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How AI Is Reshaping China's Industrial Policy | Odd Lots

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# 0:00

China's Economic Priorities Under Xi Jinping

What are Xi Jinping's economic priorities?

Xi Jinping prioritizes high-tech self-reliance over traditional economic growth metrics like GDP. The focus is on developing key industries of the future rather than stimulating immediate consumer demand.

  • Xi Jinping's economic strategy emphasizes high-tech self-reliance.
  • Immediate consumer demand stimulation is seen as secondary.
  • The goal is to win in future industries and build a robust industrial system.
# 9:53

Xiaomi's Evolution and Competitive Edge

How has Xiaomi positioned itself in the market?

Xiaomi has evolved from a smartphone manufacturer to a significant player in the EV market by leveraging existing supply chains and expertise in battery and chip production.

  • Xiaomi's transition into electric vehicles showcases its adaptability.
  • The company benefits from established supply chains in China.
  • Xiaomi's success contrasts with Apple's struggles to diversify.
# 19:46

Collaboration in AI Hardware Development

How are Chinese companies collaborating on AI hardware?

Chinese firms like Deep Sea and Huawei are closely collaborating to enhance AI chip capabilities, focusing on both inference and training for large models.

  • Deep Sea and Huawei have a tight partnership for AI hardware development.
  • There is a focus on improving chip capabilities for AI applications.
  • Chinese companies are working to build sufficient compute capacity for advanced AI models.
# 29:40

China's Push for Chip Independence

What is Beijing's stance on AI companies using foreign chips?

Beijing encourages AI companies to partner with domestic chip makers to foster independence in supply chains, despite companies' preference for familiar foreign technology.

  • Beijing prioritizes self-reliance in chip production over immediate performance.
  • There is tension between AI companies and government directives on chip sourcing.
  • Domestic chip makers are experiencing increased demand due to government policies.
# 39:33

Challenges in China's Chip Manufacturing

What are the major barriers to China's chip manufacturing capabilities?

The primary challenges include bottlenecks in lithography technology and the uncertainty surrounding China's ability to develop advanced manufacturing processes.

  • Lithography technology is a critical bottleneck for China's chip industry.
  • China is exploring alternative techniques to improve chip production.
  • The chip manufacturing landscape is complex and fraught with challenges.

Transcript

0:00 I'll throw out a controversial take. Which is XI Jinping does not really care that much about the economy or about consumers or about households in the sense that, you know, in the traditional sense that we might think about in the US or in the West. I think up until now you have all these calls for, an adjustment, you know, imbalances. You know, why isn't China boosting consumption? Why aren't they offering, if not, handouts to consumers, some kind of stimulus measures to stimulate demand. Right.

0:32 There's a big demand slump, especially after that real estate collapse, which was, deliberate, sort of popping of a bubble and a pivot towards, toward something else. And the answer to all that is, if you start to, you know, if you start with the premise that the goal is not GDP growth, in and of itself, the goal is high tech self-reliance of sort of like winning the industries of the future. If you start with that premise, everything starts to make a lot more sense.

1:00 So those who have been wondering like, well, you know, is the stimulus coming, are they going to finally bail out, you know, whoever it is that needs to be bailed out in order to, get demand going? That I think is ultimately seen as secondary downstream to this high tech push. And the idea is there's this very clunky term, that has become sort of like the, the buzz word, which is the, new, new quality, productive forces. If you have these particular high tech industries, growth sectors, industries of the future, if you can start to win in those areas and also have the supply chains, sort of the complete industrial system, which is like a term in Chinese, that's very common.

1:40 To, to back all that up, then everything else will kind of follow. You will end up having the kind of robust, economic growth. You will have jobs, you will have high tech jobs. Right? You know, in the shift away from sort of blue collar factory jobs, you might have purple collar jobs, jobs that require, a more advanced degree and have more technical know how, maybe, maintaining and repairing robots, for example, rather than actually sort of making widgets on the factory floor.

2:16 Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Weisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. Tracy we’re recording this on November 11th, 2026. Earlier we recorded an episode about the whole Nvidia mega speed stuff and trying to wrap our hands a little bit, around the, I guess, ecosystem of data centers that served Chinese, companies, many of them based in Southeast Asia specifically.

2:46 But like, you know, as we sort of we talked about it a little bit in the conversation that we did is like, there is also this question of like, okay, for now, Chinese AI company is like, they want to get access to Nvidia GPUs one way or another. Is that always going to be the case or eventually will China. You know we're seeing a little bit of you know China has the way in the end like eventually could it just be that this, this race to get American GPUs is not as intense?

3:15 It used to be. Yeah. I think when you look at China's technological development, I mean, the long arc of history has kind of pointed towards vertical integration and self-reliance. Self-Reliance sounds like a Communist Party's slogan for technological self-reliance. Yeah. But I think it's true. Right. And the thing with AI that we keep hearing out of China is this idea of diffusion. Yeah. Right. And so it's really interesting to see some companies that you wouldn't necessarily expect.

3:44 They're not just like, yeah, developing their own models, but like they're also developing their own components for their component. Totally. Yeah. And this is so you know. Yeah. Because we were in, Hong Kong earlier this year, I remember we did that episode with this year of Baidu. Yeah. And you know, I know that like Baidu like, has their own LLM, it’s called Ernie. You don't hear about it very much, -I didn't know it was called Ernie.

