know, clearly there are lots of reasons to worry about these markets because there are sort of regular people pensions at stake. I mean I think investors like you know like you know the sequoas of the world, professional venture capitalists have just concluded that getting the right founder, getting the right company is like the whole game, right? It's like if you because it is you know a >> work out with FTX >> it works poorly there right obviously Sequoia gets hit and we can talk about some of the examples but I mean you know WhatsApp or certainly Sequoia has had plenty of great great returns and >> did you know is you would want to invest in that fund like they've done they've done very well and so just like there there's there's just this like conclusion from these investors that it is just do the main thing basically that like understanding figuring out you know the right founder right market matters above everything else and that's sort of like this sort of regulatoratory regime being great at like disclosing things carefully doing things sort of the perfect way is just sort of like getting in the way I don't know what would you say to that that argument >> well I would say having the right founder is important and it's also important to provide oversight and to ensure accountability. So you could have the right founder, but if you're not providing guidance and oversight, if you're not exercising your influence and your power to ensure that the company is being well managed, that it's business model, this business plan is appropriate and that money is being spent responsibly and that the environment, the culture within the the company itself is is functional, then it's going to lead to problems down the road. And so that's what I've seen in my research that a lot of these founders where the founders have control and the investors are more hands-off. You see a sort of dysfunctional environment developing at the firm that impacts employees. Like I said, it also impacts customers and there's also just a lot of waste and also also a lot of sort of inappropriate or ineffective business business proposition. And so with Uber, we saw the effort to move into China.

13:52 That was sort of an ill- fated effort there. Travis Kalanak, who was the CEO at the time, the founder disregarded the advice of his investors who didn't really have the power to force him to listen to them. And we saw the same thing with Weiwork as another example. That's where they made a lot of sort of unrelated investments and wave pools. a school for kids. >> We We work FTX definitely crazy. Uber is sort of an interesting middle case where >> you know I don't think I forget I looked it up it was like 7% annual return as a public investment. It's not been a great return as a public company but it certainly >> the whole idea was not like a fraud. You know it is a real functional company at a meaningful valuation.

14:34 >> It's a functional company. It was managed very poorly. They made a lot of bad decisions. They treated their employees very poorly. the way that they treated their customers continues to be an issue even as a public company. so a lot of the problems that we're dealing with today with Uber that Uber's dealing with today with their customers, with regulators, with the courts sort of were those seeds were planted way back as a startup where again the the founder was in control and investors were pushed aside and because there was so much money available, Kell didn't have to listen to his VC investors. He could just say I'm bringing in another investor and I don't have to listen to you anymore.

15:10 >> But I don't know like the NVCA or the National Venture Capital Association. I don't know that they'd sign on to this, right? Or even like some of these benchmark or some of these investors that went to war with Travis Kalanick. I don't know that they would like sign on. >> They would not they would not sign on to >> What do you make of that? >> What do I make of that? >> You're saying they're sort of the ones the injured parties, but then they're saying, "Well, we don't want your sort of medicine."

15:32 >> What do I make of that? I think there are a lot of advantages that they get from the absence of regulation, the absence of strict disclosure requirements, the able the ability for these startups to to act sort of under the radar and outside of sort of compliance with the law. So there are a lot of benefits to that. I think there are a lot of disadvantages that they faced when all of these other sources of financing flooded into the startup financing market and they really have sort of lost a lot of control. But with secondary trading with sec latest late stage investors coming in and taking out a piece of the the early VC's investments it's kind of like a mixed bag. they can get out early at least and recognize a significant return even if the company ends up doing not so well in the public markets >> in some emperor is shown to have no clothes they might have been able to get out before that realization >> right we saw in Uber we saw with we work we we see it with many many many many other early investors are selling to latest stage investors so they're giving up control but they got on got in on a very low price and the company grew it became you know, very popular with investors and so they're they're doing well even again as the company is unable to achieve sort of a a sustainable business model and even even you know Uber today is I mean I think its first year of profitability was just a couple years ago. Why? I mean, this is a big question, but why doesn't the government, especially in democratic administrations, use more of the levers that it already has? And not even to undercut like the arguments here, but just, you know, I covered the Uber saga.

17:09 I literally wrote a story, you know, here are all Uber's legal problems. You know, it's there were so many you know, they had this hack, you know, that they didn't disclose. Obviously they were there were some settlements and but they were also you know >> as the New York Times and others have reported you know using tools to hide from police departments and >> and surveil competitors and it felt there there was a mo and you know I think the department of justice and the FTC were sending interviewing all these people and then really like nothing came of it besides I guess sort of settlements around this hack. What what is your view of why the government hasn't been able to use like tools that it already had to hold companies accountable for rulebreaking?