4:10 Yeah. But like, you don't hear about it that much. It's not one of the ones that gets like that much attention. But like here is a classic example of like, you know, they have a chip component or they have a chip design business, they have a data center business, they have the search engine business, they have the lead model, they have self-driving cars that sort of, full stack integration, so to speak. You know, when you said, like the arc of history, the the, the thing that I think of as like if there is something that gets built, if it is a built product, there's a good chance that in the future it will be built in China. Yeah.

4:45 You know what I'm saying? Like, this is anything that is physical, there's a good chance that either currently or at least on the trajectory the world is going in right now, it will have been built in China. But that also reminds me. So one of the main tensions when it comes to China manufacturing or technology production is like, okay, yeah, they build things really efficiently and cheaply and maybe better than a lot of other people do, but often they don't make that much money by doing so.

5:13 Right. Because you have the classic overcapacity problem where like the Chinese government will say, we want you all to go develop your own chips, and then suddenly there's like a billion chip developers or EV manufacturers or whatever. And then also, it seems like Chinese investors, I don't know if they've just gotten comfortable with like, yeah, I know, I've read so many Galaxy Brain takes about why like or I don't know if their galaxy brain takes but takes about how, you know, all these companies are doing so well.

5:42 But the stock's never going to. Yeah. As I get off it maybe I'll just give up trying to understand that question. Can I say one more thing about China's manufacturing prowess. So, you know, I bought these headphones you need to do your China mixing disclaimer. No, no, no, no, this is not your I went to China once and now I'm totally China tech. I, I was going to say the opposite, which is I bought these headphones.

6:06 They broke recently. They seem to be as good as beats. Like they're like, oh, these are as good as beats that they're cost me like. And whatever. The equivalent of $25 they broke. That's interesting. I know I have a bunch of random China made tech and it's doing pretty. I, I showed you that massage, that back massager with a little hands, that thing. I use it like every night before I go to bed and it's great.

6:29 Oh I have an I miss on the wait. I'm going to say another thing to actually did your eye massage massager. No, that still works. But you know, I but I'm a pair of Li-Ning running shoes. Oh, yeah, they sort of squeak. Oh, no, you said this before. Yeah. So it's like I don't know. I'm like, it's like, man, I don't know. I'm saying maybe, like, maybe, you know, maybe I should still just stick to some of these. American.

6:52 All right. Let's don't. You've turned this into a product review episode, which we didn't mean to do. Let's get to the perfect let's talk to. We really do have the perfect guys sort of tell you some pretty high stakes questions, actually, about future Chinese manufacturing chips. All of that. Someone whose work we've admired for a long time and have wanted to have on the podcast for a long time, and now it's timely. We're going to be speaking with Kyle Chan.

7:13 He's a fellow at Brookings. He also has a newsletter called High Capacity talks about all these things. So Kyle, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. Great to be on. Just for those who don't know, we followed your work for a while. Tell us a little bit about the type of work that you do. Why are we talking to you today? Good question. So I focus on Chinese technology and industrial policy, and I think, I started doing this before it was cool.

7:42 I would want to say, but now it is very much in vogue. Yeah. And the question here is not just sort of like looking at individual technologies. I think we're all familiar with the rise of Chinese EVs or Chinese air models that look almost as good as some of the American ones. But there's a bigger story underlying all this, which is sort of this nexus of the firms that are, you know, pioneering a lot of this technology.

8:08 The government that is trying to, promote this, the local governments and the central government and the industrial policy, activist like strategy to to make a dent in some of these areas, and then to tie it all together. That's, that's sort of like the the big picture question that I have, which is, you know, don't just see these as individual sectors and individual companies, but how do they actually have all these spillovers. Are those spillovers deliberate? How do the EV companies feed into the robotics industry or into the semiconductor industry and vice versa?

8:43 So on this nexus point, in some of your writings, you have these epic Venn diagrams. I don't know, do they even qualify as Venn diagrams when you have 30 circles overlapping each other? But the point is that you have all these different industries or tech businesses in China that on the surface, seem to be doing specific things. So, you know, maybe one of them is doing autonomous vehicles, another one is doing EVs, another one is doing robots, semiconductors.

9:14 But when you start to look at the relationships between them, you can see that they're actually overlapping. And I guess they're drawing on expertise in one area to develop other types of technology, walk us through that particular ecosystem as your very complicated Venn diagrams as you see it. Yeah, yeah. So for those who are not looking at this, very messy, complex diagram, it has a bunch of these circles, right? The typical Venn diagram might have two.

9:42 This has like more than a dozen. And there are different technologies like electric vehicles, batteries, robotics, smartphones, consumer electronics, AI, blah, blah, blah. And they all overlap. So the point here is that there are companies there, literally specific firms that sit at the intersection of these different sort of circles. There is bid, for example, who I think we mostly know as an EV company. But, you know, they sort of got started as a battery maker, actually, and that's partly why they became such a powerful EV company.

10:14 And they also make their own chips. They're getting into autonomous driving. So they're sort of one part of it. Also robotics as well show me as the smartphone company, I think to a lot of people, who are familiar with them, you know, known for cheap smartphones and cheap consumer electronics, household appliances, stuff like that. Air purifiers. I used to have a Show Me air purifier. That was it was okay. It might have squeak too. But then they jumped into electric vehicles.

10:41 And, you know, some people are like, wow. You know, later in the founder of Shell me is such a visionary. He took this big bet. But also he was drawing on, kind of supply chain. Foundation and a sort of pool of expertise and resources that already existed in China. Partly due to these other sectors that have, you know, flourished for for a while now from an American perspective, think about big global industrial competition, the Xiaomi story I find to be a little bit, black pilling from the American perspective, because when it when the story came out, that was when, you know, when we first heard about this company of Xiaomi, the iPhone was like in ascendance.

11:22 But in the 20 tens, at one point, Apple was looking for the next thing and like, oh, maybe we'll make cars. And then they didn't. And that fizzled. And then Xiaomi not only makes cars, but makes very seemingly makes very good cars. And so you think like Apple, you know, Apple could not go from phones to cars, but Xiaomi can apparently all these other things now just real quickly like I'm looking at your Venn diagram and American companies are kind of getting into like, they're not that different right now.

11:54 I mean, we know like, you know, Amazon they're they have their own chips that they designed. Trainium. Microsoft designs chips. OpenAI wants to design chips. I think anthropic wants to design chips, etc.. Alphabet obviously has the self-driving cars, etc.. How much of this would you confidently say this is a Chinese tech thing versus a in 2026? All big tech companies are kind of going to have to compete at every level or want to compete at every level.

12:27 It's a bit of both for sure, because, as you point out, we see some of this happening in the US tech sector. You just have like Google going into autonomous driving robotics, making their own TPUs. Yeah. You know, doing this full stack approach. And some people compare them to like Alibaba, which, you know, you can kind of almost like, level by level, match up each layer of the stack. What I think is different in the Chinese case are two things.

12:51 One is just the number of companies that are doing this right. It's not just like, a small handful that are, doing this full stack approach. It seems like even food delivery companies, are jumping into making their own foundation AI models. And you have, smartphone companies, Xiaomi making their own, chips and foundation models as well. So that's one thing that's different. The other thing that's really different is that, these are kind of like more full stack in terms of the actual manufacturing of the hardware itself.

13:25 Right? So ultimately when, you know, meta makes their VR goggles, I think a lot of that is, outsourced. The actual manufacturing is outsourced. Yeah. Including partly to, to China. So, whereas some of these other companies in China. Right. They're they're controlling the factories they're building, even further, further down to the components. So I think that's another, yeah, difference. What would you argue are the driving forces for Chinese companies doing this? Is that just a sort of, I guess, natural progression?

13:59 This reminds me very much of the Ricardo Houseman monkeys. Yeah, yeah, from trees thing where you have, like, one industry and then it leads to the next industry and it sort of builds on itself. But then in China, you also have to your professional expertise, a lot of industrial policy where, you know, the ruling authorities will come out and they'll say, hey, we don't want so many like digital internet companies or such an emphasis on them.

14:25 We want everyone to move into making like actual hardware. And you got very strong signals from the Chinese government about what matters to them at any given point in time. Yeah. The way I break it down is kind of demand versus supply side factors. By supply side, I mean like the resources, the supply chains and the talent that exists to be able to jump into one of these sectors, especially if you are already in an adjacent sector.

14:51 So that's your, houseman, monkeys jumping, across different trees. I think that's a really apt, analogy for what we see with Chinese tech companies themselves. They are jumping from tree to tree, not making a huge leap into quantum or something like that, but into kind of adjacent, overlapping industries. And then on the demand side, right, there are reasons to want to move away from a low margin industry like EVs and try to tap into maybe the next big thing, maybe robotics or some other faster growing market.

15:28 And then, of course, you know, as you're pointing out, there is the government itself, right? Like I have a line where it's like for a lot of things in China, including in China tech, it's the government. Stupid, right? That is such a crucial factor in all of this. And to ignore that would be to kind of miss, you know, the bigger political economy, which is really crucial in China. And so here you have signals from the government, both positive and negative.

15:50 And I think, the positive signals include identifying priority areas that, companies that local governments that ministries and agencies should focus on. Right. We there's a five year plan that comes out, and it literally lists out, what some of these priority areas are, whether they're chips, AI, robotics, also sort of industries of the future, quantum fusion, biotech, brain computer interface, whatever Elon is up to, it's it's probably on that list.

16:23 So you have sort of those positive signals and that, that tells the firms, if you go in this direction, that will unlock a whole bunch of, resources for you, whether it is local government support or whether it is special state backed investment funds targeting those sectors. So you kind of want to swim with the current rather than against. And there's also negative signals too. Right. So a negative signal is, a crackdown on the hedge fund industry in China.

16:50 And in some ways this is a bit of a tenuous link, but some people will hypothesize that one reason why Deep seek even started to go into the whole AI space was partly because they felt pressure, being a traditional, a financial institution. So you get you get a lot of that kind of crossover for, for various different reasons. And I'm just looking at your Venn diagram. ByteDance. So they do they have a smartphone they were working with, actually ZTE on this, a genetic smartphone.