17:53 >> That's a really good question. I think a lot of it has to do with the popularity of their services. their ability to sort of jin up public support by the platform users e either that you know for Uber, Airbnb the customers or the the people who are selling their services through the platform that that has something to do with it. A lot of that support is overblown and there there's evidence of that in some of the reporting on Uber for example that you know they made up you know public support is sort of >> but is a real politic sort of >> so that's one thing and then the other thing is just there's a lot of resistance you mentioned NVCA they're very powerful influence influential lobby and you know they the mantra is always oh we're we're supporting small businesses and this is you know regulation is bad it's going to hurt small businesses it's going to hurt the economy small businesses you employ so many people and all these things but when I look at the numbers the money that's being raised in private markets almost all of it is going to huge investment funds and huge private companies and you know very small percentage of that is actually going to small businesses so a lot of the arguments don't hold water but politically they're they're popular and they're effective and so that's part of it and then I think there's just some hesitation when Democrats are in power they're not as I guess forceful or as willing to use all levers as that we see the SEC for example doing today >> and it just like ultimately rolls up to the sort of electeds making making calls rather than it being sort of an administration state decision.

19:23 >> I think it's both. I think that you know SEC was at least at when I was at the SEC considered an independent agency with a lot of a lot of a lot of authority to interpret the laws and to adopt rules and change the rules. and certainly politicians on both sides of the aisle had ideas about what we should be doing and what we shouldn't be doing. But ultimately it was the the five commissioners who who made that call. Of course with discipline from the courts. as I think it's another thing that at least when I was at the SEC weighed on us a lot is the courts were in the background and if we took an action that we even if we believe that we had the the statutory authority to do it, if it was going to be challenged, would it survive a judicial challenge?

20:04 And that's that's a concern that we don't really see impacting the SEC today where they're just willing to do what they want to do and not so much worry about >> you get a lot of the advantage pursuing the case sending the message even ahead even if it gets overturned. >> Yeah. So but with rulem they can be challenged judicially and some some of the rules that we adopted or that were adopted while I was at the SEC were overturned judicially. but I know with the the state of the judiciary today, I think the Republican le SEC has less concern about judicial oversight or interference.

20:35 One one thing that shocked me in the book was just that you're you're required to file these form ragdes and that just like attorneys have just realized the SEC doesn't do anything about it. Like literally telling their clients, oh, you don't have to file them. and and you know as a reporter we look for these filings to see if somebody's you know raising money you know not like that's the reason necessarily to like enforce the law but it's just isn't it a terrible situation to have a law on the books that is just not enforced like how how is that happening >> yeah that's a very interesting issue and even I was surprised when I dug dug into it how you know twice the inspector general of the SEC urged the SEC to start enforcing that rule that comp that company startups have to file these formed and the SEC just you know blew that off. so the SEC is not well informed actually about the state of the private markets because in at least 50% at least by by one study at least 50% of VC backed financings are not filing that form D. So a lot of the numbers that are being thrown around even numbers that I cite in my book are understating the size of the of the private markets because we don't have the information that's required on form D. that was one of the things we looked at and it used to be a condition of the exemption. If you didn't file the form D, the transaction was not exempt.

21:57 That meant it violated the securities laws and all purchases could resend. And that was perceived to be too harsh a remedy for an administrative error. So, the SEC changed the rule and said, "Okay, you don't have to blow your whole offering because you forgot to file a form. Maybe that's too harsh." but you still have to file it. But then they didn't do anything when people didn't file it. And that's when lawyers started saying, "Eh, you don't have to file."

22:22 And the SEC hasn't taken action against that. >> With FTX, I mean, you know, it was criminal. >> Mhm. >> Like there's just no visibility into what's going on to flag an investigation while the law breaking is occurring or I know it's obviously an argument for disclosure. It's like, oh, there might have been more warning signs. In the current regime, there's nothing that the government can do when when there is lawb breakaking happening. And >> well, what was going on FTX is the exact opposite of what they said where they said there were firm barriers between FTX and Alama. So all the disclosures they made to investors, all the disclosures they made when they were lobbying the SEC and lobbying Congress said, you know, we have these great mechanisms. It's selfquidation and all of these things. But of course, they made a huge exception for Alama. the only way the public can find out about these things is when insiders spill the beans.

23:12 >> If they were a public company, would FTX have been found out or you think it's the same problem? >> Well, again, the argument is a little bit more complicated, right? So, we had this 500 shareholder rule. So as a company grew and it brought in more money and it brought in more investors and its employees became investors, everybody in the ecosystem understood the investors, their lawyers, their accountants, we're getting close to that limit. We're going to become a public company. So they start putting pressure on the company, on the leaders, on the founders to professionalize the organization as it grew so that it would have the types of internal controls and internal systems that are appropriate for an enterprise of that size. So we're talking about bringing in, for example, experienced executives. So we saw that at Google before it went public. It brought in Eric Schmidt. Facebook brought in Cheryl Sandbook. And then building out, you know, financial reporting, accounting, human resources, bringing in well-known, wellrespected investors. That's all the things that used to do to get ready for the IPO. But now we know the IPO may never happen or it's it's so far down the road. So those arguments about we have to you have to start growing up, you have to start doing things a different way, those don't hold any water anymore. And that's where we sort of get this free-for-all environment where the founder is is in charge and there's very little the investors can do to discipline them.