17:19 It had a little bit of controversy, though, because, it was supposed to be able to operate apps on your phone as, like, a normal person would. But then and this is like a classic Chinese story, they got blocked by a lot of the major Chinese platforms because they wanted their own control, and they wanted to get agents to kind of take care of like Tencent. This is going to be a big deal with all genetic stuff, which is no one wants it.

17:42 I mean, we've already there's already a knife fight happening with Agenda Commerce, where no one wants to just be a passive door. For some, this is like the walled garden stuff all over again. There's going to be a lot of that. Okay, so I'm looking at your, mega Venn diagram. And in the middle is like the one, like the, the beating heart of and that is in almost everyone in is, Wawa. And obviously it's very it's important it's interesting that they're in basically everything that you have listed here.

18:12 But it's particularly crucial when we're talking about AI. We know that one of the ingredients is chips. And we wouldn't even be talking about a company called Mega Speed getting Nvidia chips. We wouldn't be talking about chips smuggling. We wouldn't be talking about export controls or any of this. If if Wawa had enough capacity to make good enough chips to, compete with Nvidia, what do you give us? Like right now your read on where Wawa is today, both in terms of their capabilities and their capacity to produce them and their scale.

18:44 Up until now, the main problem was getting Huawei's AI chips, the ascend series, to be reliable enough and functional enough to be used by Chinese AI companies who had grown up building on Nvidia and the Nvidia Cuda. You could. It gives you ecosystem. So, there was a long process where you you did not have that entire sort of library of software, that have been optimized for Cuda. You didn't have that equivalent for Huawei's sort of ecosystem, and they had been trying to build us up, but they had this sort of chicken and egg problem, which is that they didn't have the user base to contribute and build that up.

19:24 And because they didn't have the libraries, they didn't they could attract the user base. So they had this chicken and egg problem. But now, in part, you know, thanks to the export controls on, and, and restricted access to Nvidia GPUs, there's been a push, especially from Beijing, to close the loop on this relationship and get the Chinese AI companies to work with the AI chip makers, especially Huawei, to sort of almost co-design, future hardware.

19:55 And in particular, you have a really tight, partnership between Deep Deepsea and Huawei, where they literally have personnel, situated at each other's companies. They have, a lot of intensive, sort of technical, back and forth trying to figure out how to have these chips run, at least for inference, for, for deep models. And you see, actually now increasingly other Chinese companies announcing that their latest models like, ZTE AI's latest models are, you know, on day one, ready for up running on Huawei chips as well as other domestic, AI chips in China.

20:34 And then more recently, we have this push for the training side. Right. So up until now, the Huawei chips were good enough for inference. But were not quite good enough for training, especially for these really massive, two, 3 trillion parameter models. And while we have been trying to, improve not just the, their capabilities at the single chip level, but try to leverage their expertise as a network networking technology company, to bundle more of these chips together, to tightly connect them together and to kind of make up for what they lacked in quality with quantity.

21:19 So these chips were less efficient. They were less powerful on an individual basis. But you could bundle them together and you could start to build up these sort of super pods. And the goal there was to build up enough sort of compute capacity that was concentrated that you could run a large pre-training run, successfully. And so that's the tipping point. I think we're starting to see with the Chinese AI models. And, there's rumors that the next deep sea model, for example, will be fully pre-trained on Huawei chips.

21:54 Okay. So that's sort of like on the capability side. But then there's a production capacity side. Yeah. Which is another story altogether because because, basically it even if you're trying to do this sort of quality for quantity trade off, you do need enough quantity. You do need enough volume of chips in order to satisfy all that demand. And at this point Huawei is constrained. So Huawei works a lot with Smic. Smic is sort of like the premier, foundry in China for, for chipmaking.

22:25 They are kind of like the analog of TSMC. And they are limited by their equipment, by the lithography machines that they have and by their own supply chains. So Huawei has been working closely with them, but they have limited capacity, and a lot of their capacity is actually allocated towards, Huawei. Huawei itself has been leading its own efforts to build kind of a separate network of fabs. Also trying to supply, its own sort of chip needs.

22:54 And that is still sort of ramping up as well. And so the big question is how quickly can you get that production scale up over time? And how limited is that by not just the number of fabs you have, but the equipment that goes into them? By for example, lithography machines, especially, do you the immersion machines that largely at this point still come from ASML and the Netherlands. So and then there's also the HBM bottleneck as well.

23:21 So, you have Chinese companies like Smt, trying to move from Dram into HBM and while they still lag behind, you know, the, the big three, Hynek, Samsung, micron, they're, they're trying to in the next, 2 to 3 years trying to get to at least good enough, HBM to then supply to kind of pair up with, with Huawei chips. But at this point, there even been reporting that Huawei is having to customers like we can make the, the we can make the the NPA's the neural processing units.