24:33 >> I see. Because you're saying it the the sort of >> IPO process would have created way more of the sort of like potential internal whistleblowers because you hire some HR per is that >> a little bit more than that. the the >> management structure, the management systems as a very small startup has to be very flexible. But as it grows, as it becomes a multi-billion dollar enterprise, those structures, those systems don't really work anymore. >> And there are a lot more people involved and there's a lot more money involved.

25:02 And so you have to have better systems of control for accounting. So there some of the biggest startups didn't have a C CFO for a number of years. I think Uber is one of those. There are others that I mentioned in the book. and that just wouldn't be tolerated if all the lawyers and the investors and investment banks understood within two three years we're going to be a public company and we have to start to look like one. So this governance structure that's now developed at startups, the one of founder control, the founder friendly model, super voting shares for founders, founders decide everything, founder mode, whatever you want to call it.

25:35 that's now persisting past the IPO. And as these companies go public, they go public with this this dual class structure and more and more power is being concentrated in the controlling shareholders. And we're seeing courts, state courts now being differential to that model as well. >> Do you see some cost with sort of I don't know the sort of organizational bloat? I guess that this I I just feel like there's sort of an attraction here to sort of hiring all these people, you know, just when you're running a company, organizations want to stay as lean as possible. And part of why investors like founder control is, you know, it's sort of like a big swing.

26:18 It's like, yeah, the company sort of lives or dies based on this this person, but it's a lean organization that can do something fundamentally different. And once you create these huge organizations, you tend to hire people who have worked at a lot of different companies, you know, who sort of know the sort of standard practices, which is good for, I guess, following the rules, but often bad for disruption, to use sort of an overused word, right?

26:44 >> Well, these are huge companies. They have they have a huge number of employees, but they don't have the structures in place to manage them. and they're they don't have obstructors in place to ensure compliance with laws whether it's labor laws, employment laws or just the laws that govern their activity. and so I think as you grow you need to develop those structures and with respect to financial reporting it's really important that the investors the managers the directors understand how the company is doing and if you don't have a CFO you don't have control over spending and you don't necessarily have good information about how the company's performing and that's where we see fraudulent financial statements you know being submitted to the directors being submitted to lenders and all this type of fraud. It's it's really hard to prevent corporate fraud when you don't have effective oversight of financial reporting and financial management.

27:34 >> Let's let's talk a little bit about the new regulatory regime because you're you're calling for more regulation in a world where the government wants less. I mean, it seems like the Trump administration, instead of saying, "Let's, you know, raise the private markets closer to the public markets or put more pressure on private companies to go public, let's just lower the public company standards." Yeah. Any What are your reactions to what has been coming out of the Trump administration on regulating the public? So I guess my biggest concern is the pullback on enforcement and deterrence because a lot of the characters that I write in about my book who were prosecuted. So their case was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed fraud and some of them are in jail. Many of them have their sentences commuted or were pardoned by President Trump and then we can't really do constitutionally much about the pardoning, but then the SEC would then drop its charges and drop its cases against those individuals as well. So that's a big concern. you're not going to deter fraud if you can commit fraud, become really rich, and you know, lobby for a pardon.

28:41 >> it's it's really dark. I mean, you know, I know I can sound like somewhat aligned on the Silicon Valley stuff. I do think it's corrosive to our society. You know, I think venture capitalists might correctly in my view have this idea that it's like, all right, some people will defraud us. We think it's small, but like ultimately our returns aren't going to be decided that by that. if they were going to defraud us, it's basically the same as them failing. And so we don't really, you know, tell us, we just sort of like move on. We don't invest in them again. We tell other people not to invest again, but we're gonna have to write it off as a bad company or a fraud. Like I think that's how a lot of at least early stage VCs would talk about, you know, because that's the whole point of stage financing, you know? It's like I have a series A company, we see what happens, we didn't overinvest, then we have series B. So, but my my point and you can disagree with what I just said in a second, but my point is actually to agree with you that there's big societal harm independent of what happens to the investors to just allow a culture where like you can do pretty well by conning investors for a couple rounds even if they have the financial incentive to like move on with their lives and don't want, you know, people like me writing about it. Don't don't want to be on the radar of people like you and would rather just like whatever, write it off, forget about them. I mean, it's not my job as an investor to think about like the societal costs of rewarding people for defrauding me on, you know, what is ultimately not a hugely significant investment for my firm.

30:05 >> Some of them were significant. I my book is focused on the big ones, right? I focus on the big ones to show that the that the that the system's not working as the VCs describe it. So, if you read a book about VCs, the VCs are all hands-on. They're in there. They're providing government. >> We're still stuck on this idea that like Sequoia is not signing on to that. you know, they were the they were a big investor in FDX. They were on the board and they didn't come they didn't experience that fraud and then come to the conclusion that oh, we want the government to regulate more like I I I still struggle to understand if this is meant to sort of protect them, why aren't they a supporter of the idea?

30:44 >> Why aren't they a supporter of the idea? because they believe in deregulation and they believe in government is bad, right? And they have the power to force their beliefs on our system of government. And I think that's what's causing a lot of the problems that that we're seeing developing in the startup market. you know, some VCs of course do lament this. I mean, some of some have gone on the record saying, you know, the founders are too powerful.

31:08 but like I said, if they can get out if they can get in early and get out early, they tend to do do okay. When they get in late and get out on the IPO, they're not necessarily doing so well. And again, sometimes that's more of the non-traditional investors, mutual funds, hedge funds, and and private equity funds, corporate venture capital, but still, everybody would do a lot better if the company grew, succeeded, went public, and didn't develop all of these, dysfunctions that really detract from their ability to develop, like I said, a sustainable business model, a profitable business. I I took us back to sort of the old question, but the the Trump administration policies I what do you make specifically of this idea that company public companies should only have to file every 6 months?

31:54 >> Yeah. So, I mean, all of it is based on this idea of making IPOs great again and it's really based on some of the observations I'd actually made in my book that the number of public companies has dropped significantly since 1996 and the number of IPOs is also down significantly from 1996. But the SEC is saying it's because there's too much regulation. It's because of DoddFrank and too many rules and too many costs and that's why. But actually my book shows and there the charts in the book that show this that this all started in 1996 with the adoption of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, NISMA, which lifted the cap on the number of clients a private investment fund could have. So that includes private equity hedge funds and venture capital funds. So that just blew the top off of how big a private investment fund could could grow. That's when the size of the private investment markets assets under management took off and that's where we see the number of IP the number of public companies start to shrink.

32:48 so that it's the it's the 1996 acts and the and the jobs act that really are the best explanation as to why the number of public companies has gone down and why private private companies are staying private. startups are staying private for much longer than before. So if that's your concern and if you want to address that problem, it would be to look at those reforms and reconsider those and not just lower the standard or lower the bar for what it means to be a public company.

33:15 >> I just want to make I missed this argument. So it's it's that it became much easier to become sort of a private investment firm and a large one and so then a lot of money flew moved into the private markets, >> right? It used to be 100 client limit as a private fund and if you went over that limit you had to become basically a mutual fund and comply with the mutual fund rules. >> So once the SEC not SEC once the Congress changed that rule and said no you can have as many clients as you want as long as they're qualified as long as they meet certain size thresholds wealth thresholds private funds started to grow enormously. So, venture capital funds were relatively small compared to how big they are today. And venture capital funds you know each each each round that they raised for a fund would be again relatively small but now they're many of them are over a billion dollars hundred billion dollars was was the largest I think with the the vision fund. so you had these huge funds making huge investments in huge tanches where there used to be much smaller funds making smaller investments at a time and and the VCs had to you know form syndicates in order to make a really big financing round and so you could only raise large sums of money in public markets because the amount of capital available in public markets was limited because of again that 100 investor rule. So that's when we saw again private investment assets under management and private markets grow from under 2 million before 2000 to more than 25 million last year. I'm sorry 25 trillion, right?

34:50 >> I wrong order of magnitude. Trillion. We're talking trillions. Yeah. >> But the six-month rule you're you're just saying it's misguided in its efforts. Like do you are you >> markets thrive on information? we rely on investors making decisions based on information to allocate capital efficiently and to sort of also provide discipline for corporate managers. So if we're going to reduce the amount of information available, if we're going to reduce the frequency at which those that information is disclosed and if we're going to reduce the reliability of information, that's going to impact the efficiency of markets. It's going to impact investors confidence in markets.

35:30 is most likely going to raise the cost of capital and it's most likely going to increase volatility in the market. So there's really no good reason for doing this. And again, the IP make IPOs great. Again, maybe it's a great slogan, but it's just a sort of a little bit of a deceptive trope, >> right? I just find like writing about public and private companies. I find writing about public companies extremely artificial. They can't talk on the cadence that they actually want to talk on. They can't really talk about the future even if they think the future is sort you know they certainly can't make it's hard to make projections they're limited on how much they can sort of sell the future even if they think that's what's really driving their business they I mean and then there are all these pieces where they're allowed to give all this body language to investors that are private like you know literally Goldman Sachs has a tech conference reporters are invited and they have some of the talks only for investors and some for the media. Like whereas the private markets, you know, people are much looser about saying what they really think the core identity of the company is. You know, there's an honesty about like, oh yeah, I know so and so. You should meet them.

36:47 Like it's much more human. I I don't know. Just like experiencing the private markets and the public markets as like a human being. the private markets feel much more in sync with how humans operate and the public markets feel yeah governed by regulation and artificial. Do do you see that? >> well what I hear you saying is that public company managers or spokespeople their representatives are more disciplined than private company managers and their representatives.