23:58 But it's sort of byo h bring your own HBM. You can have to source that from elsewhere. So that's another bottleneck in the near-term. Yeah. So that's sort of where we stand in terms of, the shifting capabilities, but then also the bottlenecks on the production side. This is sort of a tangential question, but on the other hand, I think it's actually a very fundamental question when you look at the export controls around chips, the US export controls, there was an argument when these first started being applied that this was going to I think people called it the sort of like three body effect that it was going to have, the effect of speeding up China's own technological development and like lending even more of a sense of urgency to develop their own chip competitors.

24:43 When you look at what's happening with Huawei chips now, does it feel like that's happened that China has like had its kind of Sputnik moment? I guess I think that the US expert roles had a massively galvanizing effect on China's push for semiconductor self-reliance. People who argue against that point to the fact that China has had a longer effort predating U.S. export controls, to try to develop their own sort of national chip industry. You have, National semiconductor plants, you know, going back into the 20 tens.

25:16 But what's really different here is sort of this full stack effort to build not just the chips, but the equipment, the materials, the photoresists, the etching deposition equipment, to build up the entire supply chain. China is almost trying to replicate the entire global semiconductor supply chain in China, which I don't think any country has ever done before. And some indicators of like how big a switch this has been is, lithography. Lithography was one area that China had really deprioritized for a long time.

25:47 They had not really invested in building up that capability. I think largely because they expected to be able to have access to lithography machines, going, you know, for the foreseeable future. And when that switch happened, when, for example, during the first Trump administration, you got the the effective ban on EUV lithography machines from ASML to China. That was a huge wake up call because that basically capped the ability of Chinese, chip chipmakers to make chips of a certain process node of a certain kind of scale, and, degree performance.

26:23 That was it was a huge moment. It basically kind of limited China's chip ambitions as long as they were reliant on the rest of the world. And so from then on, you see this long term effort. And building lithography machines in particular, requires a very long term, sustained effort. But you have this long term and especially pioneered by Huawei, who, you know, not ironically, was the main target of a lot of these export controls from the U.S to, figure this whole thing out by hook or by crook, by trying to recruit engineers from all around the world, including from ASML, by investing in, the R&D in a couple of different sites.

27:01 There's, one rumored site in Shenzhen where there is supposedly a UV lithography machine prototype in the works. So all these efforts are a sign that China is kind of like switched from. Yeah, we should probably make our own chips to we must at all cost. And it's priority number one on the five year plans. It occurs to me with I, you know, you could imagine a lot of industries in which, you know, what you're like, set your sights on being able to match global, you know, global scale.

27:35 And eventually you just grind and grind and you get there. And China has obviously done that in, several areas and beyond. Just getting to the frontier, racing past the frontier batteries is one of the obvious categories that just comes to mind, just far ahead of the frontier when it comes to AI models themselves. You know, I understand this impulse. It's like, okay, like use I use the Huawei chips and let's work together and build up this ecosystem.

28:03 But at the same time, like that could potentially until falling a little bit behind the frontier. And this is a brutal fight for the frontier that is literally measured in months in many cases. And we talk about, you know, the next best models being six months behind or three months behind or whatever it is, is the retention with AI specifically where the Chinese model and here I'm not talking about AI, but the Chinese model of like, let's work on our self-reliance.

28:35 Let's build this network does have the risk of like, yeah, but what if we do that and now we're nine months behind? Or what if we do that now we're 12 months behind and these sacrifices of not just trying to get the Nvidia chips by hook or by crook are not worth making, even if it's good on a national basis. The trade offs here are really sharp, and they're trade offs all over the Chinese industrial policy landscape.

29:01 It's like one of the big themes that I focus on. And in this specific case, you have this trade off between today. Can you close the gap with the US AI frontier? Can you narrow that gap, or are you focus on tomorrow being able to build a fully self-reliant semiconductor supply chain that may not be completely, you know, on par with what TSMC and Nvidia can produce, but is good enough and will basically allow China to continue to make AI progress regardless of what Washington decides.

29:32 And I think here what's interesting is the tension between the firms and the government in China. And even across industry in China, there's different views, right? So there are the Chinese AI companies, like Deep Sik or ZTE or Alibaba, who, they want to build better battery models. They would probably prefer to just keep building on Nvidia chips if they could. They are very familiar with that. It doesn't require much extra work.

30:02 So they're sort of optimized on running on that platform. But Beijing doesn't like that. And for the Chinese central government, the goal is not just to have really incredible models today. The goal is to build up that kind of independence and sovereignty, essentially, in supply chains in the long run. So you see this tension where you have the Chinese companies clamoring to get the two hundreds that Trump allowed to be exported to China. They seem very eager there.

30:32 You know, they were putting in their orders. They were trying to negotiate how much they could get. And you have Beijing itself saying, hold on, hold on. Like, we don't want so many of these Nvidia GPUs. We want to focus. We want you guys to focus on partnering with domestic chip makers in China to close that loop and to help them make their their chips better. And of course, there's disagreement within the industry in China because that AI companies want to run faster on the models.

30:58 But of course, all the chip makers, you know, they love the export controls and they love Beijing's push for self-reliance because they have seen an astronomical surge in demand for their chips that didn't exist before. Can you talk a little bit more about, I guess, I guess, the long game here, or what Beijing would regard as a success, because it's very easy to imagine a scenario where China becomes very good at a bunch of new technologies, partly by integrating a lot of its existing firms or doing the sort of vertical integration that we've been discussing.