37:21 and so that that has good good and bad qualities. there's a rule regulation FD. So that means that you can't disclose material information to one investor without disclosing it to the public at the same time. And so that has imposed some discipline, but it's also helped to reduce information asymmetries in the market. So it used to be that analysts got information first, they might give that information to their favorite clients and then it gets released and then the public reacts. So they're basically frontr running the market. That was changed by regulation FD. it has imposed a lot of discipline and it probably has imposed a lot more reticence to speak freely about what's going on. but you can make projections, you can talk about the future. but if you make projections and they don't have a strong basis or if you make projections that you know are unrealistic, there's a potential for for fraud liability. I think that in the private markets there's not as much concern about fraud liability because there's a lot of fraud. Very little of it is detected. even less of it is is prosecuted or or the basis of a lawsuit.

38:21 So, you don't have that discipline. And so, there's a lot of misinformation that's being put out to the public and invest and reporters have been complicit, I think, in proliferating that information. I think the best example of that would be Theronos with Elizabeth Holmes where she termed a lot of reporters. They just not, you know, I think they weren't being reporters. They were being spenographers or PR, you know, PR adjacent. so there's a lot of >> obviously one reporter did help bring them down but yeah I mean for >> right right so the an investigative reporter but most of the most of the reporting on on Thoronos was just basically puff pieces and you know we work as I think similar I mean people said Adam Newman was weird but they weren't really going into what's actually going on at the company is it really profitable is it a is it a sustainable business model it's just like it's cool you know it's fun >> well it depends on the stage but there I mean people were like community adjusted Ibido you know among the business press was like a laugh line. I do feel like ahead of the IPO there was definitely an incredility that >> well after they after they filed Sure.

39:22 but before before there were a lot there was a lot of I think concerns that were sort of reported in the press things that were problematic but more more or less even when that information came out basically got a pass. So there was you know conflict of interest transactions that were reported well ahead of the IPO that people didn't really pay attention to until it was sort of in an official SEC document. Yeah, I mean the media obviously relies on what people tell them and then if they're not, you know, and that's why having reliance on, you know, documents you can get sued over rather than just statements.

39:56 >> Exactly. Exactly. If you have to file your financial statements, they're more likely to be true than if you just say, "Hey, we're profitable >> even even when we're not." So, there have been a lot of instances where startup founders will say they're profitable and then they they file and it turns out that they weren't. >> Right. Do you do you see a path to regulated markets? >> so I'm not as hopeful as I was when I started writing this book because, you know, private market regulation was on the SEC agenda when I was at the SEC.

40:24 So, we were looking at regulation D and we were looking at 12G and we were looking at sort of ensuring again that investors have adequate information when they're making decisions and that transactions in private markets were well informed. but there weren't any rules that were proposed or adopted while I was there. and even after I left but now things are going in the opposite direction. But I do hope that you know if we have a change in leadership these proposals are you know they're they're I repackaged them but they're not new. And so if we have a change of leadership at the SEC hopefully that the chair and the with support from Congress will take up some of these reforms.

40:59 >> Do do you think Silicon Valley and the startup ecosystem is a net positive for the American economy? I think it's positives and negatives. So, I mean, most of most of the reporting and most of the most of the excitement is it's it's all very positive and there's a lot there's a there's a lot of positive stories to tell and we have a lot of successful companies and a lot of successful products that have improved our lives.

41:22 So, I don't want to sort of look past that. That's really important. my concern with Silicon Valley is the absence of due diligence, absence of due diligence, absence of effective oversight. looking at the the other way for at misconduct and fraud that impacts employees. people living in Silicon Valley who are trying to make a living and they're putting up with really what I view as intolerable behavior. It's not intolerable. They they tolerate it, but they shouldn't have to tolerate it. it's there a lot of gender and and race in inequality in Silicon Valley. I think that's obviously bad for society.

41:59 and there's I'm concerned about hurt hurting where you know now VCs aren't necessarily focused on innovation. They're just focused on you know catching the next wave. And so for a for AI for example >> you agree with that right now. Yeah. Investor% investors think there's a lot of group think at the moment. >> Yeah. 50% of the money that went into startups last year went to AI companies and most of it went just to just a few companies. So there's all those other entrepreneurs who are coming up with good ideas, who have good business plans that are sustainable. and they can't raise money because it's all going into AI. So it's it's kind of distorting the the process for innovation and entrepreneurship as well. There >> investors would say there's a lot of capital chasing chasing ideas. I mean, is that I know obviously there are people who want to start companies that can't get funded, but there there is a lot of money to >> there's a lot of money out there.

42:52 should 50% of it be going into AI related companies? Should you be able to be easier to raise raise money if you just say you're working on AI than if you have another another business idea? I mean hopefully, you know, the the market would be funding lots of good ideas from all types of founders from all types of backgrounds. but that's not what we're seeing happening. we're seeing it very skewed to a certain type of a founder who's it's more easier for them to raise money and I would I would guess it's easier for them to get away with misconduct as well.

43:21 >> One piece that you mentioned that I'm super sympathetic on is the sort of employee protections. I feel like employees at startups often surprise me. They I mean they go to companies that don't tell them you know what percentage of the shares they have. They often chase companies with high valuations as if that's a sign that the company's going to do well rather than behaving like an investor hoping to get >> upside. >> yeah, I don't know. I guess my attitude is like why I mean these are fairly you know wealthy white collar employees that are not always but you know have have many options. So some some of my reaction is just I guess the VC capitalists which is just like you know why aren't why aren't they more savvy? I mean you you know think about it from a regulator's lens like I mean I guess first part is how much onus do you put on them and sort of their strategic decision making about why don't they just hold the line on what they need in a comp package and then after you engage with that piece of it sort of regulatory proposals for what to do to protect them >> right so there's a SEC rule rule 701 that basically says you can issue securities to your employees without providing them disclosure so again how are they going to make good decisions if they don't have the information on which to base their decision. So, they're basing it on vibes, on publicity, on, you know, what they hear about the company. And if a company is raising a lot of money and looks successful, that sounds good. Even though, like you said, it might be better to go to a smaller company that hasn't reached that high valuation yet. But they don't have any they don't have adequate information.

44:57 And even where the rule requires that companies provide them certain information, not sufficient, but more information, companies are reluctant to do so. So, they're holding that information back. And there have been a couple of enforcement actions, but there's also just like a lot of literature and sort of, you know, industry talk saying like, how can we avoid giving this information? So, you can tell, right? They don't want to give this information to their employees because they want to keep it confidential because they benefit from the confidentiality. They benefit from not having to disclose their earnings or their losses or their burn rate or problems that are occurring to the the company risk, legal risk. They benefit from keeping that to themselves. And if they disclose it to their employees and then that information gets up, they're they're going to lose that advantage. So they they figure well better to breach the law or you know comp not not fully comply with the law than risk our all of our confidential information being being disclosed. So I don't really blame the employees for not understanding.

45:46 It's very complicated. Even if you work for a public company you get options and there's lots of disclosure. It's still a complicated a lot of complicated decisions that have to be made. and people might be really smart. They might be great engineers or software designers or you know whatever whatever they do but they don't necessarily have that financial expertise. >> So what what do you want the the SEC and the government to do? >> Well again the principle is disclosure.

46:08 So if you're going to be issuing securities to your employees they should be provided with disclosure the kind of disclosure they need to decide do they want to accept the job do they want to continue to work at this company you know where a big portion of their compensation is in the form of stock. so there's just some basic information that I think employees need. Not just the number of shares, but the percentage of their ownership. sort of where they stand in the quote unquote stack, where they're at the bottom, right? So, of course, they know they're at their bottom, but like what protections do the people at the top have that are such that they might prevent them from actually ever realizing, you know, like the expected return on on their investment. And then information about who who's running the company, who the controlling shareholders are, risks, things like that. employees should have that information. They should have it when they make their investment decision and they should have it, you know, as the company goes forward so that they can decide, do I want to stay at this company? Do I want to leave? Sometimes if they decide to leave, they're leaving options on the table. They have to decide, do they want to exercise those options? They have to maybe raise cash to do that. How can they make that decision when they all they know is what they're reading in the newspaper or what's available, I guess, on Pitchbook or venues like that, which again is just self-reported and it's not reliable information. I go around in circles about what to do about startup valuations. You know, I think early on when I was covering Silicon Valley, I did a story at Bloomberg that was like, you know, the fuzzy math of startup valuations. You know, the investors, as you well understand, have all these preferences. And so, just because it has some headline number, you know, it's worth it at a lower, you know, it doesn't mean the common stock is worth that price. On the other hand, it's sort of like the best signal we have. you know companies do end up getting acquired above those preferred valuations. I I don't know what the alternative is. I don't do you have any view on I don't know what whether how much to heed these like unicorn valuations and is there any sort of like government I mean there's like 409 there you could have independent ones but they don't have to disclose them right now. I I don't know what's the solution or do we need one to the sort of madeup?

48:12 >> Yeah. So, when the unicorn term sort of came into common parliament, this was back in 2013 when there were very very rare like I said only 43 or so. but then that became a term of art if you want to call it that. It became a goal that startups wanted to reach. and so everybody wanted a billion dollar valuation and you can there ways to get to that billion dollar valuation even if your investors don't really value the company that high by giving certain downside protections. And so I think that's led to a lot of inflated valuations especially around that $1 billion threshold. but a study says that startup valuations are overstated by as much as 50%. And that's probably true because they're based on the last round of financing. And as you mentioned, the preferred stockholders in the last round have superior rights even to prior rounds of of of of preferred stockholders. And so everybody knows those aren't real valuations. But we need a convention. So everybody uses it.