31:32 But margins, you know, remain pretty thin. Maybe households don't feel particularly wealthier than they did in the past, which is something we've been talking about on the show as well. Like, would that count as a success, for Beijing, if all those products were, I guess, integral to global supply chains, I'll throw out a controversial take, which is XI Jinping does not really care that much about the economy or about consumers or about households in the sense that, you know, in the traditional sense that we might think about in the US or in the West.

32:12 I think up until now, you have all these calls for, an adjustment, you know, imbalances, you know, why isn't China boosting consumption? Why aren't they offering, if not, handouts to consumers, some kind of stimulus measures to stimulate demand. Right. There's a big demand slump, especially after that real estate collapse, which was, deliberate, sort of popping of a bubble and a pivot towards, toward something else. And the answer to all that is, if you start to you know, if you start with a premise that the goal is not GDP growth, in and of itself, the goal is high tech self-reliance of sort of like winning the industries of the future.

32:52 If you start with that premise, everything starts to make a lot more sense. So those who have been wondering like, well, you know, is the stimulus coming, are they going to finally bail out you know, whoever it is that needs to be bailed out in order to, get demand going? That I think is ultimately seen as secondary downstream to this high tech push. And the idea is there's a very clunky term, that has become sort of like the buzzword, which is that, new, new quality, productive forces.

33:20 If you have these particular high tech industries, growth sectors, industries of the future, if you can start to win in those areas and also have the supply chains, sort of the complete industrial system, which is like a term in Chinese that's very common. To, to back all that up, then everything else will kind of follow. You will end up having the kind of robust, economic growth. You will have jobs, you will have high tech jobs. Right?

33:47 You know, and this shift away from sort of blue collar factory jobs, you might have purple collar jobs, jobs that require, a more advanced degree and have more technical know how, maybe, maintaining and repairing robots, for example, rather than actually sort of making widgets on the factory floor. So, you know, to take a step back, basically, I see that there is this sort of all in push to try to become, if not the dominant, a dominant global player in, a number of these key industries and everything else is sort of like, you know, if that works, that's great.

34:25 But that's not really the the main goal right now. I'm curious about, your read on whether XI Jinping is well, I built to put it about and actually there's two different dimensions when I ask that question of what that could mean, one of them, but let's take a sort of straightforward, quotidian one. So we did a few episodes a couple of years ago about, and I know there's been progress since then about, biotech and China and how that's growing and expanding, but there is a view in Silicon Valley that there won't be a biotech industry, that there will be an AI industry, and that the AI will find all the biotech.

35:07 And that actually there might it may even be stupid to try to like, invest in what we call biotech per se today, that you should really just be building more advanced AI models, because those models are going to be what finds all the molecules of the future, etc. and I'm sort of curious the degree to which either XI or people in China have this view. It's like, forget biotech, forget all this other stuff, forget quantum, just build a great AI model.

35:36 And then the AI model will solve these other things in science. Yeah, that's interesting because at first I was going to say XI Jinping is for sure AI pilled. That is a really key priority. And maybe at the top of the list of sort of these more general purpose technologies that they think are going to sort of fuel their their growth and development going forward. But the way that you phrase it was really interesting because I don't think that, he or the powers that be in Beijing see this as the be all, end all the last technology.

36:08 That's right. That's right. I think they want to integrate this into everything else. They want it to turbocharge, drug discovery and health care innovation and manufacturing. And they want to infuse sort of like the physical world with physical AI and have robotics and, autonomous, you know, delivery systems everywhere. But whether that will just completely eclipse the traditional, you know, it's funny to have this term like the traditional high tech I know, I know, it's of the future.

36:37 Like, but yeah, basically I don't see that happening. And in fact, when you see the kinds of, policy documents, the blueprints, the plans going, going ahead, these different technology sectors are still laid out as like, critical, you know, you know, so-called future pillar industries. Basically, biotech is an interesting example here because like, I think it tells you something about how China actually approaches a lot of these technological development projects because like the big biotech, the original big biotech push, that was mostly from an agrarian perspective, right?

37:12 That was like, we're going to develop new technologies in order to boost food production. Oh yeah. Yeah. Right. And then it morphed into like bio medical. Yeah, yeah, like actual pharmaceuticals. And so you can envision now that like they're probably they probably don't think that models are going to, you know, solve the entire this is the biomedical thing. But like there absolutely will be an adaptation of like biopharma with AI. I'm sure Dario thinks the models will just come.

37:39 Oh yeah. Yeah, yeah. Well I mean we've had interesting examples. So Satriani, who we had on the show, has been working with one of the models to develop a, and an anti-venom for Scorpion bite. Oh. Which apparently didn't really exist before. This was like, for all different types. And they're showing some progress on. Yeah, I think it's going into some sort of clinical trial. So, you know, it's an interesting one for sure. Let's go back to chips for a second.

38:06 You know, I sort of at this point still have this view that eventually, like the trajectory of the world is that if something is built, it will be built in China. Now that may change. And there's a lot of efforts to, like, fight against this, I don't know, extra beer or whatever it is, but that is the, the, the trend. I'm curious. Like in five years, if if Huawei is not at the frontier of chip production and scale, etc., why not?

38:35 What would what would be a reason to think that maybe they you're not going to be able to do in chips what they've been able to do in many other industries. It depends on what you mean by sort of like not succeeding, because on the one hand there is like not catching up to the frontier and sort of keeping pace. And in that way I kind of compare the whole chip industry, to like, trying to catch a bullet train, because you like trying to run as fast as possible and accelerate as possible, but you're the, the, the goal that you're trying to catch or the frontier you're trying to catch up to is itself accelerating.

39:13 Yeah. So, you know, while Huawei's improving and while some of the other Chinese chipmakers are also sort of improving and, they're, they're trying to catch companies like TSMC, which is just investing like an incredible amount. And they're already at the frontier and they're operating with the best technology, the best equipment in the world from Japan and the Netherlands and, Germany and the US. And so when you put that all together, it's that's a formidable sort of there's not like a finish line that you reach and you'll say, like, I got to the global frontier.

39:43 That finish line is also running away from you. But, if you're asking about, you know, will they be able to have sort of like, good enough chips that have decent enough supply where, Chinese AI can sort of continue roughly at the pace that it's going at now. You know, what were the what would be the major barriers to that? Probably then it would be, bottlenecks in the equipment, in particular lithography. And so there is a huge sort of, range of uncertainty around how effectively China can develop its own lithography, especially to do the immersion and the potentially EUV, or whether China might be able to bypass some of that technology.

40:29 Right. There's been some, you know, hype around Huawei's efforts to do the sort of logic folding where they're arguing, you know, some people just say it's fancy chip packaging, but, you know, they're trying to rather than just drive down the process node, further and further as if you had an EV machine. They're trying to basically, double back and sort of repack. You use better packaging so that you can build connections sort of within the chip itself.

40:56 And that's supposed to be another workaround. There's other sort of techniques like multi patterning where you kind of like re redo the design multiple times. But that can get messier in terms of lowering your yield rate and causing more errors along the way. So there's sort of like workarounds. But ultimately I think the the key bottleneck is the lithography machines and whether China can can get there and then those. Right. This is the thing that's like so wonderful.

41:24 And also so frustrating about the chip business, which is you can pick any one of these, parts of the, of the chip stack, like lithography and in and of itself has supply chains numbering in the hundreds, if not thousands. And so, you know, for every essential, heavy machine, there's going to be a Trump lasers company, no relation to, the president. There's going to be, special, lenses made by Zeiss, that are the best in the world. And, you know, there's always the stats about how they're so perfectly level.

41:58 But every single one of those in and of itself is another choke point. Essentially, in the whole sort of, complicated global chip supply chain. Last question here for you before we let you go, what's your answer for why stock investors never seem to make any money and John, and actually we haven't talked about much on the part. I mean, it's been a very bad year for China. Yeah, it really has it's actually been a pretty brutal year.

42:21 Surprise, surprise. You know, stock investors, they're like, no, this is the year. It's finally what is your what's your answer that you would give for why. Like all the progress etc., stock investors never seem to make any money. A big part of it is it's hard to make profits in, in in China, it's hard to have a sustained competitive moat. There are some exceptions to that. So, you know, one company that I always find interesting is DJI.

42:49 Yeah. Why aren't there, like, a bazillion Chinese drone companies? How did that market get so concentrated? You know, you have like, sia, smrt, as I mentioned earlier, with, with, with memory, and it has carved out a special space within that, that sector. But in general, we do have an answer for DJI. That's a good I hadn't thought about that, but do you have an answer for why DJI is singular within the drone space like where they are?

43:12 I actually don't know. It could just be, a quirk of timing and we may actually start to see the flight coming. Right? So, there seem to be new players emerging, but at least at this point, it's sort of, you know, it's an in its own category. But more broadly, you do have this phenomenon where it's hard to have as a sustainable moat, you have other companies jumping into the mix that also have access to, frankly, some of the best engineers, including your own engineers, who can who can jump ship, they have access to financing from local governments.

43:43 So the barrier to entry for a lot of these, industries is actually relatively low. And so they end up getting kind of flooded with, you know, overcapacity, redundancy, but then also building these overall very, very globally competitive industries that once China starts to export to the rest of the world, well, good luck to the rest of the world. So I think that's that's part of the reason why why we see this effect if you don't have long term profits.

44:07 So don't expect that to really be sustainable. It's hard to justify, you know, rising or high valuations. All right, Kyle Chan, great chatting with you. Great to finally have you on the podcast. Let's stay in touch. Absolutely. Thanks you guys. You know Tracy, the Chinese stock market selloff is so bad that once again, and I think this is not the case, but once again, the Moutai company is the number one. The most, the biggest member of the CSI, 300 index.

44:40 That's everyone's drinking because, you know, like, you know, number two is Catl. So that's, that's the, the battery company. Yeah. And then there's some other, but we're back to the world where the, the baijiu company. No, I mean, it is amazing if you look at, like, a long term chart of the Shanghai Composite since 2000, don't make any money. It's like it's pretty much almost a horizontal line. Yeah. I mean, there are some pretty big ups and downs, but, like, the overall direction of travel is always sideways.