49:09 And I guess I'm I'm guilty of that as well because I'll be like this is a hundred billion dollar company. because you know, Pitchbook or or Prequent or somebody else has said that. What quality financials do they need to have? I guess to satisfy what you want, right? I think a challenge here is, you know, I run a very small business, so I'm not going to claim to understand what it's like to be a series C company, but >> realistically for my business, you know, I could spend, you know, we have a good accountant now, like we know the numbers, but still like I could spend time chasing a huge sponsor that I know will 50%, you know, move my business, or I could like spend time on like the financials, which might give me a little bit more strategic precision, but it's not sort of worth the time spent there.

49:52 There is a real trade-off between investment in sort of really digging into the financials versus just operating the business. And I think talking to startup founders that remains true as these companies fail that it it does take real effort to maintain sort of SEC quality financials. And so do you want and at what threshold do you want private companies to have the same quality financials that a public company would have? That's a really good question. so the SEC rules, you know, for for private offerings, if they include unacredited investors, which most of them don't, require GAP GAP compliant financials. And if audited GAAP compliance financials are available, they should be provided to investors as well. And that that to me makes sense. And for these multi-billion dollar companies, they can certainly afford to have a CFO or a controller or chief accounting officer who focuses other on financials. and then the other executives can focus on building the business. they can certainly afford that and they can afford to have a quality auditor, not a fly by night auditor, but a high quality auditor audit audit those financial statements.

51:00 And most of the investor engravments require them to do that. But what we've seen over and over again is that you know the founders get the money and they the CFO leaves or they never hire a CFO. And the investors, you know, just a few examples, these are obviously anecdotes are like, "Hey, you need to hire a CFO." And they don't want a CFO. they either they don't want one or they don't want to take the time to hire them and then they're misspending they're misspending their money and their their financials aren't aren't accurate and investors end up losing out. So certainly a company that's a billion dollar company or that's raising hundreds of million dollars from investors the investors should insist we're giving you 20 million hundred million dollars. Some of that money can be used to build out the financial reporting structure and know the C CEO and CFO don't have to be there spending all their days working on it but they need to stay informed and how can they make good decisions about where to grow the business, where to direct the business if they don't have those financial reports. They can't. That's what basically we learned from Enron and Worldcom and that's why we have the Sarbain Oxley Act to ensure better internal controls, better, you know, top level oversight and board oversight over the financial reporting process. But that doesn't apply to these startups even if they're bigger. Many of them are bigger than most public companies.

52:12 >> I wanted to quickly talk about crypto I guess before we wrap up. I mean there's definitely you know view in Silicon Valley. I mean the Andre and Horowitz you know heavily invested in crypto so very self-interested but I think they believe that you know it's multi- agency but the the government was under the Biden administration just unwilling to really say it's legal or it's illegal and therefore it advantaged companies that were willing to sort of behave more cavalerely and if you were waiting for clear SEC DC guidance, you you know, you were you were sort of in trouble because it was often not clear what was allowed and what wasn't in a sort of Biden era >> crypto. I don't I don't agree with that at all. I think the SEC was very clear that most of these or many of these crypto assets are securities and that if you're a platform and you're listing these for sale then you are a securities exchange and you need to register and if you're raising money by issuing crypto assets in many instances you are issuing securities and those need to be registered. that was a very clear message. I don't know that it was clear that the SEC was going to take action, right, to enforce that.

53:32 >> When Coinbase went public, were they treating Bitcoin as a security? >> So, when when when when Coinbase went public? I think it was a I think it was a direct listing. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. >> It was a direct listing. and then, you know, Bitcoin wasn't we weren't treating Bitcoin as a security, but a lot of the other crypto assets were being treated as a security. and to the extent that they were listing those, if the SEC challenged it, they would just take them off.

54:01 >> You know, they would just say, "Oh, we're not going to sell that one anymore." But that didn't change whether it was a crypto stock exchange or not. >> Right. We were clear, but we didn't enforce it. >> Right. So, I think they were clear about what the position was. There was there were enforcement actions. There was an enforcement action against Ripple or I guess yeah, against Ripple which was ultimately for the most part successful. So, it wasn't like the SEC was sitting on its hands. But sure, there was a lot of talk and less action. that changed with FTX and the SEC filed a lot of lawsuits against these companies that they had been talking with about the need to register and by and large were successful in almost all of them. So, in almost all of them, preliminary motions, motions to dismiss or summary judgement, the SEC succeeded in, you know, to the extent that it was arguing that certain of these crypto assets were securities, the courts agreed with them. so there was not a lack of clarity. It was just a lack of willingness to comply with the law. and now, you know, they bought an election and they're changing the law.

55:01 >> Yeah. I mean, which which is dark though. I think there you've also accepted a reality that there is some level of if the government doesn't enforce it sufficiently, is it sort of a morally binding law? >> I think it's a little bit problematic to say this is a problem. you need to stop doing it and being ambivalent, right, about whether you're going to bring bring an enforcement action. The SEC brought a lot of enforcement action. So, I don't want to criticize the SEC for not bringing enough enforcement actions, but again, they weren't necessarily always following up on those statements with an action. And so, that did leave a little bit of wiggle room and allowed allowed the market to grow. And once it grows to a certain extent, it's re once it gets so big, it's really hard to get your arms around it and to get it back under control. And I think I think it was a problem that was confronting the SEC even while I was there because the market kept growing. but you know, I think when when FTX imploded and we had the crypto winter, it did give an opportunity to step in and there was political support behind it. And so I think that's probably why we saw a more aggressive enforcement approach after that. I hate to talk about it as like Democrats, but this has become so partisan. But yeah, do you think, you know, if Democrats ever regain, you know, executive power when they do, there's going to be more like courage and ferocity here? I mean, and there's such table stakes. You know, we've we're, you know, arguing about a set of things where maybe I don't agree with every proposal you have, but there's also just like Trump coins and like rampant corruption that's been happening that really needs to be rooted out sort of ferociously.

56:37 >> Do you see sort of you know the generation of regulators who' be tasked with doing that prepared to act with the sort of >> seriousness that this predict the future? I think, you know, the crypto money was spread around. I mean, FTX is a good example. Sam Beckman Freed made sure to spread the money around. I think that currently they're either spreading the money around or targeting people that they think aren't going to be supportive. So, even if you're not giving somebody money, if you're sort of holding this sword over their heads that if they don't get in line or if they speak out against crypto, they're going to sort of support your opponent. it's having a big impact on Congress. and so there are a lot of Democrats that are on board with crypto. even though there are lots of problems, including the corruption problem, >> accept that like crypto will exist in some form while not allowing it to be a sort of a source of actual like corruption. And >> >> or you think there's no sort of wrangling the sort of crypto?

57:39 >> I think the crypto issuers, the crypto platforms don't want to comply with the securities laws. I think it's going to be really hard to get to a point to say at this in the future that they have to comply. I think that they're big, they have a lot of power, they have a lot of money. and again, even with the FTX implosion with with the implosion of all the crypto platforms, the freezing of all these assets, they were able to regain political power and just go backbusters on what they were doing before. So, you know, it's hard to predict the future. So if there's a there's a if there's a big wave election, if there's a big change in the Democratic party where this sort of a sclerotic leadership sort of hands over the reigns, who knows anything could happen, but I don't know if that I'm not really going to predict that. No, no, no. I'm not betting on anything.

58:28 >> All right, Renee Jones, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. >> Thanks for having me. It's been a great conversation. >> Enjoyed it. Check out Untamed Unicorns. Thanks so much. >> Thank you. >> That's our episode. This is the Newcomer Podcast. Thanks for listening. Please like, comment, subscribe. Go find us on our Substack at newcomer.co. If you're hungry for more podcasting, I also have a talk show called the Cerebral Valley Show. we love your comments. Thanks for all your support and see you next week.

Summary

Renee Jones discusses the evolving landscape of startup governance and the implications of founder control in her book "Untamed Unicorns." She argues for increased regulation and disclosure in private markets to protect investors and employees, highlighting how the current system allows for significant misconduct without accountability.

- Startups have shifted from investor control to founder control, leading to increased risks of misconduct.
- The lack of regulatory oversight in private markets allows companies to operate without adequate disclosure, harming investors and employees.
- Current accredited investor standards are outdated and fail to ensure informed investment decisions.
- The 500 shareholder rule has been altered to allow startups to delay going public, reducing accountability.
- Many startups lack proper financial oversight, leading to mismanagement and potential fraud.
- The SEC has been criticized for its inconsistent enforcement of regulations, particularly in the crypto space.
- Jones advocates for reforms that would require startups to provide more comprehensive disclosures to investors and employees.
- The concentration of venture capital in a few sectors, like AI, risks stifling innovation in other areas.

Questions Answered

Why should startups be tamed?

The speaker argues that the startup financing system has shifted over the past few decades, leading to a lack of investor control and oversight. This has resulted in founders having too much power without sufficient accountability, which can lead to mismanagement and failures.

What role does oversight play in startup success?

While having the right founder is critical, it is equally important to provide oversight to ensure accountability and proper management. Without guidance, even strong founders can lead their companies into trouble.

What happens when startups grow without proper structures?

As startups grow, they need to professionalize their operations and implement appropriate internal controls. The lack of these systems can lead to chaos and mismanagement, especially when the company is preparing for an IPO.

How do IPOs influence company governance?

The IPO process traditionally encourages companies to implement better governance and internal controls. However, with fewer companies going public, the lack of these structures can lead to inefficiencies and increased market volatility.

What challenges exist in valuing startups?

Startup valuations can be misleading due to the influence of investor preferences and the lack of reliable information. The term 'unicorn' has become a goal for startups, leading to inflated valuations that may not reflect true market value.

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