45:13 Sideways? Yeah. And every once in a while, like, there's a hype cycle. But I thought that was really interesting. This idea that like air strikes me as, a real tricky thing for the Chinese model of development because intuitively it's like, yes, I suspect that like on enough time. Absolutely. You would, you know, it seems that we would get as good as Nvidia and eventually you have the skill to produce as much as TMZ on the long enough timeline.

45:46 But in the meantime, the pace of improvement in the model layer is so fast that can you afford to like, how long can you afford to go with the homegrown technology if it's not good enough? And that's a very interesting question to me. The other thing, we didn't even really get into sort of self recursive improvement for model development, but that also seems like Cliff isn't the right word. But like if the Western models get there before China.

46:18 Yeah. Like can't afford. Yeah. Like if if there's a thing and we don't even know if it's a thing. Yeah. But if it's a thing then it's like that really I think puts a limit on the degree to which any model maker can really. It's like we're going to go with the indigenous technology. Yes, it'll slow us down, but it's good for the nation. If there is this day in which you can get to like RSI and then it's off to the races, if that's real.

46:41 But the counterpoint to all of that is basically like, well, what are these AI models for? Right? Like the AI is supposed to help us like run our businesses more efficiently, produce things more efficiently, maybe make some technological breakthroughs here and there. And so, yeah, the focus on actual diffusion throughout the economy makes a lot of sense from that perspective. Whereas in like in the US, it very much feels like AI is the sort of like be the model itself is the be all and end all of development.

47:14 I was talking to some folks the other day, in finance, and they're saying that look like there is a point where AI is good enough for us, as in, there is a point where we cannot absorb more intelligence per se. And at that, and once you hit that point where you could like, you could make the models ten times smarter, we can't use this. Yeah. And then what are you doing it for? And then the list of things that can actually absorb that intelligence.

47:40 If you're a widget manufacturer, you're not going to be like solving Navier-Stokes or something like that. You just want to like automate a few things. Right? And this is if you were to make the bull case for the commodification of intelligence, it would be some version of most economically productive things in the economy. Do can only absorb so much intelligence, unquote, and that the American closed source labs will not like yes, they might have big margins on the very frontier, but that's not the market is smaller, the market is smaller than the rest of it gets really commodified.

48:21 And there's no money. That's a very plausible way that I don't know that that's going to be. It's just plausible. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me @tracyalloway. -And I'm Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me @thestalwart. Follow our guest Kyle Chan. He's @kyleichan. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez @carmenarmen Dashiell Bennett @dashbot. Cale Brooks @calebrooks and Kevin Lozano @kevlloydlozano.

48:49 And of course, you can chat about all of these topics 24/7 in our discord, discord.gg/oddlots. And for more content, you can check out our daily newsletter. Please subscribe! That's over at bloomberg.com/oddlots. And if you enjoyed this conversation, if you like it when we talk about complicated Venn diagrams, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And if you're watching on video then please like or leave a comment. Or better yet, subscribe. And remember, if you're a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.

49:21 Just go to the Bloomberg Channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for joining.

Summary

The discussion centers on China's technological ambitions, particularly under Xi Jinping's leadership, emphasizing a shift from traditional economic growth to high-tech self-reliance. The conversation highlights the importance of vertical integration in industries like AI and semiconductors, and the challenges faced by Chinese companies in achieving technological parity with Western counterparts.

- Xi Jinping prioritizes high-tech self-reliance over traditional economic growth, viewing GDP growth as secondary.
- China's push for self-reliance in technology is seen as a response to U.S. export controls, particularly in semiconductors and AI.
- Companies like Huawei and Baidu are developing their own chips and AI models, aiming for vertical integration across various tech sectors.
- The Chinese government signals priority areas for investment, influencing companies to focus on specific technologies like AI, robotics, and biotech.
- There is a tension between the immediate needs of tech companies for advanced components and the government's long-term self-reliance goals.
- The discussion highlights the challenges of overcapacity in the Chinese tech market, leading to thin profit margins for many firms.
- The need for advanced lithography technology is a significant bottleneck in China's semiconductor ambitions.
- The conversation suggests that while China aims to catch up technologically, the rapid pace of innovation in the West poses ongoing challenges.

Questions Answered

What are Xi Jinping's economic priorities?

Xi Jinping prioritizes high-tech self-reliance over traditional economic growth metrics like GDP. The focus is on developing key industries of the future rather than stimulating immediate consumer demand.

How has Xiaomi positioned itself in the market?

Xiaomi has evolved from a smartphone manufacturer to a significant player in the EV market by leveraging existing supply chains and expertise in battery and chip production.

How are Chinese companies collaborating on AI hardware?

Chinese firms like Deep Sea and Huawei are closely collaborating to enhance AI chip capabilities, focusing on both inference and training for large models.

What is Beijing's stance on AI companies using foreign chips?

Beijing encourages AI companies to partner with domestic chip makers to foster independence in supply chains, despite companies' preference for familiar foreign technology.

What are the major barriers to China's chip manufacturing capabilities?

The primary challenges include bottlenecks in lithography technology and the uncertainty surrounding China's ability to develop advanced manufacturing processes.

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